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The Relationship between Cognitive and Neural Bases of Metamemory Judgments 
by 
Alexandra M. Gaynor 
 
Advisor: Dr. Elizabeth F. Chua 
Metamemory monitoring, the process of making subjective assessments of the status of one’s 
own memory, is crucial to guiding behavior and effective learning.  Past cognitive research has shown 
that subjective confidence judgments are inferential in nature, and based on cues available at the time of 
the judgment.  When confidence is based on cues that are related to objective memory performance, 
metamemory accuracy is high.  However, past studies have shown that metamemory monitoring tends to 
be inaccurate because individuals base their confidence on information that is not predictive of memory 
success, such as the fluency with which items were encoded during study, or invalid information about 
task difficulty from external sources.  Brain research has lagged behind cognitive research in establishing 
the neural bases of metamemory monitoring, but there is evidence that the prefrontal cortex contributes to 
Judgments of Learning (JOLs), subjective confidence judgments made during encoding about the ability 
to retrieve information at later test.  Retrospective Confidence Judgments (RCJs), which are made at 
retrieval and reflect one’s confidence in his or her response, have been associated with activity in the 
prefrontal, parietal, and temporal lobes.  However, there is evidence that the roles of each of these 
regions in metamemory monitoring may vary with the information on which confidence is based 
(e.g.,fluency of encoding or information about task difficulty), and here we present two experiments which 
tested how the neural mechanisms underlying JOLs and RCJs interact with the cognitive bases of the 
judgments.  Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to directly 
manipulate activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) 
during a JOL task in which subjects studied words that varied in their fluency at encoding.  Results 
showed that DLPFC stimulation impaired encoding for both fluent and disfluent conditions, and aPFC 
stimulation enhanced JOL accuracy for disfluent encoding conditions.  Conversely, DLPFC and aPFC 
stimulation decreased JOL accuracy for fluently encoded conditions, suggesting the causal roles of the 
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aPFC and DLPFC in JOL accuracy vary depending on whether JOLs are based on the cue of fluency or 
disfluency.  
Experiment 2 (Chapter 3) used fMRI to explore the neural correlates of RCJs and how 
confidence-related  activity varies when RCJs are based on internal memory cues as compared to 
external cues about question difficulty during a semantic recognition task.  Results showed that as 
compared to recognition, the process of making RCJs engaged regions consistent with those identified 
using episodic memory tasks.  As compared to cued trials, uncued trials produced activity in lateral and 
medial parietal, and inferior temporal regions, which may reflect self-referential processing or uncertainty.  
Activity in the parietal lobe was greater for invalid than valid cues during hard questions, while occipital 
and subcortical regions showed greater activity during valid than invalid cueing for easy questions, 
suggesting confidence-related activity varies with both cue validity and actual question difficulty. Lastly, 
activity in bilateral medial temporal lobes covaried with the degree to which subjects incorporated invalid 
cues into their confidence judgments for correctly answered hard questions, which we speculate may 
reflect integration of multiple sources of information during RCJs.  Taken together, these experiments 
suggest that the roles of brain regions involved in metamemory processes differ based on the information 
on which individuals base their confidence assessments.  This work provides novel contributions to our 
understanding of the functional organization of the prefrontal cortex, as well as how multiple regions 
within the prefrontal, parietal, and temporal cortices contribute to recognition confidence based on 
external sources of information.  Furthermore, our results inform the understanding of structure-function 
relationships in metamemory, which is critical to developing appropriate interventions to treat clinical 
populations with metacognitive deficits, and suggest non-invasive brain stimulation may be an effective 
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Unawareness of memory failures has been demonstrated not only in healthy individuals but also 
in populations with Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia, depression, and various learning disorders 
(Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005; Souchay, Isingrini, Pillon, & Gil, 2003).  This unawareness can be viewed as a 
difficulty with metamemory, which has been broadly defined as knowledge about one’s own memory 
(Nelson & Narens, 1990). Metamemory is thought to guide subsequent behaviors, and may be especially 
useful for those experiencing difficulties in memory because accurate metamemory allows for using 
compensation strategies and seeking professional help that may result in earlier diagnosis and greater 
rehabilitation (Metcalfe, 2002; Souchay et al., 2003).  However, more basic research is needed to 
understand the cognitive and neural bases of metamemory processes in healthy individuals, before we 
begin to understand how metamemory is affected in memory disorders.  
One common cognitive framework of metamemory posits that cognitive processes are divided 
between an object level, which corresponds to memory processes, and a meta level, which corresponds 
to metamemory (Nelson & Narens, 1990). These levels are interrelated and information is exchanged 
through monitoring and control processes.  Object-level information, such as the content of the memory, 
is monitored for accuracy and relevance based on the current goals, and the results of that monitoring 
inform the meta level, which contains a mental simulation of the object level.  The object level can then, in 
turn, be controlled through behavior (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982).  The monitoring stage of this 
process involves subjectively assessing one’s own memory abilities and the content of the object level 
(Nelson & Narens, 1990).  On the other hand, metacognitive control involves the decisions and behaviors 
that are based on the meta-level representations that arise from the results of monitoring.  For example, 
when a student is studying for a test, he or she must make a subjective judgment about how well he or 
she knows the information she is studying (i.e., a monitoring process), and then determine based on that 
judgment whether, and how much, more study is needed in order to recall the information at test (i.e., a 
control process).  Metamemory monitoring judgments have been found to guide study time (Metcalfe, 
2002; Nelson, Dunlosky, Graf, & Narens, 1994; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede, 1999) and also to 
influence error correction, in that feedback on inaccurate monitoring judgments results in those 
Gaynor 2 
inaccurately judged items being more likely to be corrected (Butterfield & Mangels, 2003).  Thus, the 
ability to produce accurate metamemory judgments during monitoring is crucial to implementing effective 
behavioral control.  Identifying the mechanisms underlying accurate metamemory monitoring is crucial to 
understanding how monitoring influences learning and memory in both healthy individuals and those with 
deficits. 
Metamemory monitoring occurs at multiple time points along the learning and memory timescale, 
and further work is needed to understand monitoring processes that occur prior to retrieval (i.e., 
prospective monitoring) and after retrieval (i.e., retrospective monitoring) (Nelson & Narens, 1990).  
Prospective monitoring, which occurs prior to retrieval, reflects an individual’s confidence in his/her later 
ability to successfully retrieve studied items. One of the most commonly studied prospective monitoring 
tasks is the Judgment of Learning (JOL), a judgment made after study about one’s ability to later 
remember a currently retrievable item (Nelson & Narens, 1990).  Retrospective monitoring tasks require 
subjects to monitor their memory after retrieval; the most common of such tasks is the Retrospective 
Confidence Judgment (RCJ), in which individuals judge their confidence in the accuracy of a previously 
retrieved response (Nelson & Narens, 1990).  The experiments that will comprise this dissertation focus 
on the cognitive and neural bases of JOLs made during an associative encoding task (Experiment 1), and 
RCJs made during a semantic retrieval task (Experiment 2), in order to elucidate the mechanisms 
underlying metamemory judgments made at different points during the learning process.  Although there 
is substantial behavioral research suggesting both these types of judgments may be inferential in nature 
and based on cues available at encoding or retrieval (Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000; Jia et al., 
2016; Koriat, 1997; Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005; Koriat, Nussinson, Bless, & Shaked, 2008; Yue, Castel, & 
Bjork, 2012) there is significantly less research examining the neural mechanisms associated with 
metamemory processes (Chua, Schacter, Rand-Giovannetti, & Sperling, 2006; Chua, Schacter, & 
Sperling, 2009a, 2009b; Do Lam et al., 2012; Henson, Rugg, Shallice, & Dolan, 2000; Kao, Davis, & 
Gabrieli, 2005; Ryals, Rogers, Gross, Polnaszek, & Voss, 2016; Yokoyama et al., 2010).  Moreover, there 
is a gap in knowledge about how the contributions of brain regions shown to be involved in metamemory 
monitoring may differ when subjective confidence is based on different cues at the time of the judgment.  
Given that accurate metamemory monitoring is crucial to effective learning and behavioral control 
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(Metcalfe, 2002; Nelson et al., 1994; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede, 1999; Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault, 
2003), understanding the neural underpinnings of metamemory monitoring is an important topic of further 
investigation.  The current studies aim to determine how regions of the brain known to be involved in 
metamemory processes may interact with the cognitive bases of JOLs and RCJs to contribute to 
metamemory monitoring processes in healthy adults. 
 
The Cognitive Basis of Metamemory 
Early theories regarding the cognitive basis of metamemory proposed that individuals have 
privileged access to their own memory traces, and that metamemory judgments are made based on the 
strength of this memory trace (Hart, 1965).  However, a significant body of experimental research has 
demonstrated that some manipulations alter metamemory ratings but not memory accuracy, and vice 
versa, posing a challenge for the hypothesis that subjective judgments are based on direct access to 
memory strength (Daniels, Toth, & Hertzog, 2009; Dunlosky & Nelson, 1994; Rabinowitz, Ackerman, 
Craik, & Hinchley, 1982; Shaughnessy, 1981).  Instead, it has been widely accepted that metamemory 
judgments are inferential in nature and based on information available at the time of the judgment, which 
may include the strength of the memory trace, but may also include cues such as the fluency with which 
the stimulus is processed, or the conditions of learning (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989; 
Koriat, 1997).  Because JOLs and RCJs are made at different points throughout the learning process, 
different information is available for individuals to use as the basis of their metamemory judgments.  For 
instance, JOLs, which are made during encoding, can be based on cues related to ease of encoding or 
familiarity of the stimulus, whereas RCJs are likely based on cues related to retrieval processes, such as 
speed of retrieval or amount of information retrieved.  When individuals base their inferential judgments 
on cues that influence memory performance, their judgments are likely to be accurate (i.e., the 
metamemory judgment and the memory judgment are congruent, such as a high confidence correct 
response). However, there are many cues available that appear to influence JOLs and RCJs, but not 
actual memory success, such as fluency of encoding (Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 2003; Jia 
et al., 2016), and invalid information from external sources (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002; Jaeger, 
Lauris, Selmeczy, & Dobbins, 2012).  When individuals base their inferential judgments on such cues that 
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are not indicative of memory success, these judgments are inaccurate (i.e., the metamemory judgment 
and the memory judgment are incongruent, such as a high confidence incorrect response).  Thus, in 
order to understand what drives metamemory accuracy, it is important to understand what cues 
individuals use to make JOLs and RCJs and how these cues relate to memory accuracy.  
 
Judgments of Learning 
JOLs, prospective judgments made at study about the ability to remember given items at a later 
test, are one of the most commonly studied types of metamemory monitoring (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; 
Koriat, 1997; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Nelson & Narens, 1990), and the level of JOL rating given is 
often predictive of strategic control of memory processes, suggesting individuals use JOLs to guide their 
learning (Metcalfe, 2002; Nelson et al., 1994; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede, 1999). JOL accuracy, which 
is a measure of how well the judgment at study predicts actual subsequent performance at test, has been 
correlated with better memory performance (Nelson et al., 1994; Thiede et al., 2003), such that 
individuals with better metamemory also tend to have better memory.  However, individuals with intact 
memory often demonstrate inaccurate JOLs (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992), suggesting memory and 
metamemory processes are dissociable, and further research is necessary to investigate the mechanisms 
underlying accurate metamemory. 
In an experimental setting, trial-by-trial JOLs are typically assessed by having participants study 
stimuli, most often words, but sometimes visuospatial or facial stimuli (Nelson, Narens, & Dunlosky, 2004; 
Sommer, Heinz, Leuthold, Matt, & Schweinberger, 1995; Watier & Collin, 2011), and then generate a JOL 
by rating their confidence in their ability to remember a given item at later test.  Alternatively, subjects 
may be asked to give global JOLs, during which they estimate how many items total they think they will 
remember at test.  Trial-by-trial JOLs are often given on a scale of 0-100% confidence (Kelemen, 2000; 
Scheck, Meeter, & Nelson, 2004) or a Likert-type point scale (King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 1980), 
but subjects may also be prompted to rank items by how well they think they will remember them 
(Leonesio & Nelson, 1990).  JOLs can be given immediately following the presentation of each item, 
known as immediate JOLs, or following a given amount of time, usually lasting the duration of the 
remainder of the study set, referred to as delayed JOLs.  After each item has been studied an given a 
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JOL, a memory test is given to test either recognition or recall of studied information, which enables 
analyses of metamemory accuracy (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; Nelson & Narens, 1990). 
One early hypothesis regarding the cognitive basis of JOLs is that JOL ratings are based directly 
on encoding strength (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969; Daniels et al., 2009; King et al., 1980). This hypothesis 
echoes more general ‘direct access’ or ‘trace access’ theories of metamemory monitoring, which suggest 
that metamemory judgments are based on the strength of traces of the actual memory being judged 
(Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969; Hart, 1965, 1967a, 1967b; Sikström & Jönsson, 2005). Indeed, there is 
evidence that stronger memories may lead to higher and more accurate JOLs.  Daniels et al. (2009) had 
younger and older adults make immediate JOLs during study, and then rate the quality of their memory 
for each item using Recollect, Familiar, or No Memory judgments at test. They found that items 
recollected at test were correlated with higher JOL ratings at study as compared to familiar or not 
remembered items (Daniels et al., 2009). Such evidence of a positive correlation between memory 
performance and level of metacognitive confidence is consistent with the hypothesis that JOL ratings may 
be partially based on direct access to the strength of the memory being judged, or based on factors that 
influence subsequent memory accuracy, such as the amount of detail included when generating a mental 
image at study. 
Despite the above evidence that subjective confidence may be somewhat based on memory 
strength, one important limitation of direct-access theories lies in the idea that if JOLs or other 
metamemory judgments are in fact based directly on memory abilities, experimental manipulations that 
affect JOLs should affect memory performance in similar ways, and vice versa. While this tends to be the 
case, both processes are not always sensitive to the same manipulations (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1994; 
Rabinowitz et al., 1982; Shaughnessy, 1981; Skavhaug, Wilding, & Donaldson, 2010). For instance, 
Shaughnessy (1981) conducted an experiment in which subjects studied paired-word associates using 
either interactive imagery or rote rehearsal strategies, and made an immediate JOL following each pair. 
Participants underestimated memory abilities using imagery as compared to rote rehearsal: memory 
performance was greater for pairs encoded using imagery, but there was no difference in JOLs between 
groups (Shaughnessy, 1981). These results oppose the direct access views that JOLs are based directly 
on memory traces, given that manipulations affecting memory performance failed to influence JOL 
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ratings. 
An alternative to the direct access theory is that metamemory judgments are inferential, and 
based on various cues available at the time of the judgment (Koriat, 1997).  These may include the 
conditions of learning, characteristics of the stimuli being learned, or the perceived strength of the 
memory trace (Koriat, 1997).  One cue that has been shown to influence JOL ratings is encoding fluency, 
which is typically measured by the speed involved in executing a task (Begg et al., 1989; Hertzog et al., 
2003).  For example, when participants are asked to use imagery to connect paired items during 
encoding, fluency would relate to the speed with which the image is created, how many images are 
generated, or how salient the image is (Begg et al., 1989; Hertzog et al., 2003). Numerous studies have 
suggested that JOLs are positively correlated with speed or ease of processing (Begg et al., 1989; 
Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998; Hertzog et al., 2003). Hertzog et al. (2003) measured fluency using 
subjects’ latency in generating mental images to bind the two items in a word pair during encoding, and 
found a strong correlation between latency in generating an image and JOL ratings. However, fluency 
was not correlated with actual recall performance, indicating that individuals’ JOLs were based on a 
sense of ease of processing, but this did not actually contribute to JOL accuracy, as JOLs were 
inconsistent with probability of recall (Hertzog et al., 2003).  Benjamin, Bjork and Schwartz (1998) also 
found that JOLs were positively correlated with response time during recall of trivia information, but 
slowly-produced answers were associated with more successful retrieval.  Begg et al. (1989) found that 
the longer participants took to study items in a paired-associate task, the lower their JOLs, indicating that 
JOLs may have been driven by heuristics related to ease of encoding, such as the idea that items 
requiring more study time are less likely to be remembered (Begg et al., 1989).  Similarly, Benjamin 
(2003) found that subjects predicted they would be more likely to recognize high-frequency as compared 
to low-frequency words, but actually had better recognition memory for low-frequency words (Benjamin, 
2003).  In a more recent study, Jia et al. (2016) found that manipulating perceptual fluency by altering font 
style did not alter the effect of word frequency on JOLs, and that subjects gave higher estimates for 
hypothetical participants’ ability to remember high- as compared to low-frequency words, suggesting that 
a combination of fluency and pre-existing beliefs about stimulus memorability may jointly contribute to 
inaccurate JOL ratings. 
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Although JOL ratings are positively correlated with processing fluency, there is a great deal of 
evidence that information more deeply processed at encoding is better remembered, making disfluency a 
better predictor of future memory success (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975).  However, 
individuals tend to discount the memory benefits of ‘desirable difficulties’: those conditions which produce 
less fluent encoding but lead to better learning because they are more deeply processed (Bjork, 1994; 
Sungkhasettee, Friedman, & Castel, 2011).  Perceptual disfluency is one such desirable difficulty that 
promotes deeper encoding but is generally discounted by subjects making metamemory judgments.  
Studies have shown that manipulations that promote disfluency, such as difficult-to-read fonts, produce 
better memory performance than easy-to-read fonts (Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer, & Vaughan, 
2011).   One study has suggested that in situations of limited visual information, subjects must generate 
the full stimulus themselves, producing a generation effect that benefits memory (Nairne, 1988).  
Although perceptually disfluent items are likely better remembered due to more elaborative processing 
during encoding, individuals’ metamemory judgments often do not account for this memory benefit.  
Sungkhasettee et al. (2011) showed that participants’ JOLs were similar for words presented upright and 
upside-down at study, but they later recalled more upside-down than upright words due to deeper 
processing of upside-down words during encoding. 
Similarly, subjects disregard the benefit of deep encoding strategies when studying paired 
associates rehearsed under “maintenance” or “elaborative” instructions: they have better recall for items 
under elaborative rehearsal, but subjectively judge both strategies to be equally effective (Shaughnessy, 
1981).  Subjects’ JOLs are also insensitive to the memory benefits of using interactive imagery during 
encoding (Rabinowitz et al., 1982), and to the improved recall resulting from repeated presentations of 
stimuli as compared to single presentations (Koriat, 1997).  This effect persisted even when participants 
were given feedback about the accuracy of their answers, suggesting a strong tendency to discount the 
beneficial effects of repeated stimulus presentation. 
These findings are in line with theories of cue-utilization that distinguish between intrinsic and 
extrinsic cues as bases for JOLs.  Intrinsic cues include characteristics inherent to the stimuli themselves, 
such as familiarity of the stimulus, while extrinsic cues include manipulations at encoding, such as 
repetition or duration of item presentation (Koriat, 1997). Koriat (1997) demonstrated that in a paired-
Gaynor 8 
associates memory task, intrinsic cues had similar effects on recall and JOLs, but extrinsic factors did not 
influence JOLs as strongly as they did performance, suggesting the basis of JOLs, and the relationship 
between JOLs and encoding processes, may be mediated by the type of cue on which people based 
inferences about memorability (Koriat, 1997).  Several other studies have provided evidence that JOLs 
are sensitive to intrinsic cues, but tend not to take into account extrinsic cues, even though the latter are 
often more predictive of memory success (Begg et al., 1989; Koriat, 1997; Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005).  
JOLs that are based on cues that influence later performance will be more accurate than those based on 
information that is not predictive of memory success, and determining how individuals use these cues 
appropriately to support accurate metamemory predictions is critical to developing interventions that may 
promote effective metamemory control to enhance learning. 
 
Retrospective Confidence Judgments 
Unlike JOLs, which are prospective judgments made at or immediately following study, RCJs are 
retrospective judgments, which are made after retrieval and reflect the individuals’ confidence in the 
accuracy of their response (Nelson & Narens, 1990).  Experimental tasks that measure RCJs may assess 
confidence following either recall or recognition.  Recognition judgments may be one-step responses, in 
which participants are asked to give a recognition judgment that also incorporates their confidence in the 
response (for example, in an old/new recognition test, indicating ‘sure old’, ‘unsure old’, ‘unsure new’ or 
‘sure new’) (e.g., Kim & Cabeza, 2007, 2009; Moritz, Gläscher, Sommer, Büchel, & Braus, 2006), or using 
a two-step process, in which participants give an RCJ immediately following the recognition response on 
confidence scale (e.g., Chua et al., 2006; Chua, Schacter, & Sperling, 2009a). 
Behavioral research has suggested that similar to JOLs, RCJs are inferential in nature, and are 
based on information available at retrieval, in addition to cues at encoding (Busey et al., 2000; Koriat & 
Levy-Sadot, 1999; Koriat et al., 2008).  There is some evidence that subjects monitor and assess the 
strengths of their stored memories at the time of retrieval, and base their confidence on the results of 
these assessments (Busey et al., 2000).  Cues directly related to memory, such as vividness, are a 
common basis of RCJs, and often lead to relatively accurate confidence judgments because confidence 
and actual memory performance are related to the same information (Busey et al., 2000).   
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Although findings that RCJs are based on cues that directly influence memory strength is 
consistent with a direct access view of metamemory, RCJs are also often based on information that is 
nondiagnostic of actual memory performance.  For instance, in an eyewitness memory paradigm, Lindsay 
et al. (1998) found that when individuals made recognition confidence judgments following identification of 
a target from a lineup, conditions that led to better memory performance (e.g., viewing a 3 minute video of 
the target from a variety of perspectives, as compared to a 10 second video of a brief close-up of the 
target) also led to increased confidence, suggesting accuracy and confidence were based, at least in part, 
on the same information.  However, conditions that resulted in higher RCJs for correct recognition also 
resulted in higher confidence in false identifications, suggesting that participants tended be more 
confident overall under conditions they expected would lead to better memory, even when their 
responses were incorrect (Lindsay, Read, & Sharma, 1998).  Thus, despite evidence that RCJs can be 
partially based on the strength of the memory being retrieved, findings of high confidence in false 
memories indicate that confidence and memory are at least partially dissociable and rely on somewhat 
different mechanisms.  This is consistent with the theoretical framework of metamemory, in which the 
meta-level contains a dynamic representation of the memory itself, which is often imperfect due to its 
susceptibility to distortions, which are typically caused by failure to incorporate information that is present 
in the object-level, or incorporating properties that are not actually present (Nelson & Narens, 1990).   
Evidence that individuals have high confidence in incorrect responses challenges early direct 
access views of metamemory, and more recently, a growing body of research has suggested that RCJs 
are likely inferential in nature and often based on information other than the strength of the memory, 
some of which may not be reflective of actual memory success.  For instance, Loftus & Pickrell (1995) 
found that post-event suggestions can lead individuals to remember a wide variety of events that did not 
actually happen to them, with no awareness of the inaccuracy of these memories. In remember-know 
paradigms testing recognition of word stimuli, subjects made ‘remember’ false alarms to nonstudied 
items, even though a ‘remember’ judgment typically reflects a subjective sense of a stronger or more vivid 
memory trace than a ‘know’ responses (Norman & Schacter, 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  Thus, 
it appears that recognition judgments are not based entirely on access to the strength of memory traces.  
Instead, such studies provide evidence that RCJs are in fact inferential and based on cues available at 
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retrieval, such as familiarity and fluency (Busey et al., 2000; Koriat et al., 2008).  This theory is consistent 
with Koriat’s (1995) accessibility hypothesis, which posits that individuals search through information in 
memory at retrieval, and base their RCJs on whatever information they are able to retrieve (Busey et al., 
2000; Koriat, 1995, 1997).  This information may include the memory trace, but may also be comprised of 
other information such as familiarity of the cue or target, or the conditions of retrieval (Busey et al., 2000). 
There is evidence that individuals rely on multiple sources of information when assessing their 
confidence, and Koriat et al. (2008) proposed that the information on which subjects base RCJs can be 
broadly divided into experience-based and information-based cues (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; Koriat et 
al., 2008). Information-based judgments are those that rely on pre-existing beliefs about one’s memory, 
competence in the domain being tested, or exam difficulty.  They may also be based on the strength of 
evidence that is gathered in favor of the chosen response, relative to evidence in support of alternatives 
(Koriat et al., 2008).  Experience-based judgments, in contrast, are not based on declarative content, but 
rather, rely on subjective feelings or cues that arise from the experience of learning, such as a sense of 
familiarity with the stimulus or the ease with which an answer was retrieved.  Confidence judgments may 
be affected by both information-based and experience-based sources of information, reflecting both 
declarative information about the item being retrieved, and the subjective sense of ease with which it was 
retrieved (Koriat et al., 2008).    
One experience-based cue that has been shown to influence RCJs is retrieval fluency (Shaw, 
1996; Shaw & McClure, 1996).  Shaw & McClure (1996) repeatedly questioned participants about an 
event they witnessed over the course of several weeks following the event, and showed that subjects had 
greater confidence for those details about which they were repeatedly asked during post-event 
questioning, as compared to those items they were only asked about during the initial questioning.  
However, actual memory accuracy was not significantly different between conditions, indicating repeated 
retrieval during post-event questioning may lead to a greater sense of fluency, which artificially inflates 
memory confidence.  Shaw (1996) also found that simply engaging in reflective thought about previous 
responses caused subjects to have higher later confidence ratings for both correct and incorrect 
responses, but had no impact on later memory accuracy, again supporting the idea that individuals base 
RCJs on a sense of retrieval fluency despite this ease of retrieval not being associated with improved 
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memory.  Similarly, Kelley & Lindsay (1993) used a priming procedure to demonstrate that prior exposure 
to both correct and related, but incorrect, answers on a general knowledge test influenced subjects’ 
response times and confidence in giving primed answers.  Repeated presentation of a scene has also 
been shown to increase confidence ratings for scene-face associative recognition, especially for incorrect 
responses, suggesting that individuals base RCJs on familiarity with the cue, even though this may not 
reflect accurate retrieval of the cue-target pair (Chua, Hannula, & Ranganath, 2012). 
Support for the hypothesis that RCJs are also based on information-based cues has come from 
research showing that confidence is sensitive to consensuality, i.e. the proportion of people who endorse 
a given response, regardless of whether that response is correct (Koriat, 2008b).  The effect of 
consensuality on confidence suggests that individuals rely on informational cues to make memory 
judgments, increasing their confidence for questions to which they believe most people should know the 
answer. In one experiment, subjects studied English words and their translation in a foreign language, 
including word-pairs for which participants are likely to agree on the wrong translation (Koriat, 2008b).  
Results showed that confidence ratings correlated with the consensuality of the translation rather than its 
correctness, as subjects had increased confidence for the correct answer when the majority of 
participants agreed on the correct answer, but also had inflated confidence for the incorrect answer when 
it was a response endorsed by most participants (Koriat, 2008b).  These findings suggest confidence is 
sometimes based on information-based cues.  Because responses endorsed by others are correct more 
often than not (Koriat, 1976), items for which there is a consensus on the correct answer likely activate 
more correct than incorrect information about the target.  However, items for which there is a consensus 
on the incorrect answer likely also activate many incorrect partial clues about the target, suggesting that 
subjects use an information-based process by deliberately weighing evidence in favor of one response 
over another when making their confidence judgments, regardless of whether that evidence is correct.  
Confidence in incorrect responses may rely on experienced-based cues as well, including cues 
that influence confidence in correct answers, such as ease of retrieval (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993).  Indeed, 
there is some evidence that experience-based processes contribute to the correlation between 
confidence and consensuality: response times are shorter for consensual responses, regardless of their 
correctness.  This suggests subjects may use response latency as an experience-based cue on which to 
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base their confidence (Koriat et al., 2008), and that confidence judgments likely rely on a combination of 
both information-based and experienced-based cues. 
Other studies have provided further evidence that subjects use a combination of information- and 
experience-based information when making RCJs (Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012; Koriat et al., 2008).  One 
experiment demonstrated that when subjects were asked to spontaneously list reasons in support of an 
answer, confidence increased with the number of reasons listed, presumably because of both increased 
supportive evidence and greater ease of retrieval (Koriat et al., 2008).  However, when researchers 
imposed the number of reasons to be listed, confidence did not increase with number of reasons subjects 
were required to list.  This suggests that the increased effort subjects experienced with a greater number 
of reasons in the forced-report condition counteracted the effect of the strength of supportive evidence on 
confidence.  Thus, it appears that when information-based cues (such as strength of supporting evidence, 
reflected by number of reasons listed) and experience-based cues (such as ease of retrieval) conflicted, 
confidence judgments were made on the basis on the experience of retrieval (Koriat et al., 2008). 
Although in some cases individuals appear to base their confidence on experience-based cues 
when they conflict with information-based cues, there is also evidence that people rely more heavily on 
external information when unable to rely on internal experience-based signals to make RCJs (Jaeger, 
Lauris, et al., 2012).  In one episodic memory task, subjects were given cues from reliable (75% valid) 
and unreliable (50% valid) sources about whether an item was ‘likely old’ or ‘likely new’ in an old/new 
recognition test (Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012).  For low confidence trials, when participants could not rely 
on their own internal cues, they incorporated the recommendations of both reliable and unreliable 
sources, and continued to rely on cues from unreliable sources even when those sources were only 
correct on 25% of trials (Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012).  Subjects have also been shown to base their 
estimates of others’ ability to solve anagrams on their own ease of solving them, but when answers were 
provided for them, eliminating the subjective sense of fluency they derived from solving the problems 
themselves, subjects instead based their judgments on pre-existing theories and rules about solving such 
problems (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). 
The hypothesis that individuals rely more heavily on information-based cues when their internal 
experience-based cues are weaker is further supported by the finding that inaccurate eyewitnesses’ 
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confidence is more affected by confirming feedback than accurate eyewitnesses following identification of 
targets in a lineup (Bradfield et al., 2002).   This post-identification feedback effect likely occurs because 
individuals do not engage in online monitoring of their confidence or other variables related to the retrieval 
conditions, such as their view of the suspect or speed of identification.  Due to this weak memory of the 
conditions of retrieval, subjects are more reliant upon the feedback to make confidence judgments. 
Consistent with the idea that subjects’ confidence judgments should be more influenced by external 
factors when their internal signals are weaker, Wells & Bradfield (1999) also found that when subjects 
were asked to think privately about their certainty prior to feedback, they were less influenced by the post-
event feedback, perhaps because stronger internal cues about the accuracy of their retrieval responses 
led to less reliance upon external factors when making RCJs.  Taken together, the results of studies on 
how subjects incorporate external information into their confidence judgments suggest that individuals are 
more likely to base their confidence on information-based cues when internal experience-based cues, 
such as those relating to the strength of the underlying memory trace, are unreliable. 
 
Measures of Metamemory Accuracy 
Identifying which cues people use to make metamemory judgments allows us to identify cognitive 
mechanisms underlying accurate metamemory, as well as those factors that contribute to dissociations 
between subjective confidence and objective memory performance.  Generally speaking, metamemory 
accuracy is evaluated by measuring how well subjective confidence correlates with objective performance 
(Benjamin & Diaz, 2008).  In experimental metamemory tasks, metamemory accuracy refers to the 
congruency between the subjective judgments about one’s own memory, and actual memory 
performance at test, i.e., the probability that correct responses are endorsed with high confidence and 
incorrect responses are endorsed with low confidence (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).  
Indices of metamemory accuracy can be divided into those that measure absolute versus relative 
accuracy. Absolute accuracy reflects the relationship between mean rating values and mean 
performance, whereas relative accuracy refers to a within-subject correlation between memory 
performance and metacognitive predictions (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008).  Calibration curves are a common 
measure of absolute accuracy, in which mean performance is plotted against mean confidence judgments 
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(Benjamin & Diaz, 2008).  These provide a measure of the degree to which mean ratings correlate with 
mean performance, i.e. and individual with perfect calibration between memory and metamemory would 
give a mean confidence of 80% to items they remembered with 80% accuracy (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008).  
Relative accuracy measures are often preferred to absolute accuracy measures, such as 
calibration curves, because they are less influenced by idiosyncratic ways in which subjects use the rating 
scale (Scheck et al., 2004). Instead, relative accuracy measures provide a measure of correspondence 
between metamemory judgments and memory performance that is based on confidence of one item 
relative to another (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Historically, the most commonly used statistical tool for 
analyzing relative metamemory accuracy is the Goodman-Kruskal Gamma Coefficient, γ, which 
measures the association between confidence judgments and memory performance based on the 
difference between concordant and discordant pairs (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008; Nelson & Narens, 1990), 
calculated by the formula (Concordances − Discordances)/(Concordances + Discordances) (Spellman, 
Bloomfield, & Bjork, 2008). The gamma coefficient is useful in that its expected value is constant across 
any changes in a person’s confidence threshold, and requires no assumptions be met regarding 
distribution of ratings (Nelson & Narens, 1990). However, the gamma coefficient has been criticized as a 
suboptimal measure of relative accuracy due to the fact that it treats data ordinally, and does not take into 
account the magnitude of judgments: for instance, if a subject were to assign two items JOLs of 5% and 
95% confidence, gamma would treat this equivalent to a case in which a subject rated two items with 
JOLs of 49% and 50% (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008). Interval-properties, which allow for the measurement of 
the relative degree of difference between items, may prove to be a better measure of metamemory 
monitoring accuracy. 
To address the need for interval-level analysis, a signal-detection based measure called da has 
sometimes been used in addition to, or instead of, gamma coefficients in studies of metamemory 
accuracy (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008; Masson & Rotello, 2009; Toth, Daniels, & Solinger, 2011).  In 
metacognitive signal detection, a metacognitive hit, such as giving a high confidence rating to a 
successfully remembered item, is plotted against the probability of a metacognitive false-alarm, such as a 
high-confidence item that is not successfully remembered.  In a task with a confidence rating scale from 
1-10, each confidence level would be treated as a response criterion, which distinguishes high from low 
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confidence, such that a liberal criterion would assign low confidence to a response of 1 and high 
confidence to responses of 2-10, and a conservative criterion would assign low confidence to responses 
of 1-9 and high confidence to ratings of 10.  Each possible split of the response data produces hit and 
false alarm rates that are plotted against one another.  Da represents the distance between this 
isosensitivity plot and the line representing chance performance (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008), and is 
calculated by the following formula: da = √2yo⁄√1+m2 in which y0 represents the y-intercept and m 
represents the slope of the isosensitivity function. 
Another calculation of metamemory accuracy that is closely related to da uses receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) analyses (Fleming & Lau, 2014).  Similarly to da, this method involves plotting 
metacognitive ‘hits’ (high-confidence correct) against ‘false alarms’ (high-confidence misses), and 
metacognitive sensitivity is reflected by the area under the ROC curve, typically abbreviated as AUROC2.  
If the AUROC2 is 0.5, metacognitive accuracy is at chance, with values above 0.5 indicating more 
accurate metacognitive monitoring (Fleming & Lau, 2014).  Both da and AUROC2 are useful in that they 
do not require that the underlying distributions of memory responses and metamemory judgments be 
equal in variance, and allow for interval-level analyses with equal intervals across the scale range 
(Benjamin & Diaz, 2008). 
Another model-based approach to measuring metamemory accuracy, known as meta-d’, allows 
researchers to dissociate task performance from metacognitive sensitivity using signal detection analyses 
(Maniscalco & Lau, 2014).  Because performance on the memory task itself can influence metamemory 
sensitivity, meta-d’ accounts for this influence by comparing metamemory sensitivity to primary task 
sensitivity (d’).  Meta-d’ and d’ are measured in the same signal-to-noise ratio units, making it possible to 
directly compare the sensory evidence available for decision-making (d’) to the sensory evidence 
available for metacognition (meta-d’) (Fleming & Lau, 2014).  Thus, an ideal subject who uses the 
maximum possible metacognitive sensitivity to make confidence judgments would have equal meta-d’ 
and d’ values.  This approach is particularly useful because it is a measure of metamemory efficiency, i.e. 
metamemory performance relative to underlying task performance, and thus can account for differences 
in memory performance (Fleming & Lau, 2014).  This dissertation reports da measures of metamemory 
accuracy, which will allow us to use improved ways of indexing metamemory accuracy and also compare 
Gaynor 16 
our results to other metamemory literature using this measure. 
  
The Neural Basis of Metamemory Processes 
Although a significant amount of research has been conducted on the cognitive bases of 
metamemory processes, relatively less is known about the neural bases of metamemory accuracy.  Most 
of the neuroimaging and lesion studies addressing metamemory function have focused on regions that 
modulate by the subjective level of confidence ratings (Chua et al., 2006, 2009a; Do Lam et al., 2012; 
Kao et al., 2005), and only a few studies have identified brain regions associated with metamemory 
accuracy (Kao et al., 2005; Yokoyama et al., 2010).  One potential reason for the lack of findings reported 
about metamemory accuracy is that different components of metamemory accuracy, such as knowing 
when you know (i.e., high confidence in hits) and knowing when you don’t know (i.e., low confidence in 
misses) may rely on different neural and cognitive mechanisms (Luo, Kazuhisa, & Luo, 2003).  Although 
there has been work associated with metamemory accuracy and the subjective levels of confidence, 
based on the cognitive research there is a need to further our knowledge about the brain bases of 
metamemory processes relates metamemory judgments that are based on different cues.   
Neuroimaging and lesion studies have implicated regions of the prefrontal cortex in JOL 
processes (Do Lam et al., 2012; Kao et al., 2005; Vilkki et al., 1999; Yokoyama et al., 2010), and 
prefrontal and parietal cortices in RCJs (Chiou, Carlson, Arnett, Cosentino, & Hillary, 2011; Davidson et 
al., 2008; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005; Simons, Peers, Mazuz, Berryhill, & Olson, 2010), but there is some 
evidence that this activity may vary with the type of judgment and the information on which the judgment 
is based (Kim & Cabeza, 2007; Ryals, Rogers, Gross, Polnaszek, & Voss, 2016).  Cognitive research has 
shown that metamemory judgments may be based on various sources of information, and those made on 
information that affects memory performance, such as depth of processing or internal signals regarding 
the strength of a memory trace, are more accurate than judgments made on the basis of information that 
is not diagnostic of memory accuracy, such as encoding fluency or external information (Koriat, 1997; 
Koriat et al., 2008).  Investigating how the recruitment of different brain regions may vary with the 
cognitive bases of metamemory judgments is crucial to our understanding of accurate memory 
awareness, but remains a relatively unexplored avenue of research. Experiments 1 & 2 examine how the 
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brain bases of JOLs and RCJs, respectively, may vary based on the cognitive bases of the metacognitive 
judgment. 
 
Judgments of Learning recruit the prefrontal cortex 
Past research has typically focused on the cognitive bases of metamemory processes (Jaeger, 
Lauris, et al., 2012; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Koriat, 2008b; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; Koriat et al., 2008; 
Shaw & McClure, 1996), but only a handful of studies have investigated the neural bases of metamemory 
monitoring (Do Lam et al., 2012; Kao et al., 2005; Ryals et al., 2016; Vilkki et al., 1999; Yokoyama et al., 
2010), and further studies are needed to investigate the neural underpinnings of JOLs and how they 
relate to the cognitive bases of these judgments.   Several neuroimaging and lesion studies have 
provided evidence that the PFC contributes to JOL ratings, encoding, and accuracy (Do Lam et al., 2012; 
Kao et al., 2005; Vilkki, Servo, & Surma-aho, 1998; Vilkki et al., 1999).  For example, patients with both 
right and left prefrontal lesions are less accurate than healthy controls and posterior lesion patients in 
predicting future retrieval success (Vilkki et al., 1998), and those with right frontal lesions showed 
impaired JOL accuracy in a face-location association task (Vilkki et al., 1999), suggesting a causal role of 
the PFC in metamemory accuracy.  Neuroimaging experiments have provided further evidence of how 
specific prefrontal subregions contribute to JOL processes.  Specifically, areas in the anterior prefrontal 
cortex (aPFC), comprised of Brodmann areas 10 and 11, have been implicated in JOL processes (Fig. 1) 
(Do Lam et al., 2012; Kao et al., 2005).  Two fMRI studies have demonstrated increased medial prefrontal 
(BA10) and orbitofrontal (BA11) activity with higher JOLs, suggesting these regions may track the 
magnitude of the subjective level of confidence (Do Lam et al., 2012; Kao et al., 2005). Kao et al. (2005) 
also showed that activity in more lateral and posterior regions of the PFC (BA44/6) was associated with 
both JOL ratings and encoding, signifying common underlying mechanisms between JOL and encoding 
processes.  Turning to metamemory accuracy, individual differences in JOL accuracy were correlated 
with ventromedial prefrontal activity (BA11), suggesting that in addition to being involved in tracking the 
magnitude of JOL ratings, more anterior regions of the PFC play a role in JOL accuracy.  This distinction 
between functional roles of the anterior and posterior PFC in metamemory is consistent with studies 
showing that various functions of cognitive control are arranged hierarchically along the rostro-caudal axis 
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of the PFC in a gradient of increasing complexity (Badre, 2008; Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, Panzer, & 
Grafman, 1999; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003). 
Past research on the functional organization of the PFC has suggested that posterior regions of 
the PFC track information about stimulus properties and relay this information to anterior regions, which 
are responsible for forming more abstract representations and relationships (Badre, 2008; Badre & 
D’Esposito, 2009; Koechlin et al., 2003).  Indeed, there is evidence that the DLPFC is activated when a 
task requires monitoring and manipulation of externally-generated information, such as information about 
the task stimuli, while the aPFC is involved in monitoring information that is internally-generated, such as 
overarching task goals or self-referential assessments of performance (Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000).  Thus, 
if metamemory functions are similarly arranged in a hierarchical fashion within the PFC, it is possible that 
the DLPFC modulates with the level of JOL ratings because posterior regions track stimulus-level 
information that influences confidence, while the aPFC is associated with JOL accuracy because it is 
responsible for monitoring the relationship between JOLs and encoding in the interest of ongoing task 
goals.  In addition to neuroimaging evidence that supports a correlation between the aPFC and 
metamemory accuracy, one study has also demonstrated a causal role of the aPFC in JOL accuracy. 
Ryals et al. (2016) applied theta-burst stimulation, a form of non-invasive brain stimulation, to areas of the 
PFC during a JOL task, and showed that compared to DLPFC and sham stimulation, aPFC stimulation 
decreased overall JOL ratings for subsequent misses, suggesting the aPFC plays a causal role in JOL 
accuracy, and that stimulation made subjects more aware of failures at encoding that would result in poor 
performance at test.  This raises the hypothesis that perhaps rather than integrating all lower-level signals 
from posterior regions, the aPFC supports JOL accuracy by increasing sensitivity to information at 
encoding that is predictive of memory performance (Ryals et al., 2016).    
There is a clear need to examine how the roles of PFC subregions involved in JOL processes 
may vary depending on whether JOLs are based on cues that are either diagnostic or nondiagnostic of 
future memory performance.  Elucidating the specific roles of PFC regions in JOL accuracy, and how they 
may change with the cognitive bases of the judgments, would provide insight into how the brain supports 
accurate metamemory awareness, as well as the general functional organization of the PFC. Experiment 
1 manipulates the basis of JOLs to test whether the aPFC is correlated with JOL accuracy because it 
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integrates information from posterior regions (Badre, 2008), or because it increases sensitivity to 
diagnostic cues over nondiagnostic cues (Ryals et al., 2016).  Experiment 1 will use a non-invasive brain 
stimulation technique known as high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS), which 
allows us to directly manipulate brain activity to test hypotheses about the causal roles of PFC regions in 
JOLs, and also determine whether brain stimulation may serve as an effective way to enhance JOL 
accuracy. 
 
Retrospective Confidence Judgments rely on prefrontal and parietal regions 
Neuropsychological experiments have provided evidence that the prefrontal and parietal cortices 
are involved in RCJs (Chiou et al., 2011; Davidson et al., 2008; Kennedy, 2001, 2004; Simons et al., 
2010).  Although some studies have shown that patients with frontal traumatic brain injuries demonstrated 
intact RCJs following recall (Kennedy, 2001, 2004), others have demonstrated that RCJs were impaired 
in frontal lobe damaged patients in recognition tasks (Chiou et al., 2011; Pannu, Kaszniak, & Rapcsak, 
2005), suggesting the PFC is involved in RCJs, but the type of retrieval task may moderate its role in RCJ 
performance.  In addition to the PFC, regions of the parietal cortex have also been implicated in RCJ 
processes (Davidson et al., 2008; Simons et al., 2010).  Neuropsychological studies show that patients 
with focal parietal lesions have reduced confidence in their memories as reflected by fewer ‘remember’ 
responses in remember/know paradigms (Davidson et al., 2008), and those with bilateral parietal lesions 
also have lower RCJ ratings in old/new recognition and source recollection tasks (Simons et al., 2010), 
suggesting the parietal cortex plays a role in the magnitude of RCJs.  
Thus, it appears the PFC and parietal cortex play important roles in RCJs, and neuroimaging 
research has further identified subregions in which greater activity is correlated with low-confidence, high-
confidence and RCJ accuracy. FMRI experiments have shown greater activation in the DLPFC and 
ventrolateral PFC for low RCJs as compared to high RCJs, using a face-name associative recognition 
paradigm (Chua et al., 2009a), item and source memory judgments (Hayes, Buchler, Stokes, Kragel, & 
Cabeza, 2011) and during an old/new verbal recognition task (Henson et al., 2000).  Hayes et al. (2011) 
also showed that dorsal parietal regions showed greater activity during low confidence trials.  This 
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increased activity with lower confidence may reflect greater demands on monitoring processes during low 
confidence trials (Chua, Pergolizzi, & Weintraub, 2014; Henson et al., 2000). 
In contrast, some regions show greater activity with higher as compared to lower RCJ ratings.  
Several fMRI studies have shown that activity in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) varies with the 
subjective level of the confidence judgment (Chua et al., 2006, 2009a; Chua, Schacter, & Sperling, 
2009b; Kim & Cabeza, 2007).  Greater activity in ventral parietal regions has also been correlated with 
high confidence responses, in contrast to dorsal regions which are more active with low confidence, 
suggesting subregions of the parietal cortex may differentially track magnitude of confidence ratings 
(Hayes et al., 2011).  This is consistent with research demonstrating a distinction between the roles of 
superior and inferior parietal regions in other memory processes.  Activity in the superior parietal lobe has 
been associated with top-down allocation of attention to memory retrieval (Ciaramelli, Grady, & 
Moscovitch, 2008; Olson & Berryhill, 2009), such as during the process of post-retrieval monitoring, and 
studies have shown activity in this region is greater when monitoring more uncertain or ambiguous 
targets: activity is greater for low vs. high confidence, for high-frequency vs. low frequency words 
(presumably because more effort is required to avoid false-alarms to more familiar words), and while 
evaluating lures that resemble studied material (Ciaramelli et al., 2008).  Thus, it appears that the 
superior parietal cortex may be broadly involved in top-down direction of attention to the contents of 
memory retrieval (Ciaramelli et al., 2008; Sestieri, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2017), which is consistent with 
studies demonstrating its increased activation with low RCJs.  In contrast, increased activity for high vs. 
low confidence in more ventral regions of the PPC is consistent with previous findings that the inferior 
PPC is more active during retrieval based on recollection than familiarity (Henson, Rugg, Shallice, 
Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & Buckner, 2005), during retrieval success as 
compared to correct rejections (Konishi, Wheeler, Donaldson, & Buckner, 2000), and that PPC activity 
increases with the precision with which features of a visual stimulus are remembered (Richter, Cooper, 
Bays, & Simons, 2016), suggesting that increased inferior PPC activity with high confidence may reflect 
the strength of the memory being assessed (Cabeza, Ciaramelli, Olson, & Moscovitch, 2008; Rugg & 
King, 2017).   
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In addition to correlational evidence implicating the parietal cortex in RCJs, non-invasive brain 
stimulation experiments have also provided evidence for a causal role of parietal regions in metamemory 
judgments: transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the inferior parietal lobule has been shown to 
selectively disrupt subjective but not objective measures of episodic memory retrieval (Sestieri, 
Capotosto, Tosoni, Luca Romani, & Corbetta, 2013). 
Turning to RCJ accuracy, one fMRI study showed increased activity in the right aPFC with 
increased correlation between RCJ ratings and memory performance (Yokoyama et al., 2010).  This 
finding is consistent with the aforementioned hypotheses regarding the possible hierarchical organization 
of metamemory functions within the PFC, wherein metamemory accuracy is reliant upon anterior PFC 
regions (Badre, 2008; Ryals et al., 2016).    
There is some evidence, however, that both prefrontal and parietal activity associated with RCJs 
may vary based on the cognitive basis of the judgment (Kim & Cabeza, 2007).  One fMRI study compared 
activity during high and low confidence ratings based on true and false memory, and showed greater 
activity in frontal (BA6) and lateral parietal regions (BA7) for low vs. high confidence during true 
recognition, but the opposite effect for false recognition (although it should be noted that for high vs. low 
confidence in false recognition, frontal activity was slightly more anterior [BA8] and lateral parietal activity 
was more anterior and ventral [BA39/40] compared to activity seen for low vs. high confidence in true 
recognition (Kim & Cabeza, 2007)).  Because false recognition is thought to rely on familiarity, whereas 
true recognition is based on recollection of details, it may be that frontoparietal activity associated with 
RCJs varies with the information on which the judgment is based (Chua et al., 2014; Kim & Cabeza, 
2007).  Given the evidence that the cognitive basis of RCJs may be a combination of internal experience-
based and external information-based cues (Koriat et al., 2008), the contribution of the parietal cortex to 
RCJs may also depend on whether individuals base confidence on internal vs. external information, or 
experience a conflict between these sources of information.  Indeed, there is some evidence that the 
parietal cortex is involved in processing conflicts between internal and external cues in episodic memory 
tasks (O’Connor, Han, & Dobbins, 2010).  One fMRI study found that when subjects were given cues 
from reliable and unreliable sources about the likelihood that a target was old or new, greater activity in 
the inferior parietal lobule was associated with invalid as compared to valid cueing, suggesting this region 
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may be recruited when external information-based cues conflict with experience-based cues during 
recognition (O’Connor et al., 2010).  Experiment 2 uses fMRI to investigate the neural bases of RCJs 
based on valid and invalid cues about question difficulty in a semantic recognition task, to determine 
whether frontoparietal contributions to RCJs vary with the cognitive basis of the judgment. 
 
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation 
Neuroimaging and lesion studies have provided some evidence about the brain regions involved 
in making accurate metamemory judgments (Kao et al., 2005; Ryals et al., 2016; Yokoyama et al., 2010).  
However, neuroimaging research is correlational and does not allow for interpretations about causal roles 
of brain regions in cognitive functions, and lesion studies are often limited by significant between-subject 
variations in lesion size and location (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005; Souchay et al., 2003).  Transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS), a form of non-invasive brain stimulation, has gained considerable attention in 
recent years as a potential intervention for a variety of clinical disorders, and a means by which to test 
causal roles of brain regions in cognitive functions (Colzato, Sellaro, & Nitsche, 2017; Flöel, 2014; Nitsche 
et al., 2008; Zhao et al., 2017), and has been shown to alter performance in various cognitive tasks, 
including metamemory performance (Chua & Ahmed, 2016; Chua, Ahmed, & Garcia, 2017).  Given that 
neuroimaging research has provided us with regions of interest to use as targets for stimulation (Do Lam 
et al., 2012; Kao et al., 2005), tDCS may serve as a useful tool for investigating causal roles of PFC 
regions in JOL processes, and determining whether stimulation may serve as an effective way to 
enhance metamemory accuracy; this method will be used in Experiment 1.  
Conventional tDCS involves passing a weak electrical current from one stimulating electrode, 
often referred to as the anode, to a return electrode, often referred to as the cathode, forming a circuit 
(Datta et al., 2009).  A typical experimental protocol involves application of 1mA to 2mA of continuous 
direct current for 10 to 20 minutes (Flöel, 2014).  Although electrical stimulation has been shown to alter 
neural excitability (Bikson et al., 2004; Hampstead, Brown, & Hartley, 2014; Stagg & Nitsche, 2011), 
some questions remain about the underlying biological mechanisms responsible for tDCS-induced 
changes (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011).  There is evidence that the weak current that extends through the scalp 
and skull to reach the cortex may reduce the resting potential of neurons under the anode, and this 
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depolarization results in an increase neuronal excitability (Bikson et al., 2004).  Conversely, the current 
may raise the resting potential of neurons under the cathode, which decreases neuronal excitability 
(Bikson et al., 2004; Bikson, Rahman, & Datta, 2012).  Research has suggested that tDCS may modify 
spontaneous neural activity by altering the conductance of ion channels to change polarization of the 
resting membrane potential (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011), as well as increasing astrocytic calcium levels that 
are thought to contribute to synaptic plasticity (Monai et al., 2016).  There is also evidence that tDCS 
modulates neuronal firing after active current application has ceased, and that the mechanisms 
underlying these “after-effects” may differ from those associated with on-line stimulation (Stagg & Nitsche, 
2011).  Similarly to on-line tDCS effects, long-term effects of stimulation appear to depend on alterations 
in neuronal membrane potentials; however, tDCS has also been shown to induce synaptic modifications 
that lead to long-term synaptic plasticity after stimulation has ended (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011).  Small 
increases in calcium concentration have been shown to induce long-term depression, while large rises in 
calcium lead to long-term potentiation, and these changes are thought to be dependent on activation of 
NMDA receptors resulting from stimulation (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011).   
There is some skepticism about whether tDCS produces effects on the brain in practice (Horvath, 
Forte, & Carter, 2015a, 2015b), but several studies combining tDCS with neuroimaging techniques have 
provided evidence that stimulation does indeed produce changes in cortical activity, both at a local level 
and in regions functionally and anatomically connected to regions under the electrodes (Hampstead et al., 
2014; Keeser et al., 2011).  In one fMRI study, subjects receiving “anodal stimulation” over the parietal 
cortex, with the cathode over the PFC, showed greater activation in parietal regions compared to subjects 
receiving the opposite anodal/cathodal placement, as well as greater effective connectivity between 
parietal and frontal regions.  Such results suggest that tDCS not only increases activity in the region 
under the stimulating electrode, but also modifies connectivity between the target region and a more 
distributed network (Hampstead et al., 2014).  Another tDCS-fMRI experiment showed that “anodal 
stimulation” to the PFC altered resting-state network connectivity in regions both close to and distant from 
the site of stimulation, further suggesting tDCS directly modulates cortical activity, and this effect extends 
to areas connected to the target area (Keeser et al., 2011).  One simultaneous tDCS-EEG study showed 
that compared to sham stimulation, “anodal” and “cathodal” tDCS over the sensorimotor cortex produced 
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changes in both spontaneous cortical activity, and event-related synchrony, providing evidence that tDCS 
directly alters rhythmic cortical activity as well (Roy, Baxter, & He, 2014).  The timecourse of tDCS effects 
(online vs. offline) may also interact with the location of excitability (local vs. global): in one study, 
researchers applied TMS over the left posterior parietal cortex before, during, and after tDCS to the right 
posterior parietal cortex, and measured changes in excitability using EEG (Romero Lauro et al., 2014).  
By using EEG to record TMS-evoked potentials, a measure of cortical reactivity, the authors showed that 
tDCS induced a rise in global excitability both during and after tDCS, while local excitability was increased 
immediately following tDCS (Romero Lauro et al., 2014).  Thus, although some questions remain about 
the exact mechanisms by which it exerts its effects (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011), tDCS has been shown to 
produce measurable changes in excitability at both the local and global level, both during and after 
application of stimulation (Hampstead et al., 2014; Keeser et al., 2011; Romero Lauro et al., 2014; Roy et 
al., 2014). 
Evidence that tDCS alters brain activity in distributed regions outside the area under the 
electrodes has implications for the experimental design and interpretation of results from tDCS studies. 
For instance, it is possible that changes in cognitive processes can be achieved by stimulating multiple 
brain regions, or that stimulation to one region will have downstream effects on regions outside the sites 
of interest.  Thus, it is important to recognize that tDCS has relatively low spatial focality, and studies 
aiming to determine the causal roles of specific cortical regions should acknowledge the possibility that 
areas outside the region of interest may contribute to changes in cognitive performance. 
TDCS is relatively inexpensive and safe, with few side effects, making it a useful technique for 
determining causal roles of brain regions in numerous cognitive processes (Flöel, 2014; Jacobson, 
Koslowsky, & Lavidor, 2012).  Most subjects experience a mild itching or burning sensation during 
stimulation, but this diminishes quickly (Woods et al., 2016).  In order to control for placebo effects that 
may result from the experience of these scalp sensations, tDCS protocols typically employ a “sham” 
condition, in which current ramps up to the full amount of current delivered during active stimulation, and 
then immediately back down to baseline for the duration of the task (Gandiga, Hummel, & Cohen, 2006).  
Although tDCS blinding can be difficult to achieve (Davis, Gold, Pascual-Leone, & Bracewell, 2013; 
Horvath, Carter, & Forte, 2014), this condition is thought to minimize the potential effects of expectations 
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on behavioral results between stimulation groups, and one double-blind study showed no significant 
differences between sensations reported by participants in active and sham conditions (Gandiga et al., 
2006). 
However, using conventional tDCS, inferences about specific brain regions being targeted are 
limited by poor spatial resolution, resulting in possible stimulation of regions outside the area of interest, 
as evidenced by findings that the effects of stimulation extend beyond the target region (Hampstead et 
al., 2014; Keeser et al., 2011; Romero Lauro et al., 2014; Roy et al., 2014).  In order to improve spatial 
resolution of tDCS, researchers have begun using “high definition” tDCS (HD-tDCS), in which smaller 
electrodes are positioned with one stimulating electrode among an array of four return electrodes.  This 
montage allows for more focal stimulation of cortical regions of interest, and thus allows for stronger 
conclusions about specific causal structure-function relationships (Datta et al., 2009; Villamar et al., 
2013).  Although fewer studies have been conducted using HD-tDCS due to its relative novelty, there is 
some evidence it may produce stronger and longer-lasting changes in the brain as compared to 
conventional tDCS (Kuo et al., 2013), and reduce the likelihood of stimulating outside regions of interest.  
This increased specificity of stimulation, in addition to evidence of its ability to alter performance in other 
types of metamemory monitoring tasks (Chua & Ahmed, 2016; Chua et al., 2017), make HD-tDCS an 
ideal method to test how precise regions of the brain contribute to metamemory processes.   
Given that accurate metamemory monitoring is crucial to effective learning and decision-making 
(Cosentino, Metcalfe, Cary, De Leon, & Karlawish, 2011; Metcalfe, 2002), and metamemory deficits have 
been identified in a wide range of clinical populations (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005), it is important to 
understand the neurocognitive underpinnings of metamemory monitoring processes during both encoding 
and retrieval.  Although metamemory judgments are influenced by information available at the time of the 
judgment, which may or may not be correlated with objective memory performance (Benjamin et al., 
1998; Koriat, 1997; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999), it remains unknown how the roles of brain regions 
associated with metamemory processes may differ with the cognitive basis of these judgments.  By using 
neuroimaging and non-invasive brain stimulation methods, we aim to provide converging evidence to 
support the novel hypothesis that the way in which the brain supports metamemory monitoring during 
both encoding and retrieval varies with the cues on which judgments are based, which has previously 
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remained untested.   Experiment 1 will use HD-tDCS to test the effects of stimulation on JOLs based on 
different sources of information to determine whether the causal roles of PFC subregions change with the 
cognitive bases of the judgments, and contribute to our understanding of the functional organization of the 
PFC as a whole.  Experiment 2 will use fMRI to test how brain activity associated with RCJs during a 
semantic recognition task varies based on the presence and validity of external cues about question 
difficulty, to test how the brain supports recognition confidence judgments based on internal memory cues 
vs. external sources of information.  Together, these experiments aim to elucidate how the neural 
mechanisms underlying metamemory monitoring during both encoding and retrieval may differ with the 
information on which subjective judgments are based, and inform structure-function relationships 
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Past research has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs), subjective confidence judgments 
made at study about the ability to remember given items at test, are inferential in nature and based on 
cues available during encoding.  Subjects tend to give higher JOLs to more fluently encoded items, 
despite having better recognition memory for less fluently encoded items, which leads to poor JOL 
accuracy.  Research has implicated the dorsolateral and anterior regions of the prefrontal cortex (DLPFC 
and aPFC, respectively) in JOL and encoding processes, but no studies to date have tested how the roles 
of these regions vary with the cue on which JOLs are based.  Here we used high definition transcranial 
direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS), a form of non-invasive brain stimulation, to test the causal roles of 
the DLPFC and aPFC in encoding success, JOL ratings, and JOL accuracy when subjects studied words 
that varied in their fluency at encoding. HD-tDCS over the DLPFC impaired encoding, as evidenced by an 
increase in subsequent false alarms.  Turning to JOLs, we showed that for words that are less fluently 
encoded, the aPFC contributes to accurate JOLs by biasing individuals toward basing their subjective 
judgments on disfluency, which is predictive of objective memory success.  Conversely, DLPFC and 
aPFC stimulation decreased JOL accuracy for high-frequency words, suggesting the roles of these 
regions in JOLs vary with the cognitive bases of the judgments. These results contribute to our 
understanding of the causal roles of subregions of the prefrontal cortex in objective and subjective 






A student studying for an exam must be able to monitor the status of her memory in order to 
guide her behavior: has she learned the material well enough to stop studying?  If not, how much longer 
will she need to study in order to remember the material during the exam the next day?  The ability to 
produce accurate judgments about the status of one’s own memory, known as metamemory monitoring, 
is crucial to effective learning and decision-making (Metcalfe, 2002).  One of the most commonly studied 
metamemory monitoring tasks, the Judgment of Learning (JOL) requires individuals to predict, during 
encoding, whether or not studied stimuli will be successfully remembered at test (Nelson & Dunlosky, 
1991; Nelson & Narens, 1990). How well the predictive judgments correlate with actual memory 
performance is known as JOL accuracy. Research on the cognitive bases of JOLs has suggested these 
judgments are not based on direct access to a memory representation, but instead are inferential in 
nature and based on a variety of information, often referred to as cues, that are available at study (Koriat, 
1997).  Unfortunately, individuals often base their JOLs on cues that are not predictive of memory 
performance, resulting in inaccurate JOLs. Although research has shown that the accuracy of JOLs 
depends on the information on which the judgments are based, less is known about the brain regions that 
contribute to JOL processes.  Regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), including the dorsolateral PFC 
(DLPFC) and anterior PFC (aPFC) have been implicated in the magnitude JOL ratings and their accuracy 
in predicting future retrieval (Do Lam et al., 2012; Kao et al., 2005; Ryals et al., 2016), but it remains to be 
understood how the roles of these regions may vary with the cognitive basis of the judgment.  The current 
study aims to test how the PFC supports JOL accuracy by testing whether the roles of the DLPFC and 
aPFC may vary when JOLs are based on information that is and is not predictive of actual memory 
performance.  
A significant body of research has been conducted on the cognitive bases of JOLs, and it is 
generally accepted that people make inferences about the memorability of given stimuli based on various 
cues (Benjamin et al., 1998; Koriat, 1997). Typically, individuals tend to use “intrinsic cues,” which are 
characteristics of stimuli, for example factors related to encoding fluency such as item difficulty or speed 
of processing, to make their JOLs, despite the fact that these factors tend not to influence memory 
performance (Begg et al., 1989; Koriat, 1997; Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005).  For example, in a number of 
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studies, ease of processing, as measured by encoding speed, positively correlated with JOLs, but not 
subsequent memory performance (Begg et al., 1989; Benjamin et al., 1998; Hertzog et al., 2003).  
Similarly, studies manipulating word frequency, which also varies ease of processing, showed that 
subjects gave higher JOLs to high-frequency words, but actually have better memory for low-frequency 
words as evidenced by higher hit rates and fewer false alarms (Benjamin, 2003).  Thus, individuals often 
make incorrect inferences about the future memorability of items because they rely too heavily on intrinsic 
cues that do not always predict memory performance. 
Not only have individuals been shown to rely on misleading cues when making JOLs, but 
research has also shown they tend to undervalue cues that are predictive of future memory performance 
(Shaughnessy, 1981; Sungkhasettee et al., 2011).  These “extrinsic cues” are related to the conditions of 
learning, such as stimulus repetition, and duration and depth of encoding (Dunlosky & Matvey, 2001).  
For example, participants studied paired-word associates using either interactive imagery or rote 
rehearsal strategies, and made an immediate JOL following each pair (Shaughnessy, 1981). There was 
no difference in JOLs for the imagery versus rote rehearsal strategies, but memory performance was 
greater for pairs encoded using imagery (Shaughnessy, 1981). Similarly, another study showed that 
participants’ JOLs did not differ for words that were studied upright or inverted 180 degrees, but 
participants later recalled more inverted than upright words (Sungkhasettee et al., 2011).  This effect 
persisted even when participants were given several study-test cycles, which provided them with the 
opportunity to potentially learn about the benefits of deeper processing of inverted words.  Such results 
suggest subjects discount the memory benefit of ‘desirable difficulties’, such as the increased processing 
required to encode inverted words, which results in better subsequent memory performance 
(Sungkhasettee et al., 2011).   
In addition to understanding what kinds of cues participants do and do not use to make JOLs, it is 
also critical to determine how JOLs relate to subsequent memory performance, which is referred to as 
JOL accuracy (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008).  Unfortunately, immediate JOLs, those made during or 
immediately after study, are typically not very accurate (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991) because participants 
often based JOLs on fluency of encoding, which is nondiagnostic of memory success, or fail to consider 
the depth of encoding when making JOLs (Begg et al., 1989; Benjamin, 2003; Koriat, 1997; 
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Shaughnessy, 1981; Sungkhasettee et al., 2011).  The current experiment manipulates the cognitive 
basis of JOL accuracy by testing how JOLs vary for words of different fluencies based on familiarity with 
the stimulus (i.e., high vs. low frequency words) and fluency of perceptual processing (i.e., words 
presented in an upright or inverted orientation), and investigates how the brain supports JOL accuracy 
when judgments are made on cues that vary in their influence on memory performance. 
Turning to the brain bases of JOLs, neuroimaging and lesion studies provide converging 
evidence that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is important for JOLs, with different subregions relating to JOL 
ratings and JOL accuracy (Kao et al., 2005; Vilkki et al., 1999). Lesion studies have focused more broadly 
on the prefrontal cortex and showed that, compared to posterior lesion and control patients, patients with 
prefrontal lesions made less accurate predictions at the time of study about later retrieval success (Vilkki 
et al., 1999).  It is worth noting that there may be some hemispheric differences, with damage to the left 
frontal cortex leading to over-predicting recall ability, and damage to the right frontal cortex leading to 
both under-prediction and over-prediction of recall ability (Vilkki, Servo, & Surma-aho, 1998).  
Neuroimaging experiments have identified subregions of the PFC that may be responsible for specific 
aspects of JOLs, with some between study variations due to stimulus type and paradigm (Do Lam et al., 
2012; Kao et al., 2005).  For JOL ratings, greater activity in the medial PFC and orbitofrontal cortex 
[Brodmann areas (BA) 10 and 11] was correlated with higher JOL ratings in a face-name associative 
encoding task (Do Lam et al., 2012), whereas there was greater activity in lateral  (BA 44/6) and 
ventromedial prefrontal (vmPFC; BA11) regions for “will remember” predictions as compared to “will 
forget” predictions a scene encoding task (Kao et al., 2005), regardless of JOL accuracy. Similarly, in a 
verbal encoding task, Yang et al. (2015) found that “will remember” predictions were correlated with 
greater activity in the DLPFC (BA8) and vmPFC (BA10), as compared to “will forget” predictions.  ERP 
studies have also shown that the process of making JOLs produces a medial frontal positive waveform, 
the magnitude of which is correlated with the magnitude of JOLs ratings, implicating the medial PFC in 
the cognitive process of making JOLs as well as the subjective level of confidence expressed (Müller et 
al., 2016; Skavhaug et al., 2010; Skavhaug, Wilding, & Donaldson, 2013). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that both anterior (e.g., orbitofrontal), and posterior (e.g. DLPFC) regions within the PFC may 
track the magnitude of the JOL ratings, and anterior regions associated with JOLs are more medial, while 
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posterior regions are more lateral.  In terms of JOL accuracy, individual differences in JOL accuracy, as 
indexed by Gamma coefficients, were correlated with vmPFC (BA11) activity (Kao et al., 2005).  Although 
there is some variation in the subregions whose activity correlates with JOLs, both anterior and posterior 
prefrontal subregions have been shown to play roles in JOL ratings or accuracy, and are regions of 
interest that will be examined in the current experiment. 
Indeed, one brain stimulation study compared more anterior and more posterior prefrontal regions 
in JOLs (Ryals et al., 2016).  In an associative recognition and JOL task, continuous theta burst 
stimulation to the aPFC improved JOL accuracy as compared to DLPFC and vertex stimulation, 
suggesting a causal role of the aPFC in making accurate judgments (Ryals et al., 2016).  Although the 
main effect of stimulation location on trial-by-trial measures of JOL accuracy was marginal, aPFC 
stimulation decreased overall JOL ratings for subsequent misses, suggesting stimulation made subjects 
more aware of failures during encoding that would result in poor memory performance at test.  This raises 
the hypothesis that the aPFC supports JOL accuracy by increasing sensitivity to information at encoding 
that is predictive of later memory performance (Ryals et al., 2016). 
The results of Ryals et al.’s (2016) experiment testing the casual roles of the aPFC and DLPFC in 
JOLs showed no significant effect of stimulation on recognition performance.  This is notable because 
past research has implicated the PFC in successful episodic encoding.  Altough there is some evidence 
that patients with DLPFC lesions tend to be more impaired in recall than recognition (Mangels, 
Gershberg, Shimamura, & Knight, 1996; Staresina & Davachi, 2006), other studies have shown that 
patients with DLPFC lesions show impaired episodic recognition (Duarte, Ranganath, & Knight, 2005; 
Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1995), and neuroimaging research has more specifically highlighted the role of 
the left DLPFC in successful episodic encoding as measured by subsequent recognition (Blumenfeld & 
Ranganath, 2006, 2007; Sperling et al., 2001).  Given that common brain regions, such as the DLPFC, 
are associated with both objective and subjective memory processes, it is important to distinguish 
between the neural underpinnings of JOLs as compared to successful encoding.  Some metamemory 
studies have shown a dissociation between regions that contribute to JOLs and encoding: patients with 
prefrontal lesions show impaired JOLs but intact memory (Vilkki et al., 1999), and one fMRI study showed 
that activity in the medial PFC and aPFC was associated with the process of making JOLs, even when 
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exclusively masking JOL-related activity with contrasts reflecting encoding-related activity (i.e. identifying 
JOL-related activity that is independent of encoding) (Do Lam et al., 2012).  ERP research has also 
shown that JOLs and encoding processes produce similar positive waveforms over fronto-central and 
parieto-occipital sites in early time windows, but that these signals diverge at later time windows, with a 
negative waveform associated with JOLs but not encoding over left central sites (Skavhaug et al., 2010).  
Taken together, these results suggest that the neural mechanisms underlying JOLs and episodic 
encoding are partially dissociable.  Understanding the shared and distinct roles of brain regions in 
subjective and objective memory is crucial to clarifying the neural bases of JOL accuracy, which reflects 
the relationship between these two processes. Given that the aim of the current study is to test the role of 
the PFC in JOLs based on cues that vary in their diagnosticity of memory performance, a major focus is 
how the aPFC and DLPFC may differentially contribute to encoding and JOL processes. 
The current experiment uses non-invasive brain stimulation to test the novel hypothesis that the 
aPFC may bias individuals to make JOLs based on information that is predictive of later memory success, 
and discount cues that are nondiagnostic of future performance (Ryals et al., 2016). If the aPFC 
increases sensitivity to diagnostic over nondiagnostic cues, aPFC stimulation should result in increased 
JOL accuracy across cue types, as it will bias individuals toward basing JOLs on information that is 
predictive of memory success. Gaining knowledge about the causal role of the aPFC in JOL accuracy, 
and whether its role varies with the cognitive basis of the judgment, is a crucial step toward understanding 
the neural underpinnings of accurate memory awareness, establishing precise structure-function 
relationships, and informing future interventions to treat metamemory impairments.  
To test the roles of the aPFC and DLPFC in JOLs, we used transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS), a non-invasive brain stimulation technique, to manipulate brain activity.  Conventional tDCS 
involves passing a weak electrical current from one stimulating electrode, typically referred to as the 
anode, to one return electrode, typically referred to as the cathode. Because conventional tDCS uses 
relatively a relatively large anode and cathode that are spaced farther apart, inferences about specific 
brain regions being targeted are limited by poor spatial focality, resulting in possible stimulation of regions 
outside the area of interest (Datta, Truong, Minhas, Parra, & Bikson, 2012; Hampstead et al., 2014; 
Keeser et al., 2011).  To improve the spatial focality of tDCS, the current experiment uses “high definition” 
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tDCS (HD-tDCS), in which smaller electrodes are positioned with one stimulating electrode among an 
array of four return electrodes.  Although fewer studies have been conducted using HD-tDCS due to its 
relative novelty, there is evidence it produces changes in more focal regions of the cortex (Kuo et al., 
2013), with stimulation constricted to the area within the radius of the cathodes (Villamar et al., 2013).  
This increased spatial specificity reduces the likelihood of stimulating outside targeted regions of interest, 
and makes HD-tDCS a better method for testing how more precise subregions of the PFC contribute to 
JOL accuracy. Furthermore, HD-tDCS has been useful at identifying the causal role of the DLPFC in a 
different metamemory task, namely the feeling-of-knowing task, using a semantic retrieval paradigm 
(Chua & Ahmed, 2016; Chua et al., 2017).   The current experiment uses HD-tDCS to test the causal 
roles of the aPFC and DLPFC in JOL processes, and whether their roles vary with the cognitive basis of 




Twenty-five healthy Brooklyn College students were consented to participate in this six-session 
study for financial compensation ($15/hour for 4.5 hours). One participant only completed one session 
and was withdrawn from the study due to poor impedance at the second session. Thus, data from 24 
participants (12 F, ages 18-26, M = 21.0, SD = 2.11 years) were included.  G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to determine that for a repeated measures ANOVA with 1 group and 3 
measurements, a sample size of 24 subjects was needed for 80% power and a moderate effect size of 
0.27, which is lower than the effect size reported in a similar tDCS experiment testing the roles of DLPFC 
and anterior temporal lobe (ATL) in metamemory (Chua & Ahmed, 2016).  All participants were right-
handed, learned English before the age of 5, and were free from any self-reported neurological or 
psychological disorders, medical or skin conditions, unhealed wounds on the scalp, neck, face or 
forehead, and metallic implants. All participants gave written consent in a manner approved by the 





High definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) was delivered using the Soterix 
1x1 tDCS device (Model 1224-B, Soterix Medical, New York, NY) connected to the Soterix 4x1 adapter 
(Model 4X1-C3 and Model 4X1-C3A, Soterix Medical, New York, NY).   All stimulation conditions used 
five sintered Ag/AgCl ring electrodes (12 mm outer radius and 6 mm inner radius) to deliver low current 
stimulation.  In a within-subjects design, each participant received 3 stimulation sessions: active 
stimulation over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC), 
and sham stimulation over the left parietal cortex. Sham stimulation was administered over a different site 
from active stimulation to minimize the likelihood that subjects would be able to distinguish sham from 
active stimulation (i.e., subjects knew one of the three sessions would involve sham stimulation, and 
applying two sessions to the same site would indicate that one was sham, as well as possibly allow 
subjects to directly compare sensations experienced during both sessions at the same location).  
Electrode configurations were determined using Soterix HD-Explore (Soterix Medical, New York, NY), 
with electrode locations corresponding to locations on the 10-20 EEG system.  For aPFC stimulation, the 
anode was placed over FPZ with return electrodes at FP1, FP2, AF3, and AF4 (Fig 2A). For left DLPFC 
stimulation, the anode was placed over F3 with return electrodes at AF3, F1, F5 and FC3 (Fig. 2B). For 
sham, the anode was placed over CP3 with return electrodes at C3, CP5, CP1, and P3 (not shown). 
Before each stimulation session, subjects received a “pre-stimulation tickle”, which involved a 30-
second ramp up to 1 mA and immediate 30-second ramp down to baseline, to familiarize participants with 
the sensation of stimulation at half the current intensity of full stimulation, and determine whether they 
were able to tolerate stimulation.  All participants were able to tolerate stimulation. 
During each active stimulation session, following a 30-second ramp up, 2 mA of current was 
delivered through the stimulating electrode, often referred to as the anode, and distributed equally among 
the four return electrodes (0.5 mA each), often referred to as cathodes, for the duration of the study task. 
During sham stimulation sessions, current ramped up to 2 mA and then down to 0.1 mA over the course 
of 30 seconds; current was maintained at 0.1 mA for the duration of the task, which is an insufficient 
strength of current to produce any cognitive effects (Gandiga et al., 2006). The ramp up and down at the 
start of the sham session mimics the skin sensations experienced by subjects during active stimulation 
Gaynor 36 
(e.g.,itching), and has been shown to serve as an effective control in conventional tDCS so participants 
have difficulty distinguish between active and sham stimulation (Gandiga et al., 2006, but see Davis, 
Gold, Pascual-Leone, & Bracewell, 2013; Horvath, Carter, & Forte, 2014; O’Connell et al., 2012). 
Stimulation began ~3 min before start of the encoding task, and was aborted upon completion of the task.  
Each participant completed 6 sessions, which consisted of 3 study/test cycles, with 1 week 
between each.  Study and test were separated by 24 hours to ensure that there were no residual HD-
tDCS effects at test. Sessions were counterbalanced for stimulation sites and word lists across 
participants.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure  
Over 3 study/test sessions, participants studied a total of 600 words (average length: 5.63 letters, 
SD = 1.5) from the MRC Psycholinguistics Database (Wilson, 1988), which were divided into 3 study sets 
(100 words per set) and 3 test sets (200 words per set; 100 old/100 new).  50% of the words were 
presented upright, 50% presented inverted 180 degrees, and of these, 50% were high-frequency and 
50% low-frequency words. Word frequency, which refers to the number of times a particular word 
appears in a given corpus, was determined using the Kucera-Francis Frequency Scale (Kučera, H., & 
Francis, W. N., 1967).  Low frequency words were defined as those with values between 1 and 5, and 
high-frequency words ranged from 50-492, based on past research using Kucera-Francis Frequency 
ratings to define high vs. low-frequency words (Diana & Reder, 2006; Rudell, 1993).  Words were 
matched across conditions (frequency and orientation) and between lists by word length, concreteness, 
and imageability. 
Study Task:  The study task began ~3 minutes after stimulation began.  During the first visit, this 
time was filled with a practice session, during which participants studied and gave JOLs to 6 words to 
familiarize them with the task.  During visits 2 and 3, participants were at rest during the 3 minutes 
between the start of stimulation and start of the study task. All stimuli were presented using Psychopy 
v1.84.0 (Peirce, 2007).  
During each study session, subjects were presented with 100 total words for 2.5 seconds each. 
There were 25 words per frequency/orientation condition: upright/high frequency, inverted/high frequency, 
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upright/low frequency, and inverted/low frequency. Immediately after presentation of each word, 
participants saw a rating scale from 0-100% in 10% increments and gave a JOL rating (2.5 seconds) to 
indicate the likelihood they would remember the previously displayed word 24 hours later at test. 
Participants gave JOLs using the number scale on the keyboard from left to right, such that “~” = 0% 
confidence, 1 = 10% confidence, 2 = 20%, 3 = 30%... with 0 (i.e., where ‘10’ would be) indicating 100% 
confidence.  Study task duration was 8.3 min, excluding two optional 1 min breaks and self-paced 
instructions.   
After each study session, participants were given a post-stimulation questionnaire consisting of 
possible side effects they may have experienced (i.e. headache, neck pain, scalp pain, tingling, burning 
sensation, skin redness, sleepiness, trouble concentrating, acute mood changes, other), based on 
guidelines for reporting tDCS effects proposed in previous literature (Brunoni et al., 2011). Subjects 
indicated whether they experienced any of the listed side effects on a scale from 1-4 (1-absent, 2-mild, 3-
moderate, 4-severe), and whether they believed there was a relationship between the side effect and the 
stimulation on a scale from 1-5 (1-none, 2-remote, 3-possible, 4-probably, 5-definite). Finally, they were 
asked to indicate whether they thought they received active or sham stimulation (Appendix A).  
Recognition Task:  Twenty-four hours after each study session, subjects completed a self-paced 
old/new recognition test.  Each test consisted of all 100 studied words, in the same orientation as 
presented at study, and 100 new words matched on frequency and orientation (25 per 
frequency/orientation condition).  Subjects indicated their response via keypress (1 = old; 2 = new).  
Participants were compensated and debriefed after the final test on their last session.  Debriefing 
included a brief explanation of the general hypotheses being addressed by the experiment, and disclosing 
which of the three stimulation sessions were active vs. sham. 
 
Data Analyses 
To assess memory, we examined the effects of cue type and stimulation on hits and false alarms 
separately. Past research has shown that in addition to depth of encoding, greater memory for high-
frequency than low-frequency words may also be partly driven by false alarms to high-frequency words at 
test (Benjamin, 2003), so it was important to assess false alarms separately rather than in a composite 
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measure of memory such as corrected recognition or d’.  Furthermore, we predicted that memory for 
inverted words would be better than for upright words due to depth of encoding, but perceptual fluency 
may also cause individuals to produce more false-alarms to upright words at test (Johnston, Dark, & 
Jacoby, 1985).   
JOL accuracy was assessed using da, a signal-detection based trial-by-trial measure of 
metacognitive accuracy, in which a metacognitive hit, such as giving a high confidence rating to a 
successfully remembered item, is plotted against the probability of a metacognitive false-alarm, such as a 
high-confidence item that is not successfully remembered. Da is calculated by the following formula: da = 
√2yo⁄√1+m2 in which y0 represents the y-intercept and m represents the slope of the isosensitivity function 
(Benjamin & Diaz, 2008; Masson & Rotello, 2009).   
The relationships between recognition performance, JOL ratings, JOL accuracy, HD-tDCS site, 
word frequency, and word orientation were analyzed using mixed linear models and post-hoc t-tests in 
SPSS.  Full factorial designs examining effects of frequency and orientation were not evaluated due to 
low trial counts for combined frequency, orientation, and performance conditions (e.g., some individuals 
had no high-frequency upright misses). Instead, separate models were used to analyze the effects of: 1) 
frequency and stimulation on recognition performance, JOL ratings, and da, and 2) the effects of 
orientation and stimulation on recognition performance, JOL ratings, and da.  
Previous research has suggested the effects of tDCS may vary based on a number of individual 
differences, including anatomical differences related to sex, age, and head size (Datta et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, research has shown that internal psychological states, such as transient changes in mood 
(Harrison et al., 2008; Mayberg et al., 1999), alertness (Braboszcz & Delorme, 2011), and motivation 
(Berryhill, Peterson, Jones, & Stephens, 2014) alter baseline neural activity, which is likely to mediate the 
effects of tDCS (Berryhill et al., 2014; Learmonth, Thut, Benwell, & Harvey, 2015; Neuling, Rach, & 
Herrmann, 2013).  Thus, in order to control for the effects of individual variation in responses to tDCS, we 
included variables reflecting participants’ sex, age, head size, education level, mood, alertness, and 
sensitivity to stimulation as covariates in these mixed linear models.  To take into account the number of 
fixed effects parameters being estimated, all models used a restricted maximum likelihood procedure 
(SPSS version 23.0) to yield unbiased parameter estimates.  All results were considered significant at 
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p<0.05.    
In order to determine whether the inclusion of individual differences improved the strength of our 
mixed model, we first constructed a model using stimulation site, word frequency, and subsequent 
performance as predictors of JOL ratings.  Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) showed that relative to the 
model excluding covariates (AIC = 4734.677), the addition of covariates reflecting individual differences in 
stimulation experience (headache, scalp pain, tingling, burning, skin redness), mood state (sleepiness, 
trouble concentrating, acute mood changes), sex, age, and head circumference improved the strength of 
the model (AIC = 4646.953).  A model using stimulation site, word orientation, and subsequent 
performance as predictors of JOL ratings also showed that relative to the model excluding covariates 
(AIC = 4752.218), the inclusion of covariates improved the strength the model (AIC = 4666.139).  Models 
testing effects of stimulation and frequency, and stimulation and orientation on all other dependent 
variables (hits, false alarms, and da) showed that the strength of each model was improved by the 
inclusion of covariates.  Therefore, all subsequent models included these measures of individual 
differences as covariates, and subject ID as a random effect.  Stimulation site was coded with aPFC as 
the reference, and all other predictors were mean-centered to allow for interpretation of the intercept and 
avoid multicollinearity when assessing interactions.  All covariates in each model were evaluated at 
values of 0.  Outliers were determined with SPSS, using a step of 1.5 x Inter-quartile range, with quartiles 
defined according to Tukey’s hinges.  Outlier analyses were conducted on overall JOL ratings, corrected 
recognition, Gamma coefficients, and da performance.  One subject was excluded from all analyses of 
JOL accuracy based on outlier da performance during sham stimulation (da = 0.99), and another subject 
was excluded from analyses of JOL accuracy which included frequency as a predictor, due to extreme 




Because participants had optional breaks to take during encoding, and stimulation was 
terminated at the end of the encoding, we first evaluated whether there were differences in stimulation 
duration at encoding using a repeated measures ANOVA.  Total study task duration ranged from 9.24 - 
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11.28 min (M = 9.62 min, SD = .55 min), and stimulation site did not significantly affect time to complete 
study [F(2,46) = 0.340, p=0.713].  We also tested whether or not the time to complete the recognition test 
(range: 4.61 – 10.88 min; M = 7.56 min; SD = 1.41) varied by stimulation condition, and there were no 
differences between stimulation conditions [F(2,46) = 0.183, p=0.835).  
 
Participant Blinding 
To assess whether participants were blinded to the stimulation condition (i.e., active vs. sham), 
we examined their responses on the post-stimulation sensation questionnaire about whether they thought 
they received active or sham stimulation.  In the sham condition, 14 participants correctly guessed they 
received sham stimulation, and 10 incorrectly guessed they received active stimulation.  In the DLPFC 
condition, 17 participants correctly guessed they received active stimulation, and 7 incorrectly guessed 
they received sham stimulation.  In the aPFC condition, 17 participants correctly guessed they received 
active stimulation, and 7 incorrectly guessed they received sham stimulation.  To test if the belief about 
stimulation differed between conditions, we used a repeated measures logistic regression with aPFC 
stimulation as a reference.  Significantly more participants guessed they received active stimulation 
during aPFC stimulation as compared to sham (Wald Chi-Square = 5.549, p<0.05) and during DLPFC 
compared to sham (Wald Chi-Square = 3.953, p<0.05) but there was no significant difference in subjects’ 




Subsequent Recognition - Word Frequency 
In order to understand any potential effects of stimulation on recognition, we examined changes 
in hits and false alarms separately, and constructed two models with stimulation and frequency as 
predictors for each trial type (Fig. 3), and included individual differences as covariates.  For hits (Fig. 3A), 
word frequency was a significant predictor [F(1, 251.211) = 18.536, p<0.001), with higher hit rates for low-
frequency words (M = 0.660, SE = 0.038) compared to high-frequency words (M = 0.618, SE = 0.038; 
Mean Difference = 0.042, 95% CI [0.023, 0.061]), as expected due to deeper encoding of low-frequency 
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words.  There was no main effect of stimulation site (p>0.370), and no significant interaction between 
stimulation site and word frequency (p>0.310).  
Because the recognition benefit of low-frequency words has also shown to be driven by higher 
false alarms for high-frequency words (Benjamin, 2003), we analyzed the effects of stimulation and word 
frequency on false alarm rates (Fig. 3B), again including individual differences as covariates.  There was 
a significant main effect of stimulation [F(2,254.108) = 5.270, p<0.01], a significant main effect of 
frequency [F(1,251.381) = 57.946, p<0.001), and no significant interaction between stimulation and 
frequency on mean predicted false alarms (p>0.79).  Pairwise comparisons testing the significant main 
effect of stimulation site showed that as compared to false alarm rates following sham stimulation (M = 
0.241, SE = 0.027), DLPFC stimulation significantly increased subsequent false alarms (M = 0.267, SE = 
0.027; Mean Difference = 0.026, 95% CI [0.002, 0.049], p<0.05). False alarms with DLPFC stimulation 
were also significantly higher than with aPFC stimulation (M = 0.230, SE = 0.027; Mean Difference = 
0.037, 95% CI [0.014, 0.060], p<0.01), but there was no difference between aPFC and sham (p>0.38). 
There was also a significant main effect of word frequency: as expected, subjects had higher false alarm 
rates for high-frequency words (M = 0.279, SE = 0.027) than low-frequency words (M = 0.213, SE = 
0.027; Mean Difference = 0.067, 95% CI [0.049, 0.084], p<0.01).  Taken together, analyses of the effects 
of stimulation and word frequency on hits and false alarms suggest that subjects benefit from the 
distinctiveness of low-frequency words at encoding, as shown by higher hit rates for low- vs. high-
frequency words, but encoding was impaired by DLPFC stimulation, as shown by an increase in 
subsequent false alarm rates. 
 
Subsequent Recognition - Word Orientation 
We next constructed a model to examine the effects stimulation and word orientation as 
predictors of hits and false alarms.  A model including stimulation and orientation as predictors of hit rates 
with individual differences as covariates showed no significant main effect of stimulation [F(2,252.779) = 
1.120, p>0.32), and no interaction between stimulation and orientation [F(2,251.186) = 0.528, p>0.59), 
but a significant main effect of orientation on predicted hit rates [F(1,251.186) = 43.962, p<0.001]. Hit 
rates for inverted words (M = 0.669, SE = 0.038) were significantly higher than hit rates for upright words 
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(M = 0.609, SE = 0.038; Mean Difference = 0.061, 95% CI [0.043, 0.079]) (Fig. 4A), suggesting 
subsequent memory benefitted from greater depth of encoding and distinctiveness of inverted words at 
encoding.   
Turning to false alarm rates, there was a significant main effect of stimulation site [F(2,254.243) = 
5.025, p<0.01], a significant main effect of orientation [F(1,251.399) = 5.534, p<0.05], and no interaction 
between stimulation and orientation on predicted false alarm rates [F(2,251.399) = 0.024, p>0.97].  False 
alarms for upright words (M = 0.257, SE = 0.027) were significantly higher than false alarms for inverted 
words (M = 0.236, SE = 0.027; Mean Difference = 0.021, 95% CI [0.003; 0.039]) (Fig. 4B).  Pairwise 
comparisons on the effects of stimulation on false alarms showed that relative to sham (M = 0.241, SE = 
0.027) false alarms were significantly higher following DLPFC stimulation (M= 0.267, SE = 0.027; Mean 
Difference = 0.026, 95% CI [0.001, 0.050], p<0.05).  False alarms following DLPFC stimulation were also 
significantly higher than aPFC stimulation (M = 0.230, SE = 0.027, Mean Difference = 0.037, 95% CI 
[0.013, 0.061], p<0.01), with no significant difference between sham and aPFC (p>0.39). Thus, similarly 
to the effects of stimulation on memory for high- and low-frequency words, DLPFC stimulation increased 
false alarm rates.  Taken together, results suggest that encoding was poorer under DLPFC stimulation, 
as evidenced by a poorer ability to distinguish “new” and “old” items, as seen by an increase in overall 
false alarm rates after DLPFC stimulation regardless of frequency/orientation. 
 
Metamemory Performance 
Mean JOL Ratings – Word Frequency 
A primary aim of the current experiment was to test the effects of prefrontal stimulation on the 
magnitude and accuracy of JOLs based on different cue types.  Across all sessions, subjects’ mean JOLs 
ranged from 38.30 to 88.59 (M = 63.99, SD = 13.33).  We first constructed a model using stimulation site, 
word frequency, and subsequent performance on mean JOL ratings with individual differences as 
covariates.  There was a significant main effect of subsequent recognition [F(1,244.781) = 31.744, 
p<0.001] and a significant main effect of frequency [F(1,244.781) = 34.218; p<0.001]. There was no 
significant main effect of stimulation [F(2,247.462) = 0.297, p>0.74], and no 2- or 3-way interactions.  
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Subsequent recognition performance was a significant predictor of mean JOL ratings: as 
expected, mean JOLs for items subsequently remembered (M = 65.525, SE = 3.068) were significantly 
higher than mean JOLs for subsequent misses (M = 59.947, SE = 3.068; Mean Difference = 5.578, 95% 
CI [3.628, 7.528]). Word frequency was also a significant predictor of mean JOLs as predicted; JOLs for 
high frequency words (M = 65.632, SE = 3.068) were significantly higher than those for low frequency 
words (M = 59.841, SE = 3.068; Mean Difference = 5.791, 95% CI [3.841, 7.742]). Results are consistent 
with past work (Benjamin, 2003; Jia et al., 2016; Sungkhasettee et al., 2011), and support our hypothesis 
that subjects base JOLs on fluency at encoding, as reflected by higher JOL ratings for high-frequency 
words.  Stimulation site did not predict differences in mean JOL ratings and there were no significant 
interactions in the effects of stimulation, frequency, and performance on mean JOLs. 
 
Mean JOL Ratings – Word Orientation 
We then constructed a model using stimulation site, word orientation, and subsequent 
performance on mean JOL ratings with individual differences as covariates.  Again, as predicted, subjects 
gave higher JOLs to subsequent hits (M = 65.493, SE = 3.116) than subsequent misses (M = 60.350, SE 
= 3.116; Mean Difference = 5.143, 95% CI [3.316, 6.970], F(1,244.816) = 30.748, p<0.001).  Consistent 
with research showing subjects often incorrectly base confidence on fluency of encoding (Johnston et al., 
1985; Koriat, 1997), subjects also gave higher JOLs to upright words (M = 64.026, SE = 3.116) than 
inverted words (M = 61.817, SE = 3.116; Mean Difference = 2.210, 95% CI [0.383, 4.037], F(1,244.816) = 
5.675, p<0.05).  However, stimulation did not significantly predict mean JOLs [F(2,247.121) = 0.414, 
p>0.66] and there were no significant 2- or 3- way interactions.  Taken together, results demonstrate 
typical findings regarding the cues used to make JOL ratings: subjects gave higher JOLs to high-
frequency and upright words, suggesting they base confidence in retrieval on ease of encoding (Koriat, 
1997), but stimulation had no effect on JOLs for any cue type. 
 
JOL Accuracy – Word Frequency 
As is typical with immediate JOLs, subjects’ JOL accuracy was poor to moderate, with mean da 
values across all cue conditions ranging from -0.28 to 0.73 (M = 0.22, SD = 0.23), excluding outliers. To 
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understand how stimulation affected trial-by-trial measures of JOL accuracy, and whether this varied by 
word frequency, we constructed a mixed linear model using stimulation site and frequency as predictors 
of da, a signal detection based measure of metamemory accuracy (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008), and included 
individual differences as covariates. There was a main effect of word frequency on predicted mean da 
[F(1,490.084) = 14.756, p<0.001], with JOL accuracy being significantly higher for low-frequency words 
(M = 0.258, SE = 0.055) than high-frequency words (M = 0.175, SE = 0.055; Mean Difference = 0.083, 
95% CI [0.040, 0.125]).  There was also a main effect of stimulation site [F(2,498.879) = 7.642, p<0.002], 
with worse JOL accuracy in the DLPFC condition (M = 0.155, SE = 0.056) compared to sham (M = 0.229, 
SE = 0.057; Mean Difference = -0.074, 95% CI [-0.033, -0.016], p<0.05) and compared to aPFC 
stimulation (M = 0.265, SE = 0.056; Mean Difference =  -0.110, 95% CI [-0.168, -0.053], p<0.001), with no 
difference in da between aPFC and sham conditions (p>0.25). This main effect of stimulation was 
qualified by a significant interaction between stimulation site and word frequency [F(2,490.084) = 11.780, 
p<0.001], showing differential effects of stimulation depending on word frequency. For low frequency 
words, aPFC stimulation significantly improved da values relative to sham (Mean Difference = 0.164, 95% 
CI [0.083, 0.245], p < 0.001), and relative to DLPFC stimulation (Mean Difference = 0.181, 95% CI [0.104, 
0.259], p<0.001).  In contrast, for high-frequency words, aPFC and DLPFC stimulation significantly 
impaired accuracy relative to sham (aPFC vs. sham: Mean Difference = -0.092, 95% CI [-0.173, -0.011], 
p<0.05]; DLPFC vs. sham: Mean Difference = -0.132, 95% CI [-0.210, -0.054], p<0.002) (Fig. 5A).  Taken 
together, these results suggest aPFC stimulation selectively improved JOL accuracy for the less fluent 
condition, while both prefrontal stimulation sites decreased accuracy for words that were more fluent at 
encoding. 
 
JOL Accuracy – Word Orientation 
To test whether stimulation affected JOL accuracy when judgments were based on word 
orientation, we constructed a mixed linear model using stimulation site and word orientation as predictors 
of da, including individual differences as covariates.  There was a significant main effect of word 
orientation [F(1,513.516) = 13.418, p<0.001], a significant main effect of stimulation site [F(2,531.256) = 
.796, p<0.05], and a significant interaction between orientation and stimulation site [F(2, 513.516 = 3.666, 
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p<0.05] on predicted mean da.  Predicted mean da was higher for inverted words (M = 0.260, SE = 0.041) 
relative to upright words (M = 0.156, SE = 0.041; Mean Difference = 0.104, 95% CI [0.048, 0.160]).  There 
was a significant main effect of stimulation site on JOL accuracy, and pairwise comparisons 
demonstrated that da for aPFC stimulation (M = 0.266, SE = 0.044) was marginally higher than during 
sham stimulation (M = 0.195, SE = 0.045; Mean Difference = 0.071, 95% CI [0.010, 0.152], p<0.09], and 
significantly higher than during DLPFC stimulation (M = 0.162, SE = 0.044; Mean Difference = 0.104, 
95% CI [0.029, 0.179], p<0.01).  This main effect of stimulation was qualified by a significant interaction 
between stimulation site and word orientation on mean predicted da.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
stimulation site had no effect on da values for upright words. For inverted words, relative to sham (M = 
0.255, SE = 0.051), aPFC stimulation significantly improved JOL accuracy (M = 0.361, SE = 0.051; Mean 
Difference = 0.106, 95% CI [0.000, 0.212], p<0.05) and DLPFC stimulation marginally impaired JOL 
accuracy (M = 0.164, SE = 0.050; Mean Difference = -0.091, 95% CI [-0.194, -0.11], p<0.09).  This 
produced a significant difference in JOL accuracy for inverted words between DLPFC and aPFC 
stimulation sites (Mean Difference = 0.197, 95% CI [0.096, 0.299], p<0.001) (Fig. 5B). Similarly to the 
effects of stimulation on da for high- and low-frequency words, here, aPFC stimulation appears to have 
selectively improved JOL accuracy for words in the less fluent condition. 
 
Discussion 
Although the aPFC has been implicated in JOL accuracy (Kao et al., 2005; Ryals et al., 2016), 
and the DLPFC has been associated with JOL magnitude and encoding success (Blumenfeld & 
Ranganath, 2007; Do Lam et al., 2012; Kao et al., 2005), no research to date has investigated how the 
roles of these regions may vary with the cognitive bases of JOLs.   We replicated previous behavioral 
findings by showing that mean JOL ratings were higher for high-frequency and upright words, consistent 
with an ‘easily learned, easily remembered’ heuristic (Koriat, 1997).  However, because memory 
performance benefits from depth of encoding (Bjork & Bjork, 2011; Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and stimulus 
novelty (Kishiyama, Yonelinas, & Knight, 2009), recognition was better for low-frequency and inverted 
words.  Turning to the brain bases of JOLs and encoding, HD-tDCS over the DLPFC impaired encoding, 
as evidence by increased false alarms for all cue types.  For JOL accuracy, HD-tDCS over the aPFC 
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selectively improved JOL accuracy for the least fluent encoding conditions, i.e. low-frequency and 
inverted words. Taken together, our results suggest a causal role of the DLPFC in encoding, indicate that 
memory and metamemory functions are at least partially dissociable in the prefrontal cortex. and fill an 
existing gap in knowledge about the interaction between cognitive and neural bases of JOLs by revealing 
that the roles of the aPFC and DLPFC in metamemory accuracy vary based on encoding fluency. 
 
Behavioral Effects of cue type on memory and metamemory 
Our findings that word frequency and orientation predicted recognition performance are 
consistent with past research suggesting subjects have better memory under conditions of encoding 
disfluency (Besken & Mulligan, 2013; Yue et al., 2012), including disfluency that results from lack of 
familiarity with the stimulus (Jia et al., 2016; Kishiyama & Yonelinas, 2003; Whittlesea & Williams, 2000).  
Several studies have shown that the novelty of verbal stimuli influences recognition success (Kishiyama & 
Yonelinas, 2003; Kishiyama et al., 2009), likely because novelty leads to deeper processing or attentional 
orienting to unfamiliar stimuli (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Kishiyama et al., 2009).  In the current study, 
subjects had higher hit rates and lower false alarm rates for low-frequency as compared to high-
frequency words, confirming the benefit of relative novelty on recognition performance.   We also found 
effects of word orientation on memory performance: subjects had significantly higher hit rates and lower 
false alarm rates for inverted as compared to upright words, consistent with past research suggesting 
perceptual disfluency promotes memory success due to deeper encoding (Besken & Mulligan, 2013; 
Rhodes & Castel, 2008).  
Despite having better overall memory for low-frequency and inverted words, JOLs were 
significantly higher for high-frequency and upright words.  This is consistent with past research showing 
the effects of word frequency on metamemory ratings (Benjamin, 2003; Jia et al., 2016; Sungkhasettee et 
al., 2011), and supports the notion that subjects use an ‘easily learned, easily remembered’ heuristic 
wherein confidence increases with fluency of encoding (Besken & Mulligan, 2013; Koriat, 2008a; Miele, 
Finn, & Molden, 2011).  Because low-frequency words are more disfluent due to less baseline familiarity 
with the stimulus (Balota, Burgess, Cortese, & Adams, 2002; Jia et al., 2016), and processing of inverted 
words is more effortful due to perceptual disfluency (Johnston et al., 1985; Rhodes & Castel, 2008), 
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subjects rely on fluency as a cue to learning and mistakenly give lower JOLs to words under these 
conditions, based on the subjective experience of more effortful encoding. 
 
Effects of HD-tDCS on recognition performance 
In addition to the behavioral effects of frequency and orientation on recognition performance, we 
showed that HD-tDCS over the DLPFC led to greater subsequent false alarms, as compared to aPFC 
and sham stimulation.  This pattern held for the model that included frequency, with greater false alarm 
rates for both high and low frequency words, and for the model that included orientation, with greater 
false alarm rates for both upright and inverted words.  These results suggest the DLPFC plays a causal 
role in encoding success by supporting accurate discrimination between old and new items, and 
stimulation interfered with this function.   
Most past literature implicating the DLPFC in false alarms has focused on its contribution during 
retrieval (Henson et al., 1999; Parkin, Bindschaedler, Harsent, & Metzler, 1996; Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, 
& Rugg, 2005), but some research has shown the role of the lateral PFC during encoding is associated 
with subsequent false alarms (Demeter, Mirdamadi, Meehan, & Taylor, 2016; Slotnick & Schacter, 2004).  
For example, one fMRI study showed that increased activity in the lateral PFC (BA10/45) during encoding 
of shapes was associated with subsequent false-alarms to similar nonstudied shapes as compared to 
subsequent hits (Slotnick & Schacter, 2004), although it is worth noting that these regions are more 
ventral/anterior than our DLPFC stimulation site.  However, another study showed that excitatory short 
theta-burst stimulation (TBS) to the left DLPFC during encoding marginally lowered the proportion of 
subsequent false alarms for lure items relative to stimulating the vertex (Demeter et al., 2016), indicating 
perhaps short TBS to the DLPFC strengthened encoding of specific information, which lead to  a 
decrease in false alarms. 
False alarms in recognition memory are typically thought to be based on familiarity (Kishiyama & 
Yonelinas, 2003; Reder et al., 2000; Yonelinas, 1994), a hypothesis which is further supported by our 
finding that subjects had greater false alarm rates for high-frequency than low-frequency words.  In 
addition to feelings of familiarity that stem from repeated exposure to a stimulus, such as in the case of 
high-frequency words, there is also evidence that perceptual fluency may lead to a sense of familiarity 
Gaynor 48 
(Johnston et al., 1985; Proverbio et al., 2007), supporting our finding that subjects had higher false alarms 
for upright as compared to inverted words.  Although the effects of DLPFC stimulation on false alarms did 
not vary by cue type in the current study, other work has implicated the DLPFC in encoding of more 
distinctive items.  Indeed, several lesion studies have demonstrated that patients with DLPFC lesions do 
not show the memory advantage for novel stimuli typically seen in healthy controls (Duarte et al., 2005; 
Kishiyama & Yonelinas, 2003; Kishiyama et al., 2009).  In one study, prefrontal lesion patients completed 
a von Restorff task, in which photos of items were made novel at study by presenting them in a color that 
differed from the majority of other study items.  Subjects had poorer recollection- and familiarity-based 
recognition performance for all items compared to controls and, importantly, did not show a memory 
benefit for novel as compared to familiar photos, suggesting the DLPFC is crucial to the novelty 
advantage in long-term memory encoding (Kishiyama et al., 2009).  Another lesion study showed that 
patients with DLPFC lesions were impaired in familiarity-based recognition, and that this impairment was 
specific to items presented toward the lesioned hemisphere at encoding (Duarte et al., 2005), suggesting 
a deficit in successful subsequent familiarity processing at encoding, rather than retrieval. Therefore, one 
possible interpretation of the effect we found of DLPFC stimulation on false alarms is that recruitment of 
the DLPFC during encoding differs for novel vs. familiar stimuli, and tDCS to this region disrupted the 
benefit of stimulus novelty on subsequent performance. 
It is worth noting that our results show that tDCS to the DLPFC during encoding disrupted, rather 
than enhanced, recognition performance by increasing false alarms.  Although some studies have shown 
that tDCS to the prefrontal cortex can benefit memory performance (Chua et al., 2017; Matzen, Trumbo, 
Leach, & Leshikar, 2015), several other studies have shown that stimulation fails to improve performance 
in other cognitive domains (Boggio et al., 2010; Gaynor & Chua, 2016; Marshall, Mölle, Siebner, & Born, 
2005; Monti et al., 2008), and this is likely due to differences in task design, stimulation parameters such 
as electrode montages, and characteristics of the subjects in the sample (Tremblay et al., 2014).  
Therefore, our finding that tDCS to the DLPFC impaired recognition performance is consistent with 
research suggesting that excitatory stimulation does not always have facilitatory effects on performance 
(Boggio et al., 2010; Gaynor & Chua, 2016; Marshall et al., 2005; Monti et al., 2008; Tremblay et al., 
2014), and demonstrates a causal role of the DLPFC in encoding success. 
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Effects of HD-tDCS on JOL accuracy 
Based on past research implicating the aPFC in JOL accuracy (Kao et al., 2005; Ryals et al., 
2016), and evidence that the aPFC plays a role in integrating information from other regions in support of 
abstract rules and goals (Badre, 2008; Koechlin et al., 1999), we hypothesized that aPFC stimulation 
would bias individuals toward using cues that are predictive of memory success, leading to better JOL 
accuracy in the low frequency and inverted conditions.  Indeed, aPFC stimulation significantly improved 
JOL accuracy, as measured by da, for low-frequency and inverted words, relative to sham and DLPFC 
stimulation, showing that the aPFC plays a causal role in JOL accuracy.  However, we also found that 
both DLPFC and aPFC stimulation decreased JOL accuracy for high-frequency words relative to sham, 
suggesting the roles of these regions vary based on the diagnosticity of the cue: for disfluent conditions, 
the aPFC made subjects’ JOLs more sensitive to the memory benefit of disfluency, but in the case of 
high-frequency words, which are familiar and fluently encoded, DLPFC and aPFC stimulation made 
subjects more reliant on the nondiagnostic cue of fluency.  The finding that the aPFC biased individuals 
toward using disfluency as a cue that predicts memory success is in line with the theory that when faced 
with multiple possible responses based on bottom-up information from posterior regions, anterior portions 
of the PFC act to bias responses in the interest of higher-order ongoing task goals (Badre, 2008).  
However, aPFC stimulation also made subjects’ JOLs less sensitive to the fact that high fluency of 
encoding is non-predictive of memory success.  In other words, in the case of high-frequency words, 
subjects made JOLs that were even more dependent on fluency, resulting in poorer JOL accuracy.  
Therefore, it remains unclear how the aPFC may bias subjects toward using predictive information in the 
face of competing response options, because enhancement of aPFC activity increased reliance on both 
diagnostic and nondiagnostic cues.  Nevertheless, the finding that aPFC stimulation influenced JOL 
accuracy is somewhat consistent with theories suggesting cognitive control mechanisms may be 
arranged hierarchically along the rostro-caudal axis of the PFC, with anterior regions supporting complex, 
abstract relationships between representations, such as the relationship between JOL ratings and 
encoding success (Badre, 2008; Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000).   
In the context of theories proposing a hierarchical organization of the PFC, the finding that the 
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DLPFC also impaired JOL accuracy for high-frequency words could also reflect increased reliance on 
stimulus-level properties when making JOLs:  if posterior regions of the PFC track lower-level sensory 
information related to the stimulus, enhancing activity in the DLPFC may have enhanced the salience of 
the fluency cue, making it a more prominent basis on which subjects based JOLs, resulting in poorer JOL 
accuracy.  However, we did not find that DLPFC stimulation altered mean JOL ratings for any cue types, 
which might have been expected if stimulation enhanced the salience of cues on which JOLs are based, 
and further research should address whether the DLPFC plays a direct role in JOL accuracy, or whether it 
tracks only stimulus-level properties.   
 
Limitations 
Our inferences about the roles of the aPFC and DLPFC in JOLs and encoding rest on the 
assumption that we are administering focal stimulation to these precise regions using HD-tDCS.  
However, despite the ability of HD-tDCS to administer relatively more focal stimulation as compared to 
conventional tDCS (Villamar et al., 2013), it is still possible that current reached cortical regions outside 
the regions of interest in our study (Bai, Dokos, Ho, & Loo, 2014; Bikson et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2009), 
and that the differences we saw between DLPFC and aPFC stimulation conditions reflect relative 
differences between potentially broader regions stimulated by our montages.  Indeed, multimodal studies 
have shown that stimulation may alter activity in more distal cortical regions that are functionally 
connected to the sites of stimulation (Hampstead et al., 2014; Jacobson et al., 2012; Keeser et al., 2011).  
Nevertheless, studies have shown that HD-tDCS stimulation is relatively more focal than conventional 
tDCS (Kuo et al., 2013; Villamar et al., 2013), and here we show relative differences between the effects 
of aPFC and DLPFC stimulation, suggesting that the roles of these regions in JOL processes are at least 
somewhat dissociable.   
It is also important to consider that the effects of tDCS on behavior are known to be dependent on 
a variety of factors related to endogenous brain activity (Berryhill et al., 2014; Brunoni et al., 2012; Datta 
et al., 2012), which may vary based on anatomical differences, age, mood state, and levels of arousal.  
Therefore, it is possible that we failed to detect some effects of stimulation due to variability in responses 
to tDCS based on these factors.  We attempted to minimize the degree to which these factors influenced 
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our results by controlling for individual differences in sex, age, head circumference, stimulation 
experience (e.g., itching, headache), and mood states (e.g., trouble concentrating, sleepiness) in our 
analyses of the effects of tDCS on memory and metamemory; however, further research is needed to test 
how these individual differences mediate the effects of tDCS on other forms of cognition, with an aim to 
better predict who will benefit from tDCS. 
 
Conclusions 
The current experiment provides evidence for a causal role of the DLPFC in recognition based on 
distinctiveness at encoding, and of the aPFC in JOL accuracy.  Importantly, this is the first study to 
investigate how the cognitive basis of JOLs interacts with the regions of the PFC thought to be involved in 
JOL processes.  We showed that the aPFC contributes to accurate JOLs made based on word frequency 
by biasing individuals toward basing their subjective judgments on disfluency, which is predictive of 
objective memory success.  Conversely, DLPFC and aPFC stimulation decreased JOL accuracy for high-
frequency words, suggesting the roles of these regions in JOLs vary with the cognitive bases of the 
judgments.  We also demonstrated that HD-tDCS may be an effective method by which to enhance 
metamemory accuracy, but that it may also impair accuracy, and the nature of the effect varies with the 
cognitive basis of subjective confidence.  The results of the current experiment provide an important 
contribution to our understanding of the causal roles of PFC subregions in memory and metamemory 
processes and how they may vary with cognitive mechanisms underlying these functions, and our 











Brain activity associated with confidence in semantic recognition varies based on the presence 




























Past research has shown that retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs), in which subjects 
assess their confidence in a retrieval response, can be based on multiple sources of information, 
including the strength of the memory trace, internal cues stemming from the subjective experience of 
retrieval, and external information about the task.  Studies on the neural mechanisms involved in RCJs 
have implicated the prefrontal, parietal, and temporal cortices in the magnitude and accuracy of these 
judgments in episodic retrieval, but no studies to date have tested how the roles of these regions may 
differ when RCJs are based on internal memory cues as compared to external questions about task 
difficulty during semantic recognition.  Here we used fMRI to test brain activity associated with semantic 
recognition and RCJs when subjects received external information about task difficulty, in the form of 
valid, invalid, or no cues about question difficulty.  We first replicated and extended prior work on RCJs in 
episodic memory tasks, and showed that, like in episodic tasks, making a confidence judgment compared 
to making a recognition judgment engaged regions of the prefrontal, parietal, and temporal regions during 
a semantic memory task.  Next, focusing on the influence of external information, there was greater 
activity during uncued trials compared to trials with a difficulty cue in lateral and medial parietal regions, 
as well as inferior temporal regions, which may be related to response uncertainty. We found that activity 
in the parietal lobe, anterior cingulate, and occipital cortex was greater for valid than invalid cues during 
hard questions, whereas activity in occipital and subcortical regions was greater for invalid than valid cues 
during easy questions, suggesting the effects of cue validity vary with question difficulty.   Finally, we 
examined individual differences and showed that the degree to which subjects relied on an invalid cue 
during RCJs for correctly answered hard questions correlated with activity in bilateral medial temporal 
lobes, which may reflect a role of this region in integration between multiple sources of information.  
Taken together, our results contribute to our understanding of the brain regions involved in RCJs during 
semantic retrieval, and suggest the roles of these regions differ when subjects make judgments based on 





Accurate confidence in one’s own memory is crucial to effective learning and behavioral control.  
For instance, a student who is confident he has retrieved the correct answer on a given exam question is 
less likely to spend further time on that question or check his answers, while a student with less 
confidence in his response may spend more time attempting retrieval of possible alternative answers.  
Retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs) are subjective judgments made after retrieval, and reflect an 
individual’s certainty in the accuracy of their response (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Research on the 
cognitive bases of RCJs has shown that individuals make inferences based on a variety of information 
available at retrieval when making their confidence judgments, including: the strength of the memory 
being assessed, internal cues that arise from the experience of retrieval, and/or external information 
about task difficulty or preconceived notions about competence (Busey et al., 2000; Chua et al., 2012; 
Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; Koriat et al., 2008; Norman & Schacter, 1997).  However, less is known about 
the neural basis of confidence judgments based on different sources of information. Neuroimaging 
studies have implicated the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in RCJs (Chua et 
al., 2006, 2009a, 2009b; Hayes et al., 2011; Henson et al., 2000; Kim & Cabeza, 2009; Simons et al., 
2010).  Some regions, such as the dorsolateral and ventrolateral PFC and dorsal parietal cortex, show 
greater activity with lower confidence responses, while others, such as the ventral parietal cortex, show 
greater activity with high confidence.  However, there is some evidence that the roles of the PPC and 
PFC may vary with the cognitive basis of the RCJ (Kim & Cabeza, 2007).  Here, we manipulated the 
validity of external information about question difficulty in a semantic recognition task to determine how 
frontal and parietal regions contribute to RCJs that are based on external information vs. internal cues 
about memory success. 
Early research on the cognitive bases of RCJs promoted a direct access view of metamemory, 
based on the hypothesis that individuals monitor and assess the strength of stored memories, and base 
their confidence on the product of this assessment (Busey et al., 2000; Hart, 1967a).  This hypothesis 
was supported by evidence that subjective confidence judgments tend to be relatively accurate as they 
relate to objective memory performance, and both processes are often sensitive to the same 
experimental manipulations (Cohen, Sandier, & Keglevich, 1991; Lindsay et al., 1998; Stretch & Wixted, 
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1998).  However, other work challenged the direct access views because the same experimental 
manipulations can have different effects on memory accuracy and confidence ratings (Jameson, Narens, 
Goldfarb, & Nelson, 1990; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993), which suggested confidence may be based on 
information other than, or in addition to, access to the strength of stored memories, and that metamemory 
and memory processes are dissociable.  
Instead of direct access, a significant body of behavioral research has suggested that RCJs are 
inferential in nature, and the level of confidence expressed can be based on internal and external 
information available at the time of the judgment (Bradfield et al., 2002; Jaeger, Cox, & Dobbins, 2012; 
Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; Koriat et al., 2008). For instance, a subject’s 
confidence may be inflated because she quickly retrieved information during memory search in an 
attempt to answer a question (Koriat et al., 2008), and because accurate answers are often quickly 
retrieved, she infers this information is correct even if it was incorrect.  In another example, her answer 
may be consistent with external sources (Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012), and she infers her response is 
correct even if those sources are unreliable.  When RCJs are based on information that is correlated with 
actual memory success, there is a strong relationship between confidence and memory accuracy; 
however, confidence may also be based on cues that are nondiagnostic of actual memory performance, 
leading to inaccurate RCJs (Busey et al., 2000; Koriat et al., 2008).  Thus, it is critical to understand under 
what conditions subjects base their confidence on different types of information available at retrieval. 
 The dual-process system of metacognitive monitoring posits that individuals base their 
confidence judgments on: 1) experience-based cues, which arise from the subjective experience of 
retrieval, and 2) information-based cues, those that reflect previously held beliefs about one’s memory, 
test difficulty, and competence in the domain being tested (Koriat et al., 2008).  Common experience-
based cues are typically related to memory strength, such as vividness of the accessed memory 
(Robinson, Johnson, & Robertson, 2000), which lead to relatively accurate confidence ratings.  However, 
RCJs are also sensitive to other experience-based cues that are not necessarily diagnostic of memory 
accuracy, such as retrieval fluency (Shaw & McClure, 1996).  For instance, in weeks following witnessing 
an event, subjects had inflated confidence in their memory for details about which they are repeatedly 
tested, relative to those details about which they were asked only at initial questioning, but had equal 
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memory accuracy for both conditions, suggesting that repeated retrieval lead to a greater sense of 
fluency on which confidence assessments were based (Shaw & McClure, 1996).    
Information-based cues, which reflect beliefs about one’s own memory processes or factors that 
affect memory performance, have also been shown to influence confidence judgments (Jaeger, Lauris, et 
al., 2012; Koriat et al., 2008; Wells & Bradfield, 1998, 1999).  For instance, when subjects were asked to 
list reasons in support of their answer on a general knowledge recognition task, confidence increased 
with the number of reasons listed, perhaps because subjects weighed the evidence in favor of their 
answer relative to evidence in favor of the alternative, and thus had higher confidence when they were 
able to retrieve more supportive evidence (Koriat et al., 2008). Another source of external information that 
influences confidence judgments is “consensuality”, or the proportion of people who endorse a given 
response, regardless of its accuracy (Koriat et al., 2008).  For instance, Koriat et al. (2008) found that 
when subjects studied English words and their translations in a foreign language, confidence ratings 
correlated with the consensuality of the translation: subjects had higher confidence for both correct and 
incorrect answers when those answers were endorsed by most other participants (Koriat et al., 2008).  
This suggests that individuals inflate their confidence for questions to which they believe most people 
should know the answer, irrespective of the actual accuracy of the response.  
Although cues can be categorized as experience or information based, individuals often use a 
combination of information-based and experience-based cues when making confidence judgments, and 
the weights given to different type cues vary based on the individual and situation.  For example, when 
individuals have weak memories they may rely less on internal experience-based cues, and more heavily 
on external information-based cues, such as recommendations of confederates, (Bradfield et al., 2002; 
Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012; Wells & Bradfield, 1998, 1999).  Specifically, eyewitnesses’ confidence in 
their identification of targets in a lineup is inflated when they receive feedback confirming their choice, and 
this may be because of weak memory of the conditions of retrieval, such as having a clear view of the 
suspect (Wells & Bradfield, 1998, 1999).  Indeed, one study testing this hypothesis found that inaccurate 
witnesses’ confidence was higher when receiving confirming feedback than in a control condition, but 
accurate witnesses gave equal confidence ratings with and without feedback, indicating those with 
weaker internal memory cues are more affected by external feedback (Bradfield et al., 2002). Similar 
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results, in which subjects incorporate external information into their confidence ratings when unable to 
rely on internal memory cues, has been shown in old/new recognition tasks (Jaeger, Cox, et al., 2012; 
Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012).  In one study, subjects were given cues about whether an item was ‘likely 
old’ or ‘likely new’, which were either from reliable (75% valid) or unreliable (50% valid) sources.  In cases 
of low confidence, subjects were more likely to incorporate the recommendations of both reliable and 
unreliable sources, likely because they could not rely on their own internal memory cues during such trials 
(Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012).  
Although behavioral research has addressed some of the cognitive bases of RCJs, relatively less 
is known about the brain bases of these judgments, particularly how brain activity associated with RCJs 
relates to the cognitive bases of the judgments (Chua et al., 2014; Kim & Cabeza, 2007).  There is some 
initial evidence that the roles of brain regions involved in RCJs may vary with the cognitive sources of 
confidence (Kim & Cabeza, 2007), but a better understanding is needed of the neurocognitive 
mechanisms involved in the reliance on internal vs. external sources of information when making 
confidence judgments, which is the goal of this study. 
There are multiple ways to examine confidence-related processes in the brain, including 
comparing the brain activity correlated with the process of assessing one’s confidence as compared to 
the process of retrieval, and which regions track the subjective level of confidence expressed (Chua et al., 
2006).  Regions of the prefrontal and parietal cortices have been broadly implicated in RCJ processes 
(Chiou et al., 2011; Chua et al., 2009a; Davidson et al., 2008; Hayes et al., 2011; Henson et al., 2000; 
Kim & Cabeza, 2007; Simons et al., 2010).  Lesion studies have shown that RCJs are impaired in frontal 
traumatic brain injury (TBI) patients in a recognition task (Chiou et al., 2011), and in patients with parietal 
lesions in remember/know paradigms (Davidson et al., 2008), and old/new recognition and source 
recollection tasks (Simons et al., 2010).  Furthermore, neuroimaging research has shown that the process 
of making a confidence judgment, as compared to a recognition task, is associated with activity in the 
lateral and medial parietal cortex, and dorsolateral, ventrolateral, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(Chua et al., 2006, 2009b). 
Turning to the subjective level of confidence expressed, neuroimaging data has shown that in the 
prefrontal cortex, the DLPFC and ventrolateral PFC show more activity during low as compared to high 
Gaynor 58 
RCJs in an associative recognition paradigm (Chua et al., 2009a), an old/new verbal recognition task 
(Henson et al., 2000), and during item and source memory tasks (Hayes et al., 2011), perhaps because 
lower confidence trials place greater demands on monitoring processes.  In the parietal cortex, activity in 
the dorsal PPC was greater for low vs. high confidence (Chua et al., 2009a; Kim & Cabeza, 2007; Moritz 
et al., 2006), consistent with research suggesting the superior parietal lobe is involved in top-down 
allocation of attention to memory retrieval (Ciaramelli et al., 2008; Olson & Berryhill, 2009) and increased 
activity when monitoring uncertain or ambiguous targets that require more effortful retrieval (Ciaramelli et 
al., 2008).   
In contrast to dorsal PPC regions that show increased activity with low confidence, studies have 
shown that activity in the ventral PPC correlated with higher confidence ratings (Chua et al., 2009a; 
Hayes et al., 2011).  This is consistent with research suggesting the ventral PPC may track the strength 
of the memory being assessed (Cabeza et al., 2008), as evidenced by greater activity during recollection 
than familiarity-based recognition (Henson et al., 1999), and during hits as compared to correct rejections 
(Konishi et al., 2000).  Taken together, these results suggest PFC and dorsal PPC regions show greater 
activity with low confidence due to greater demands on monitoring during effortful retrieval, while activity 
in the ventral PPC tracks the strength of the memory being monitored. 
Although the above research has begun to identify how prefrontal and parietal regions contribute 
to high and low confidence judgments, it remains unknown how the neural mechanisms underlying RCJs 
interact with the cue types on which RCJs are based.   However, there is some evidence to suggest that 
the roles of prefrontal and parietal regions in RCJs may vary with the cognitive basis of the judgments 
(Kim & Cabeza, 2007).  For example, Kim & Cabeza (2007) showed greater activity in frontal and lateral 
parietal regions with low confidence during true recognition, but greater activity in similar regions with high 
confidence during false recognition.  Based on the premise that false recognition is likely based on a 
sense of familiarity, while true recognition is based on recollection, activity in the PFC and parietal cortex 
appears to be sensitive to the underlying cognitive basis of the confidence judgment (Kim & Cabeza, 
2007). Work by O’Connor, Han, & Dobbins (2010), also informs the relationship between brain activity 
and the cognitive bases of recognition judgments; when subjects were given cues from reliable and 
unreliable sources about the likelihood a target was old or new during an episodic recognition task, there 
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was greater fMRI activity in the inferior parietal lobule and the medial PFC with invalid as compared to 
valid cueing (O’Connor et al., 2010), which may reflect the recruitment of cognitive control processes that 
are engaged when internal memory signals and external information-based cues conflict.   
Much of the research to date has examined the neurocognitive underpinnings of RCJs in episodic 
memory tasks (Chua et al., 2009b, 2009a; Hayes et al., 2011; Henson et al., 2000), and fewer studies 
have examined the neural correlates of RCJs in a semantic retrieval task.  Furthermore, the small number 
of studies that have manipulated the validity of external cues in RCJs have used episodic recognition 
tasks (Jaeger, Cox, et al., 2012; Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012), leading to the question of whether the effect 
of cue validity on confidence-related activity is similar in semantic retrieval.  Past research has indicated 
that although there is some overlap between regions that contribute to episodic and semantic retrieval 
(Burianova & Grady, 2007), episodic and semantic retrieval tend to recruit different brain regions; namely, 
semantic retrieval frequently engages the left prefrontal cortex, while episodic retrieval engages right 
prefrontal regions (Nyberg, Cabeza, & Tulving, 1996).  However, there is evidence from other 
metamemory tasks that metamemory judgments during semantic and episodic retrieval recruit some 
overlapping brain regions (Reggev, Zuckerman, & Maril, 2011). Thus, an aim of the current study is to 
address the gap in knowledge regarding how cue validity effects RCJs in semantic retrieval, and how this 
compares to previous work that has identified regions that contribute to confidence in episodic retrieval.  
The current study examines how brain activity varies when confidence judgments are based on 
different sources of information in a semantic retrieval task, with a specific interest in internal experience-
based versus external information-based cues (Bradfield et al., 2002; Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012; Koriat 
et al., 2008).  Given that the parietal and prefrontal cortices are involved in retrospective confidence 
judgments (Chua et al., 2006, 2009b, 2009a; Hayes et al., 2011; Henson et al., 2000; Simons et al., 
2010), we expected that activity in the PFC and PPC would modulate depending on the information on 
which confidence is based.  In our task, subjects completed a recognition and RCJ task in which they 
chose one of four possible answers to general knowledge questions, and then gave a confidence rating 
on a scale of 1-4 for each answer.  Two-thirds of trials included a cue about the difficulty of the question 
(‘Easy’ or ‘Hard’) and one-third were uncued; cues were valid 50% of the time.  This allowed us to 
examine brain activity for invalid vs. valid cues, cued trails vs. uncued trials, and how these differences 
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varied by actual question difficulty, as well as differences in activity during the recognition as compared to 
confidence tasks, with an aim to better understand the neurocognitive correlates of RCJs based on 




Twenty healthy adults were consented to participate for financial compensation ($25/hour for 2.5 
hours). Two participants were excluded due to signal instabilities during acquisition.  Data from 18 
participants (12 F, ages 18-35, M = 22.8, SD = 3.7 years) were included. All participants were right-
handed, learned English before the age of 5, and were free from any self-reported neurological or 
psychological disorders, chronic illnesses, or contraindications for fMRI (e.g., no metallic implants, 
claustrophobia). All participants gave written consent in a manner approved by the Human Research 
Protection Program at the City University of New York.  
 
Behavioral Task 
 Participants were given a four alternative forced choice recognition test for 300 general 
knowledge questions from the Baruch Knowledge Norms (http://www.mangelslab.org/bknorms), which 
consists of a database of 406 questions related to natural and social science, mathematics, technology, 
history, geography, arts and culture.  Questions were divided by difficulty (Easy and Hard) using a median 
split in performance based on data collected from 498 CUNY students who had previously answered the 
same questions.  Each question was presented for 7s, with 4 possible answer choices, including one 
correct choice that was unique to one question, and 3 distractors consisting of the most commonly given 
incorrectly recalled answers.  Subjects indicated their response choice using the numbers 1-4 on the MRI 
button box. The key press position of the correct answer (i.e., key press 1-4) was counterbalanced across 
trials. For 500ms prior to, and throughout the duration of the presentation of the question (for a total of 
7.5s), participants saw a difficulty cue at the top of the screen.  They were instructed that an “Easy” cue 
indicated that most people tended to answer that question correctly, even if they felt they were guessing, 
“Hard” indicated that most people answered incorrectly, and “????” indicated there was no past 
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performance data for that particular question.  Prior to the start of the fMRI task, participants were given a 
practice task outside the scanner, which included feedback on accuracy of their responses to 24 sample 
questions (12 hard, 12 easy questions; one third with “Easy” cue, one third with “Hard” cue, one third 
uncued).  For all questions cued as “Easy”, participants received feedback that their answer was correct, 
regardless of actual accuracy.  For “Hard” cues and Uncued questions, participants received accurate 
performance feedback.  This was done to make the instructions stating that cues were valid and based on 
typical subject performance more believable.  During the actual task in the scanner, “Easy” and “Hard” 
cues were valid 50% of the time, and the true difficulty of Uncued questions was 50% Easy and 50% 
Hard.  Each recognition response was followed by presentation of a confidence rating scale (2.5s), during 
which subjects rated their confidence in having correctly answered the previous question on a scale from 
1-4, in which a response of 1 represented 0-25% confidence, 2 = 25-50% confidence, 3 = 50-75% 
confidence, and 4 = 75-100% confidence (Fig. 6).  Recognition and Confidence trials were intermixed with 
jittered interstimulus intervals consisting of periods of visual fixation ranging from 0-15s (M = 2.55, SD = 
3.50), and optimized using Optseq2 (https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq).  Total task time was 75 
minutes, divided into 6 runs of 12.5 min each.   
 
Behavioral Performance: Data Analyses 
We used repeated-measures ANOVAs and post-hoc t-tests in SPSS 23.0 to test the effects of 
question difficulty and cue type on mean recognition performance, and the effects of question difficulty, 
cue type, and recognition performance on mean retrospective confidence ratings. Because we expected 
participants would incorporate the cues into their confidence judgments to different degrees, we created 
cue dependency scores for each subject, which reflected the degree to which their confidence ratings 
were influenced by a given cue type under each condition of question difficulty and memory performance, 
relative to an uncued condition.  For example, a subject’s cue dependency score for invalidly cued hard 
questions would be calculated by subtracting the mean confidence rating for Uncued Hard questions from 
the mean confidence for Invalidly Cued Hard questions.  Therefore, positive scores indicate the subject’s 
confidence was inflated by the presence of the cue, negative scores indicate confidence was lower with 
the cued relative to uncued condition, and a score of 0 would mean the cue had no impact on the 
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subjects’ confidence. This provided an individual measure of cue dependency for each subject, for each 
condition of cue type, question difficulty, and recognition performance.  These individual cue dependency 
scores were used as covariates in whole-brain fMRI analyses to determine how brain activity varied with 
individual differences in how subjects incorporated cues into their confidence ratings (see below). 
 
MRI Data Acquisition 
Data were acquired on a Siemens Allegra 3T head-only MRI scanner with a custom head coil 
(NM-011; Nova Medical) at the New York University Center for Brain Imaging (New York, NY). Structural 
images were acquired with a high-resolution T1-weighted whole-brain scan using a 3D MP-RAGE 
sequence (1mm isotropic resolution, Field of View = 176mm, 176 slices).  BOLD contrast data were 
acquired with a gradient-echo echoplanar imaging pulse sequence (TR = 2500ms, TE = 15ms, Flip angle 
= 82°, Field of View = 126mm, 42 slices positioned parallel to the anterior commissure-posterior 
commissure line, voxel size 3x3x3 mm).  Visual stimuli were displayed using an LCD video projector with 
a projection screen positioned behind the subject’s head, and viewed through a mirror.  Responses were 
collected using a button box held in the right hand.  Each functional run consisted of 306 time points and 
lasted 12 min and 45 s. 
 
Data Preprocessing and Analyses 
Reconstructed EPI images underwent standard preprocessing using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust 
Centre for Neuroimaging).  The first four scans of each run were discarded, and the remaining scans 
were corrected for slice timing, motion corrected by realigning to the mean functional image, coregistered 
to the given subject’s anatomical image, normalized to the standard space image in Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) space, and smoothed with a 6-mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel.  
Trial types were categorized by cue type and actual question difficulty, producing 6 trial types: 
Valid Easy (i.e., Easy question with “Easy” cue), Invalid Easy (i.e., Easy question with “Hard” cue), 
Uncued Easy (i.e., Easy question without cue), Valid Hard (i.e., Hard question with “Hard” cue), Invalid 
Hard (i.e., Hard question with “Easy” cue), and Uncued Hard (i.e., Hard question without cue).   
To examine the relationships between question difficulty and cue type on brain activity, we 
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defined a first-level GLM based on trial types, with each of the 6 trial types further defined by the cognitive 
task within the whole trial (i.e., Recognition response and Confidence rating for each given trial), 
producing 12 conditions of interest (6 for Recognition and 6 for Confidence Rating). To account for 
variance between runs, trials from each run were in separate regressors.  The model used the canonical 
hemodynamic response function and included the durations of tasks (Recognition: 7.5s; Confidence: 
2.5s).  Individual run-specific motion regressors were also included in the model.  First-level analyses 
produced individual maps of parameter estimates for all contrasts of interest, which were then submitted 
to a second level group analysis. Timecourses of hemodynamic response function were modeled using a 
finite impulse response function using MarsBar toolbox for SPM (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 
2002).  Contrasts of activity during Confidence vs. Recognition trials were corrected for multiple 
comparisons using family-wise error correction (p = 0.05).  Due to low statistical power and the 
exploratory nature of analyses testing the effects of the presence and validity of cues on brain activity, all 
other analyses were uncorrected for multiple comparisons.  All results were considered significant at 
p<0.001, with a voxel extent threshold of 10. Voxel coordinates are reported in MNI space. 
SPM contrast maps were generated for the main contrasts of interest, including: 
1) Confidence task vs. Recognition task. Significant differences in activation shown in this 
contrast represent brain regions that differentially contribute to each process.  
2) Cued vs. Uncued trials.  Comparisons of Cued vs. Uncued trials were assessed during 
recognition and confidence tasks separately.   Significant differences in activation shown in 
these contrasts represent brain regions that differentially respond to the presence vs. 
absence of an external cue about question difficulty, tapping into the contribution of external 
information to recognition and confidence decisions. 
3) Valid vs. Invalid cued trials. Comparisons of Valid vs. Invalid trials were assessed during 
recognition and confidence tasks separately.   Significant differences in activation shown in 
these contrasts represent brain regions that differentially respond based on the validity of the 
external cue.  Based on behavioral findings, fMRI activity during Valid vs. Invalid cues were 
assessed separately for Hard and Easy questions; this allowed us to examine how 
differences in activity based on cue validity may vary with question difficulty. 
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 Individual Differences. To examine how confidence ratings and memory performance interacted 
with trial types, we used a cue dependency score, which reflected how much each individual’s confidence 
rating was altered by a given cue.  Cue dependency was calculated by subtracting the mean confidence 
rating for an Uncued condition from the mean confidence for an associated cued condition, e.g., Invalidly 
Cued Hard Hits– Uncued Hard Hits.  We conducted analyses using the individual cue dependency scores 
as covariates in SPM in the whole-brain analyses of Confidence > Recognition trials. These analyses 
examine how activity associated with making confidence judgments varied based on individual 
differences in cue usage.  Mean percent signal change for all voxels within regions of interest (ROI) was 
extracted using MarsBar to illustrate how individual cue usage covaried with activity in each condition 




Confidence Judgments. Mean confidence ratings across all question difficulty and cue conditions 
ranged from 1.79 to 3.35 (M = 2.47, SD = 0.40).  We conducted a 2 (question difficulty: Easy, Hard) x 3 
(cue type: Valid, Invalid, Uncued) x 2 (recognition performance: Hits, Misses) repeated measures ANOVA 
on mean confidence ratings.  There was a significant main effect of question difficulty [F(1,17) = 189.867, 
p<0.001], with higher confidence ratings for easy questions (M = 2.606, SD = 0.076) than for hard 
questions (M = 2.134, SE = 0.087; Mean Difference = 0.427, 95% CI [0.399, 0.544]); a significant main 
effect of recognition performance [F(1,17) = 63.899, p<0.001], with higher confidence ratings for hits (M = 
2.730, SE = 0.105) than misses (M = 2.010, SE = 0.075; Mean Difference = 0.720, 95% CI [0.530, 
0.910]); and a significant main effect of cue type [F(2,34) = 4.421, p<0.05], with higher confidence ratings 
for questions with invalid cues (M = 2.426, SE = 0.089) compared to valid cues (M = 2.333, SE = 0.067; 
Mean Difference = 0.093, 95% CI [0.010, 0.176], p<0.05).  Confidence for questions with invalid cues was 
also significantly higher than uncued questions (M = 2.350, SE = 0.088; Mean Difference = 0.076, 95% CI 
[0.021, 0.130], p<0.01), and there was no difference in confidence between uncued and validly cued 
questions (p=0.607). These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between the effects of 
question difficulty and performance [F(1,17) = 59.812, p<0.001], and a marginal interaction between 
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question difficulty, cue type, and performance [F(2,34) = 3.204, p<0.054] on mean confidence ratings.  
There was no significant interaction between question difficulty and cue type (p>0.79) or cue type and 
performance (p>0.87) on confidence. 
Pairwise comparisons were conducted to follow up on the significant interaction between question 
difficulty and performance, and revealed that for hits, subjects had significantly higher confidence for easy 
questions (M = 3.171, SE = 0.100) than for hard questions (M = 2.289, SE = 0.120; Mean Difference = 
0.883, 95% CI [0.742, 1.023], p<0.001), but for misses, confidence for easy questions (M = 2.040, SE = 
0.093) did not differ from hard questions (M = 1.980, SE = 0.065; p>0.32). 
Although the question difficulty x cue type x performance interaction did not quite reach 
significance (p<0.054), we used pairwise comparisons to examine differences in mean confidence ratings 
between these conditions.  For easy questions, confidence did not differ between cue types for hits or 
misses, but for hard questions, there were two comparisons that indicated that participants were 
incorporating the cue in their confidence judgments.  For hard questions, participants had marginally 
higher confidence for invalidly cued hits (i.e., Hard questions called “Easy” that they got correct; M = 
2.408, SE = 0.130) compared to validly cued hits (i.e., Hard questions called “Hard” that they got correct; 
M = 2.248, SE = 0.126; p<0.096) and compared to uncued hits (i.e., Hard questions with no cue that they 
got correct; M = 2.209, SE = 0.139; p<0.059).   We calculated cue dependency scores (see Behavioral 
Performance: Data Analyses, above) to determine the degree to which individual subjects relied on the 
cue in making their confidence judgments, and found significant variability in these scores for Invalidly 
Cued Hard Hits (Fig. 7).  Therefore, we used these individual cue dependency scores as covariates in 
fMRI data analyses to determine how brain activity was correlated with individual differences in cue 
dependency for Invalidly Cued Hard Hits. 
 
Recognition. Mean recognition performance (proportion correct) across all conditions based on 
question difficulty and cue type ranged from 0.12 to 0.92 (M = 0.48, SD = 0.22), and mean overall 
recognition performance ranged from 0.27 to 0.77 (M = 0.48, SD = 0.13).  We conducted a 2 (question 
difficulty: Easy, Hard) x 3 (cue type: Valid, Invalid, Uncued) repeated-measures ANOVA on mean 
recognition performance and showed a main effect of question difficulty [F(1,17) = 127.787, p<0.001), no 
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effect of cue type (p>0.72), and a marginal interaction between question difficulty and cue type on mean 
performance [F(2,34) = 2.605, p<0.089].  As expected, subjects had better memory performance for easy 
questions (M = 0.640, SE = 0.040) than hard questions (M = 0.313, SE = 0.026; Mean Difference = 0.326, 
95% CI [0.265, 0.387]).  Although the question difficulty x cue type did not quite reach significance, we 
followed it up with pairwise comparisons for Easy and Hard questions separately. There was no 
difference in recognition performance based on cue type for Easy questions.  In contrast, for Hard 
questions, recognition performance was marginally higher for invalid cues (i.e., Hard questions called 
“Easy”; M =0.336, SE = 0.028) than valid cues (i.e., Hard questions called “Hard”; M = 0.302, SE = 0.026; 
p<0.053).  Memory performance for uncued hard questions (M = 0.302, SE = 0.030) did not significantly 
differ from validly cued (p>0.99 or invalidly cued (p=0.142) hard questions.  Therefore, if anything, any 
interaction between cue type and question difficulty on mean recognition performance was driven by 
better memory for invalidly cued hard questions as compared to validly cued hard questions, whereas 
performance did not vary by cue type for easy questions. 
 
Imaging Results 
Confidence vs. Recognition Tasks 
Because a goal of the experiment was to examine activity associated with the process of making 
a confidence judgment, we first examined the contrast Confidence > Recognition, and showed greater 
activity for the confidence task in several large clusters that covered regions in the medial prefrontal, 
medial parietal, medial temporal lobe, and lateral tempo-parietal cortices (Table 1; Fig. 8). Activity in 
medial prefrontal, parietal, temporal, and lateral tempo-parietal regions is consistent with past research 
showing greater activation in similar regions during confidence ratings as compared to episodic 
recognition tasks (Chua, Rand-Giovannetti, Schacter, Albert, & Sperling, 2004; Chua et al., 2006, 2009b, 
2009a), and these areas have been implicated in the default mode network, a network of regions that are 
thought to be activated during self-referential processing (Raichle et al., 2001).  
We then examined activity associated with the process of recognition, by comparing activity 
during the recognition task to activity during the confidence task for all trials (Table 1).  The contrast of 
Recognition > Confidence showed several large clusters that encompassed multiple regions (Table 1). 
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These clusters covered regions in left and right lateral prefrontal cortex (BA44), dorsal medial frontal 
cortex (BA6/8), the left parietal lobule (BA7/39), and visual cortices (BA17/18/19) (Fig. 9).  More activity in 
these regions during recognition compared to confidence tasks is consistent with past research 
implicating the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and lateral parietal cortex in semantic retrieval 
(Badre & Wagner, 2002; Wiggs, Weisberg, & Martin, 1998) (Table 1; Fig. 9). 
 
Cued vs. Uncued Trials 
A novel contribution of this study was to examine how brain activity differed based on the 
presence of an external cue, both during the confidence task and during the recognition task.  During the 
confidence task, the contrast of Uncued > Cued trials revealed greater activity for Uncued trials in the 
right premotor cortex (BA6) , inferior temporal lobe (BA37), left medial parietal lobe (BA23), left medial 
temporal lobe (BA36) and left cerebellum (Table 2).  There were no significant clusters with greater 
activity for Cued than Uncued trials. 
During recognition, the contrast of Uncued > Cued showed greater activity for Uncued trials in the 
left lateral prefrontal cortex (BA8), left inferior parietal regions (BA39), right lateral (BA7) and medial 
(BA31) parietal lobe, and right motor and somatosensory regions (BA4/1) (Table 2; Fig. 10).  No regions 
showed significantly greater activity for Cued than > Uncued trials during recognition.  
 
Valid vs. Invalid Trials 
In addition to the presence of a cue, it was also important to examine the effect of cue validity on 
brain activity during recognition and confidence tasks (Dobbins, Jaeger, Studer, & Simons, 2012; Jaeger, 
Cox, et al., 2012).  During the confidence task, the comparison of activity during all Valid > Invalid cues 
showed greater activity for Valid cues in a small cluster (14 voxels) in the left visual association areas (-
15, -58, 19; BA18).  We then examined differences between valid and invalid cues for Easy and Hard 
questions separately, to test whether brain activity that differed based on cue validity varied with question 
difficulty.  For hard questions, the Valid > Invalid contrast revealed greater activity centered in the angular 
gyrus (33, -76, 22; BA39) extending into visual cortices (BA17/18/19), the right anterior cingulate (24, 44, 
-5; BA32), right putamen (18, 14, 4), and left occipital gyrus (-30, -79, 13; BA19) during the confidence 
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task.  For easy trials, the contrast of Invalid > Valid cues showed a small cluster in the right caudate (18, 
26, -5) and in the right cuneus (18, -85, 4; BA18), suggesting the differences in activity for Valid and 
Invalid cues vary by question difficulty, with some regions showing more activity for invalid cueing during 
easy questions, and others showing increased activity for valid cues during hard questions. 
During recognition, there were no significant clusters for the overall Invalid vs. Valid contrasts.  
For hard questions during recognition, there was greater activity for valid cues than invalid cues in the 
right parahippocampal gyrus (18, -10, -20).  For easy questions, there were no significant differences in 
Valid > Invalid cues during recognition. 
 
Individual Differences in Cue Dependency 
Because there was significant individual variability in how subjects used cues about question 
difficulty to make confidence judgments (Fig. 7), we examined how significant activity in the Confidence > 
Recognition contrast, which is thought to represent brain areas engaged in making a confidence 
judgment, covaried with individual difference metrics of cue dependency.  Based on behavioral results 
showing subjects had marginally higher confidence for Invalidly Cued Hard (i.e., Hard questions called 
“Easy”) questions answered correctly compared to Uncued Hard Hits (i.e., Hard questions with no cue), 
we included subjects’ cue dependency scores for the difference in confidence for Invalidly Cued Hard Hits 
- Uncued Hard Hits as covariates when comparing Confidence > Recognition.  This allowed us to test 
how activity that was greater during Confidence than Recognition trials varied with the degree to which 
subject incorporated the invalid cue for hard hits into their confidence ratings. 
There was a significant positive correlation between cue dependency scores and the difference in 
activity in Confidence > Recognition in bilateral medial temporal regions (L: -12, -7, -17; R: 15, -1, -20; 
Fig. 6).  To investigate whether these differences were driven by activity in Confidence, Recognition, or 
both, we defined ROIs for the two MTL clusters showing a correlation, and extracted percent signal 
change for each condition.  Bivariate correlations were used to illustrate the relationship between 
individuals’ dependency on an Invalid cue for a Hard question during a hit, and individual signal change 
during Recognition, and during Confidence.  Individuals whose confidence ratings were more dependent 
on the Invalid cue for Hard hits had greater activity in left MTL (Fig. 11) and right MTL clusters during 
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confidence rating (i.e., the more an individual increased his or her confidence for a hard question that 
they answered correctly when it was labeled “Easy”, the greater the activity in the bilateral MTL during 
confidence rating).  Correlation graphs also illustrated a negative relationship between cue dependency 
for Invalidly Cued Hard Hits and percent signal change during Recognition in the left MTL cluster, 
suggesting that the correlation between cue dependency and differences in activity between Confidence 
and Recognition was likely due to both an increase in activity during Confidence, and a decrease in 
activity during Recognition.    
 
Discussion 
We examined how brain activity varies when confidence judgments are based on different 
sources of information in a semantic retrieval task, with a focus on external information-based cues. We 
first showed that the brain regions with greater activity when making a confidence judgment compared to 
recognition in a semantic retrieval task, namely medial prefrontal, medial temporal, as well as medial and 
lateral parietal regions, were similar to those that have been previously identified as being involved in 
confidence in episodic tasks (Chua et al., 2006, 2009b). Furthermore, activity in a subset of these regions 
modulated based on the presence, validity, and/or usage of external information-based cues about 
question difficulty.  Specifically, during the confidence task, brain activity in the medial temporal lobe and 
medial parietal cortex varied based on whether or not an external cue was given.  Cue validity also played 
a role, and this varied based on task difficulty; for hard questions, there was greater activity in the lateral 
parietal cortex, centered in the angular gyrus for valid cues, but for easy questions, activity was greater in 
the caudate and cuneus for invalid cues.  Finally, activity in the MTL covaried with how much individuals 
were influenced by the external cue. These findings, combined with previous fMRI (Chua et al., 2006, 
2009a, 2009b; Hayes et al., 2011; Henson et al., 2000; Kim & Cabeza, 2007) and lesion studies (Chiou et 
al., 2011; Davidson et al., 2008; Simons et al., 2010) provide converging evidence for the roles of the 
PFC and parietal cortex in semantic recognition and subjective confidence judgments.  Furthermore, in 
light of research showing individuals incorporate both internal and external cues into their RCJs (Bradfield 
et al., 2002; Jaeger, Cox, et al., 2012; Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012; Koriat, 2008b; Koriat et al., 2008), and 
the hypothesis that brain regions involved in RCJs may vary with the basis of the judgment (Kim & 
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Cabeza, 2007), our findings suggest activity in the parietal, prefrontal and medial temporal cortices 
modulates based on the presence and validity of external cues.   
 The Process of Making Confidence Judgments & the Brain 
We were particularly interested in identifying regions engaged during the process of making a 
confidence judgment following semantic recognition because prior work has focused on confidence 
judgments in episodic tasks (Chua et al., 2006, 2009a).  Similar to prior work in the episodic domain 
(Chua et al., 2006, 2009a), in the current study there was greater activity when participants engaged in 
making a RCJ compared to when they were making recognition judgment in the medial PFC (BA 9/10), 
medial parietal cortices, and lateral tempo-parietal cortices, suggesting common mechanisms underlying 
RCJs based on different types of recognition memory.  The overlap between regions engaged in making 
a confidence judgment compared to recognition in the current and prior work (Chua et al., 2006, 2009a) is 
similar to other work in the domain of metamemory showing some overlap in brain activity associated with 
metamemory judgments for episodic and semantic memory (Reggev et al., 2011).  In a feeling-of-knowing 
task, in which subjects judged their confidence in the ability to recognize an answer that was currently not 
retrievable, activity in the aPFC, middle frontal gyrus, dorsomedial PFC, anterior cingulate, and superior 
parietal lobe was associated with metamemory judgments irrespective of whether they were based on 
episodic or semantic retrieval (Reggev et al., 2011).   
The set of brain regions that showed greater activity while making a confidence judgment 
compared to recognition resemble the “default mode network”, a collection of regions that are more active 
at rest, and thought to be involved in self-referential processing and introspection (Raichle et al., 2001).  
Specifically, activity in the dorsomedial PFC, one of the default mode regions with the greatest BOLD 
activity at rest, has been shown to increase during self-referential judgments (Davey, Pujol, & Harrison, 
2016; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Mak et al., 2017; Meyer & Lieberman, 2018).  Thus, 
one contribution of this study is that it replicates prior work identifying the brain regions involved in making 
confidence judgments in an episodic task (Chua et al., 2006, 2009a) and extends this work to a semantic 
task.   
In addition to brain regions that showed greater activity during the RCJ task compared to the 
recognition task, there were also regions that showed greater activity during the recognition task 
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compared to the RCJ task, which were consistent with past fMRI research on both episodic and semantic 
retrieval (Badre & Wagner, 2002; Chua et al., 2006, 2009a). Specifically, there was greater activity in the 
medial and left lateral PFC when participants made recognition judgments compared to when they were 
making RCJs.  Similar areas of the lateral and medial prefrontal cortex have been correlated with 
semantic retrieval (Badre & Wagner, 2002; Barredo, Verstynen, & Badre, 2016; Wagner, Paré-Blagoev, 
Clark, & Poldrack, 2001; Wiggs et al., 1998).  In particular, activity in the left medial PFC has been 
associated with semantic retrieval characterized by strong memory signals (Kim, 2016), and the lateral 
PFC has been identified as part of a control network involved in top-down control of memory retrieval 
(Barredo et al., 2016).  Although past research directly comparing recognition to confidence assessment 
has focused on episodic memory tasks (Chua et al., 2006, 2009b, 2009a), some studies have shown 
overlap between regions implicated in both types of memory retrieval (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 
2009; Burianova & Grady, 2007; Kim, 2016; Nyberg et al., 2003; Wiggs et al., 1998), supporting our 
finding that semantic recognition engages similar regions as episodic recognition, as compared to 
confidence rating. 
 
Information-based cues alter brain activity during recognition and confidence assessment 
A primary aim of the current study was to identify brain activity that varied with the presence and 
use of external cues about question difficulty during semantic retrieval. During the confidence task, there 
was greater activity for uncued than cued trials in the left medial parietal lobe (BA23), centered in the 
posterior cingulate, and also in the inferior temporal lobe (BA37), centered in the fusiform gyrus.  Activity 
in the left medial parietal lobe/posterior cingulate is consistent with past research suggesting this region is 
recruited during evaluative judgments based on subjective values and preferences (Zysset, Huber, Ferstl, 
& von Cramon, 2002), and TMS research showing that disruption of the medial parietal cortex decreased 
episodic retrieval speed judgments made in reference to the self as compared to others, which suggests 
a causal role of this region in self-referential processing (Lou et al., 2004).  Therefore, greater activity in 
the medial parietal cortex during uncued as compared to cued trials may reflect greater dependence on 
internal experience-based cues in the absence of external cues.  
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Although the recognition and confidence judgments were given as separate tasks, it is likely that 
some confidence-related processing occurred while making or even prior to making the confidence 
judgment (Chua et al., 2006), and so we also examined confidence-related activity during the recognition 
task.  We showed that as compared to all cued trials, uncued trials showed greater activity during the 
recognition task in the left lateral PFC (BA8), right inferior parietal cortex (BA39), right lateral (BA7) and 
medial (BA7/31) parietal lobes, and right frontoparietal regions (BA4).  The left lateral PFC has been 
broadly implicated in goal-directed cognitive control (Badre & Wagner, 2002; Nee & D’Esposito, 2016) 
and past research has shown greater activity in this region in response to both external uncertainty 
stemming from ambiguous circumstances, and internally attributed uncertainty, such as in the case of 
insufficient knowledge following memory search (Volz, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2004).  Thus, greater 
activity in this region for uncued as compared to cued trials in the current experiment may reflect 
response uncertainty resulting from a lack of external information about question difficulty, which places 
greater demands on memory search, or uncertainty due to the search producing inadequate information 
to make a decision.  Uncued trials also showed greater activity in the medial parietal lobe during both the 
recognition and RCJ task, which may reflect a reliance on experience-based cues about memory success 
in the absence of an external cue.  During memory search, retrieved information may elicit a feeling of 
confidence based on internal memory signals; if that confidence is insufficient to warrant reporting a 
response, however, memory search will continue until the subject can retrieve a response in which he/she 
is more confident.  Thus, retrieval relies on a bidirectional relationship between memory search and 
monitoring processes. Therefore, during uncued trials, in which subjects may have to rely more on 
internal signals related to the experience of retrieval in order to assess their confidence and provide a 
recognition response, overlapping activity in the medial parietal cortex may reflect engagement of 
experience-based cues about memory success. 
 
Cue validity modulates the roles of parietal and temporal regions in RCJs 
In addition to examining how the presence of an external cue modulated the brain basis of 
confidence judgments, we also examined how the validity of the cue modulated the brain basis of 
confidence judgments. While participants were engaged in making confidence judgments, there was a 
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small cluster with greater activity for valid as compared to invalid cues in visual association areas, and no 
regions showing greater activity for invalid cues than valid cues.  Turning to the effects of cue validity 
during the recognition task, again our results showed no regions with greater activity for invalid as 
compared to valid cueing, a result which differs from previous research during episodic retrieval showing 
that invalid cues during an old/new recognition task produced greater activity primarily the medial PFC 
and inferior parietal lobules (O’Connor et al., 2010).  The difference between our results and O’Connor et 
al. (2010) suggests that the effects of cue validity on prefrontal and parietal activity vary by task type, 
such that the regions associated with invalid external cues during episodic recognition may differ from 
those associated with semantic recognition.  However, it should be noted that when we reduced the 
significance threshold to p<0.01 for the Invalid > Valid contrast during recognition, there was significant 
activity in the medial PFC, suggesting the difference in results between our study and that of (O’Connor et 
al., 2010) may be due to lack of sufficient statistical power in the current experiment or the degree of 
differential activity in the medial PFC based on task type. 
Whereas tasks in the episodic domain have relied on confidence judgments as a marker of 
difficulty (Chua et al., 2006, 2009a, 2009b; Dobbins et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2011; Jaeger, Cox, et al., 
2012), in the current study, we used an objective marker of general knowledge question difficulty, which 
allowed us to test how the use of external cues about difficulty interacts with internal experience-based 
cues that likely vary with the actual difficulty of the question.  Therefore, we also analyzed activity for 
invalid vs. valid cues for easy and hard questions separately, and showed that during the confidence task, 
there was greater activity for validly cued hard questions than invalidly cued hard questions in the right 
angular gyrus, visual cortices, the right anterior cingulate, right putamen, and left occipital gyrus.  This is 
in contrast to previous research on episodic recognition showing invalid cueing was associated with 
activity in the anterior cingulate, a region often associated with cognitive control (Botvinick, Cohen, & 
Carter, 2004), and the angular gyrus, which is thought to play a role in recollection during episodic 
retrieval tasks (Daselaar, Fleck, & Cabeza, 2006; O’Connor et al., 2010; Yonelinas et al., 2005).  
Therefore, we again see a dissociation between activity for invalid vs. valid cues in semantic and episodic 
recognition tasks.   
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For easy trials, there was greater activity for invalid than valid cues during the confidence task in 
the right caudate (BA48) and right cuneus (BA18).  O’Connor et al. (2010) also showed that the cuneus 
and caudate were among the regions that showed greater activity during invalid than valid cueing during 
episodic recognition.  There is some evidence that in addition to its involvement in visual processing, the 
cuneus may be also be engaged during inhibitory control (Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009), and 
there is converging evidence from neuroimaging, lesion, and non-human animal research that the 
caudate nucleus is involved in executive functioning, specifically the process of goal-directed behavior 
(De Simoni et al., 2018; Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 2008). 
Taken together, it appears that the invalid cueing effect seen in episodic tasks was not replicated 
in our semantic task when questions were hard, but when questions were easy, there was some overlap 
between regions associated with invalid cueing for both tasks (O’Connor et al., 2010).  Although these 
differences may reflect differences in invalid cueing effects for episodic as compared to semantic 
recognition, they could also stem from differences in recognition performance.  Mean corrected 
recognition performance in the episodic memory task by O’Connor et al. (2010) was approximately 0.65, 
whereas in our task, overall proportion correct was only 0.45.  Furthermore, performance differed 
significantly by question difficulty, with mean performance for easy questions being 0.64 and hard 
questions being 0.31.  Thus, our finding that invalid cueing only for easy questions elicited similar activity 
as invalid cueing in the task by O’Connor et al. (2010), may reflect comparable recognition performance 
in these conditions, and suggests the effects of cue validity on brain activity varies with question difficulty.   
 
MTL activity varies with individual differences in cue dependency  
The prior analyses focus on the presence of the cue and its relationship to the question, but it is 
also important to consider the extent to which individuals used the cue to make their confidence 
judgments.  Behavioral measures suggested that participants may have had higher confidence for 
invalidly cued hard questions answered correctly, as compared to uncued hard questions answered 
correctly.  In the current experiment, an invalidly cued hard hit is a condition in which the subject is faced 
with a hard question, is cued to believe that it is easy, and successfully retrieves the correct response.  
Therefore, as opposed to confidence that stems from an internal indicating successful retrieval, which 
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would be equal for cued and uncued conditions, the inflation in confidence in this condition appears to be 
driven by the external cue signifying that other subjects also tend to answer the given question correctly. 
To examine how brain activity varies based on individual cue usage, we assessed the degree to which 
individual subjects incorporated the invalid cue into their confidence judgments by calculating the 
difference in mean confidence for invalidly cued hard hits – uncued hard hits, and used this individual cue 
dependency score as a covariate in the contrast of Confidence > Recognition. Activity associated with the 
process of making a confidence judgments significantly covaried with cue dependence in the bilateral 
medial temporal lobes, with peak activation in the amygdala extending to the anterior hippocampus.  In 
other words, the more subjects’ RCJs were inflated by the invalid cue during hard hits, the more activity 
there was in the MTL during confidence judgments.   
Activity in the MTL for correctly answered general knowledge questions is somewhat atypical, 
given that that although there is a significant body of literature implicating the MTL in episodic memory 
(Eichenbaum, Sauvage, Fortin, Komorowski, & Lipton, 2012; Nyberg, McIntosh, Houle, Nilsson, & 
Tulving, 1996; Schacter & Wagner, 1999), its role is less frequently associated with semantic recognition.  
However, a few neuroimaging studies have implicated the MTL in semantic retrieval (Ryan, Cox, Hayes, 
& Nadel, 2008; Ryan, Lin, Ketcham, & Nadel, 2010; Verfaellie, Bousquet, & Keane, 2014), and semantic 
dementia has been associated with atrophy in MTL regions including the anterior fusiform and amygdala 
(Chan et al., 2001).  In addition to potentially playing a role in semantic retrieval, research has suggested 
the MTL may also serve as a site of integration between multiple sources of information (van Kesteren, 
Ruiter, Fernández, & Henson, 2012).  One model of MTL function suggests substantial MTL-mediated 
learning takes place during cases of prediction errors, due to the region’s role in integrating old and new 
experiences and knowledge (Shohamy & Wagner, 2008).  Furthermore, there is evidence that the MTL is 
specifically engaged during encoding of information that is incongruent with existing schemas, such as 
encountering an unfamiliar item in a familiar context (van Kesteren et al., 2012).  In the current study, an 
Invalidly Cued Hard Hit trial may require subjects to integrate internal cues that arise from the experience 
of accurate retrieval with new information in the form of an external cue about question difficulty, in order 
to accurately assess confidence.  Thus we speculate that MTL activity associated with dependence on an 
invalid cue during confidence assessment for a hard question answered correctly could reflect integration 
Gaynor 76 
of multiple sources of information.  O’Connor et al. (2010) found that invalid cueing during episodic 
retrieval was associated with activity in the anterior medial temporal lobe.  This activity included a cluster 
in the right hippocampus which, although it was slightly more dorsal and posterior (21, -15, -12) than the 
MTL clusters we found, suggests regions typically associated with retrieval success may be influenced by 
subjects’ expectations based on external cues (O’Connor et al., 2010).   
 
Limitations 
An important potential limitation of the current study is the use of cues that were valid 50% of the 
time, raising the question of whether or not participants incorporated the cues into their confidence 
judgments.  Previous research has used cues that are either largely reliable (e.g., 75% valid), random 
(50%), or largely unreliable (e.g., 25% valid) in order to determine how individuals incorporate external 
cues into recognition confidence judgments based on their utility (Jaeger, Cox, et al., 2012; Jaeger, 
Lauris, et al., 2012; O’Connor et al., 2010).  In one such experiment, Jaeger, Lauris, et al. (2012) found 
that subjects’ responses conformed to both reliable (75% valid) and unreliable/random (50% valid) 
sources. Furthermore, recognition performance was equal for unreliably cued conditions and uncued 
conditions, which the authors suggest is due to subjects being more likely to conform to unreliable cues in 
instances of low confidence.  In other words, in cases when subjects have low confidence because they 
are unable to rely on their own memory, in which case their performance might be at chance (50%), there 
is no risk in relying on a random external source that also has chance accuracy, because it will not impair 
their performance relative to guessing (Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012).  Unlike the experiment conducted by 
Jaeger, Lauris, et al. (2012), which focused on the conformity of recognition responses to external cues, 
our experiment specifically tested the effects of external cues on confidence ratings as well; however, 
because our cues were valid 50% of the time, we were unable to test whether the effects of cues on 
confidence, and associated brain activity, may have varied with the reliability of the cue.  However, 
Jaeger, Lauris, et al. (2012) found that subjects conformed to cues when they were random (50% valid) 
and even largely unreliable (25% valid), and similar research on collaborative recall has shown that 
subjects are just as likely to conform to the responses of confederates who provided 100% incorrect 
details as those who were only inaccurate 33% of the time (Numbers, Meade, & Perga, 2014).  Therefore, 
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it appears that individuals often conform to external cues regardless of their reliability, supporting our 
finding that subjects were influenced by cue validity despite our use of cues that were 50% reliable. 
 
Conclusions 
Brain regions engaged when making confidence judgments during semantic recognition were 
similar to those associated with confidence assessment in episodic tasks, including the medial prefrontal, 
medial temporal, and medial and lateral parietal cortices (Chua et al., 2006, 2009b).  Moreover, and 
delving deeper into the neurocognitive bases of retrospective confidence judgments, the presence of 
external cues about question difficulty modulated activity in regions associated with memory monitoring, 
particularly lateral and medial parietal and inferior temporal regions that may be involved in response 
uncertainty.  Furthermore, there were effects related to the validity of these external cues that varied 
based on task difficulty, with greater activity for valid than invalid trials in the lateral parietal cortex, with 
peak activation in the angular gyrus, for hard questions, and greater activity for invalid than valid trials in 
the caudate and cuneus during easy questions.  Finally, we found that the more individuals relied on an 
invalid cue during RCJs for correctly answered hard questions, the greater the activity in bilateral medial 
temporal lobes, which may be consistent with theories of the MTL as a point of integration between 
multiple sources of information (van Kesteren et al., 2012).  The current study makes a novel contribution 
to our understanding of the brain regions involved in metamemory monitoring and semantic recognition 
by providing evidence that RCJ- and recognition-related activity differs when subjects make confidence 
judgments based on external information as compared to internal cues arising from the subjective 
experience of retrieval.  Furthermore, we identified brain regions that respond to the presence and validity 
of external information on which individuals base confidence in semantic memory, which has been 
previously untested.  Given past evidence that individuals likely rely more on external information when 
memory signals are weak, characterizing brain regions that respond to external cues may inform future 
hypotheses about how populations with memory deficits, particularly those associated with abnormal 






To our knowledge, these are the first studies to directly test how the roles of brain regions 
involved in metamemory monitoring vary with the information on which confidence judgments are made, 
both prospectively (i.e., with JOLs) and retrospectively.  In both experiments, we tested the roles of brain 
regions previously shown to contribute to the process of making a subjective confidence judgment, the 
level of confidence expressed, and/or the accuracy of the judgment in relation to objective memory 
performance.  Taken together, our results support the hypothesis that the neural mechanisms underlying 
metamemory monitoring during both encoding and retrieval vary with cognitive bases of the judgments.  
Furthermore, our results suggest some overlap between brain regions supporting metamemory 
monitoring and cognitive control processes, particularly when faced with multiple and sometimes 
conflicting sources of information on which to base confidence judgments.   
There are many parallels between the predominant model of metamemory, in which subjects use 
the products of metamemory monitoring (the “meta level”) to exert control over memory processes (the 
“object level”) (Nelson & Narens, 1990), and leading models of cognitive control, in which an executive 
system monitors and regulates lower-level information stemming from environmental cues (Fernandez-
Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000; Shimamura, 2000).  Past research has not only suggested that 
metacognitive regulation and executive control rely on many similar cognitive processes, but also 
identified brain regions that are common to both systems including anterior cingulate, aPFC, DLPFC, and 
basal ganglia (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000).  In Experiment 1, we used high definition transcranial 
direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) to show that the aPFC, a region implicated in higher-order control of 
cognitive processes (Badre, 2008) has a causal role in JOL accuracy, but this role varies based on cues 
related to fluency of encoding; stimulation to this region increased JOL accuracy for low-frequency and 
inverted words, which are fluently encoded, but decreased accuracy for high-frequency words, which are 
fluently encoded.  We also showed that the DLPFC plays a causal role in JOL accuracy, with stimulation 
decreasing accuracy specifically for high-frequency words, and in encoding success, with stimulation 
increasing subsequent false alarms. 
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In Experiment 2, we used fMRI to investigate how the roles of the prefrontal, parietal, and 
temporal cortices may change with the presence and validity of external cues about question difficulty in a 
semantic recognition task, and found that the presence of a cue altered activity in the parietal cortex, 
while the validity of cues influenced activity in the basal ganglia, which have previously been associated 
with error detection and goal-directed learning (Grahn et al., 2008; Holroyd & Coles, 2002).  Taken 
together, the results of these experiments support the hypothesis that the brain regions involved in 
metamemory monitoring vary with the cognitive bases of the judgments, and make an important 
contribution to our understanding of metacognition in the brain by providing evidence for overlap between 
the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying metamemory and executive control. 
 
The roles of the aPFC and DLPFC in JOLs and encoding 
Experiment 1 showed that subjects tend to base their JOLs on cues that are not predictive of 
memory success, namely, fluency of encoding. JOL ratings were higher for high- as compared to low-
frequency words, and upright as compared to inverted words, which is consistent with a significant body 
of previous work on the cognitive bases of JOLs.  Past research has demonstrated that memory 
confidence increases with fluency of encoding (Besken & Mulligan, 2013; Koriat, 2008a; Miele et al., 
2011), and that low-frequency words present a condition of disfluency due to lack of familiarity (Balota et 
al., 2002; Jia et al., 2016), while inverted words are perceptually disfluent, resulting in more effortful 
processing, resulting in lower confidence (Johnston et al., 1985; Rhodes & Castel, 2008).  Past work has 
suggested disfluency is a ‘desirable difficulty’, in that conditions that challenge the learner during 
encoding lead to enhanced memory (Bjork, 1994), but subjects tend to discount this benefit when making 
JOLs (Koriat, 1997; Yue et al., 2012).  Indeed, we found that despite lower JOLs for disfluent conditions, 
subjects had better recognition memory for both low-frequency and inverted words.  This is consistent 
with work showing that memory performance is better under a variety of conditions of disfluency, such as 
enhanced memory for words that are masked so they are perceptually occluded as compared to clearly 
presented (Hirshman & Mulligan, 1991), when subjects assess semantic characteristics of verbal stimuli 
as compared to phonemic or physical characteristics (Craik & Tulving, 1975), and when words are 
presented once as compared to several times (Tulving & Kroll, 1995).  Moreover, past research has 
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demonstrated that memory benefits from novelty of verbal stimuli (Kishiyama & Yonelinas, 2003; 
Kishiyama et al., 2009), and this may be due to deeper processing or attentional orienting to less familiar 
stimuli during encoding (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Kishiyama et al., 2009).  Therefore, the effects of 
disfluency on memory and metamemory performance may also be interpreted as an effect of stimulus 
novelty, in that low-frequency words are novel due to unfamiliarity with the word itself, while inverted 
words are made novel by the format in which they are presented.  Taken together, the behavioral results 
of Experiment 1 support a commonly demonstrated dissociation between the effect of fluency on memory 
and metamemory, wherein JOLs are higher with greater encoding fluency, but subsequent recognition 
performance benefits from encoding disfluency.  
Although the cognitive bases of JOLs are relatively well established, neuroscience research has 
lagged behind, and it remains unclear how the brain supports JOL processes, particularly when JOLs are 
based on varying information.  Experiment 1 showed that the DLPFC plays a causal role in encoding and 
JOL accuracy, the aPFC contributes to JOL accuracy, and the roles of both the DLPFC and aPFC on JOL 
accuracy vary based on encoding fluency.  HD-tDCS over the DLPFC impaired encoding, as evidence by 
increased false alarms for all cue types.  This is consistent with previous work demonstrating a role for 
the DLPFC in encoding that predicts subsequent false alarms (Demeter et al., 2016; Slotnick & Schacter, 
2004).  Increased activity in the lateral PFC during encoding predicts subsequent false alarms to familiar 
but unstudied lures (Slotnick & Schacter, 2004), and excitatory stimulation to the DLPFC during encoding 
lowers the proportion of false alarms to lure items at test (Demeter et al., 2016), suggesting a role of the 
DLPFC in the encoding of specific information that allows for discrimination between old and new events 
at test.  As described above, subjects typically show a memory advantage for novel items at encoding, 
and this is demonstrated by fewer false alarms for inverted and low-frequency words following sham and 
aPFC stimulation.  Although there was no significant interaction between stimulation and cue type on 
false alarms, pairwise comparisons did show that there was no significant difference between false 
alarms for high- and low-frequency words following DLPFC stimulation, suggesting stimulation eliminated 
the typical novelty advantage in recognition.  One previous fMRI study showed that low-frequency words 
were associated with greater activity in the left prefrontal cortex during encoding, including the left inferior 
frontal gyrus and anterior cingulate, and similar regions showed greater activity for subsequent hits as 
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compared to misses on a recognition task.  This implies the recognition benefit for low-frequency words 
may result from stronger encoding due to the recruitment of prefrontal regions that interact with medial 
temporal regions in support of successful memory formation (Chee, Westphal, Goh, Graham, & Song, 
2003).  Therefore, our finding that DLPFC stimulation increased false alarms is consistent with research 
implicating this region in processes at encoding that predict subsequent false alarms and, furthermore, 
this may be due to a disruption of novelty-based encoding for low-frequency words, as there was no 
difference in false alarms for low- and high-frequency words after DLPFC stimulation.  
HD-tDCS to the aPFC selectively improved JOL accuracy for disfluent conditions, indicating the 
causal role of this region in JOL accuracy differs by cue type.  In a TMS study of JOLs and associative 
recognition, Ryals et al. (2016) showed that theta-burst stimulation to the aPFC improved JOL accuracy 
relative to DLPFC and sham stimulation, and this was driven by a decrease in JOLs for subsequent 
misses, but no change in JOLs for subsequent hits.  In other words, stimulation made subjects’ JOLs 
more sensitive to failures of encoding but did not alter JOLs for successfully encoded items.  Conversely, 
in our study, JOL accuracy was increased specifically for inverted and low-frequency words, which were 
better remembered, and both DLPFC and aPFC stimulation impaired JOL accuracy for high-frequency 
words relative to sham.  Therefore, it appears the role of the aPFC in JOL accuracy differs based on 
encoding success. 
One theory of the roles of PFC subregions in cognitive control processes proposes that functions 
are arranged along the rostro-caudal axis of the PFC in a hierarchy of increasing complexity, wherein the 
aPFC guides concrete, lower-level signals from posterior regions of the PFC to coordinate inputs and 
internal states in the service of more abstract goals (Badre, 2008; Koechlin et al., 1999, 2003; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001).  If anterior regions of the PFC integrate all lower-level information from posterior regions, it 
would follow that stimulation to this region would increase dependence on stimulus-related information, 
such as word frequency and orientation, regardless of their predictive value.  In other words, for 
conditions in which subjects base JOLs on cues that are predictive of memory success, JOL accuracy 
would be increased by aPFC stimulation, whereas for conditions in which JOLs are inaccurate because 
they are based on nondiagnostic cues, stimulation would impair JOL accuracy due to increased reliance 
on these cues.  However, we found that subjects had equally poor accuracy for all conditions under the 
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sham stimulation, suggesting subjects based JOL on nondiagnostic cues in all conditions (giving higher 
JOLs to fluent conditions and lower JOLs to disfluent conditions).  Therefore, in the current study, if the 
aPFC integrated all cue information regardless of diagnosticity, stimulation to this region would make JOL 
accuracy worse for all conditions, because subjects base their JOLs on the nondiagnostic cue of fluency 
in all conditions.  Instead, our results suggest that stimulation to the aPFC biases individuals toward using 
disfluency as a predictive cue of memory success, but also made JOLs less sensitive to the fact that 
fluency results in poorer memory.  The finding that enhancing activity in the aPFC biased subjects toward 
using predictive cues is consistent with hierarchical models of PFC organization that suggest that when 
bottom-up input from posterior regions activates multiple possible responses, the aPFC acts in a top-
down manner to bias responses in the interest of order task-relevant goals (Badre, 2008).   
However, we also found that aPFC stimulation made subjects less sensitive to predictive cues for high-
frequency words, suggesting that in this case, rather than biasing individuals toward giving lower JOLs to 
fluently encoded words, they actually became more dependent on the nondiagnostic cue of high fluency.  
Furthermore, stimulation to the DLPFC also reduced JOL accuracy for high-frequency words.  In the 
context of the hierarchical model of prefrontal organization, this could reflect an increase in the salience of 
the non-diagnostic cue: if posterior regions of the PFC track stimulus-level externally-generated 
information (Badre, 2008; Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000), enhancing DLPFC activity could have increased the 
salience of high-frequency words and, consequently, made subjects more likely to base JOLs on the non-
diagnostic cue of encoding fluency, reducing their accuracy.  However, further research is needed to 
understand whether the DLPFC and aPFC interact in a hierarchical manner with regard to metamemory 
processes, and how manipulation of activity in each of these regions may alter cue usage to influence 
JOL accuracy. 
 
Brain activity associated with RCJs varies with external sources of information 
In Experiment 2, we showed that activity during retrospective confidence judgments was greater 
in medial prefrontal, and medial and lateral parietal cortices, as compared to the recognition task.  Activity 
in these regions is consistent with past research examining the neural bases of RCJs as compared to 
recognition in episodic memory tasks (Chua et al., 2006, 2009b), as well as other forms of metamemory 
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monitoring, such as feeling-of-knowing judgments (Chua et al., 2009b), suggesting some shared neural 
mechanisms underlying metamemory processes across tasks.  The regions in which we saw greater 
activity during confidence assessment are consistent with areas implicated in the “default mode network”, 
a group of brain regions that are coactivated during rest, and deactivated during tasks in which attention 
is directed to external stimuli (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle & Snyder, 2007).  
Default mode network activity has also been broadly implicated in a variety of self-referential processes, 
including mind wandering (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009), mental simulation 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007), and mindful awareness of one’s thoughts (Berkovich-Ohana, Glicksohn, & 
Goldstein, 2012; Tops, Boksem, Quirin, IJzerman, & Koole, 2014) suggesting an involvement of these 
regions in internally directed cognition.  Therefore, activity in these regions during confidence judgments 
is consistent with evidence that the default mode network is engaged during self-referential processing.    
There is some evidence that the default mode network may consist of multiple subsystems, 
including a medial temporal lobe system related to memory processing, and a medial prefrontal system 
that uses information from the MTL network in support of self-relevant cognition (Buckner, Andrews-
Hanna, & Schacter, 2008).  We found that the process of making an RCJ recruited brain regions 
associated with the prefrontal subsystem, supporting the hypothesis that the process of assessing one’s 
confidence engages regions that support self-referential processing. 
A primary aim of Experiment 2 was to identify neural activity that varies with the presence of 
external cues during RCJs, and we found greater activity during uncued trials in the medial parietal and 
inferior temporal lobes, as compared to cued trials.  The left medial parietal lobe has been associated 
with self-related processing, including judgments based on subjective preferences (Zysset et al., 2002) 
and the speed with which subjects retrieve self-referential episodic information (Lou et al., 2004).  
Therefore, we speculate that increased activity in these regions may reflect subjects relying more heavily 
on internal cues to make RCJ when faced with an uncued trial, given that these trials lack an external cue 
on which subjects can base confidence ratings.  Past work has suggested subjects are more likely to rely 
on external sources of information when their internal memory signals are weak (Bradfield et al., 2002; 
Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012; Koriat et al., 2008; Wells & Bradfield, 1999).  Although the finding that 
subjects rely on external memory cues when internal cues are weak does not directly inform the opposite 
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comparison (i.e. how subjects make recognition judgments in the absence of external cues), it does 
suggest subjects use a combination of information- and experience- based cues when assessing their 
confidence, and that in the absence of one type of cue, they will rely more heavily on other available 
sources of information.  Therefore, it is plausible that medial parietal activity associated with uncued trials 
reflects greater reliance on internal experience-based memory signals during RCJs.   
Another aim of Experiment 2 was to test how brain activity varies with the validity of external cues 
during RCJs in a semantic recognition task, and how this relates to past research on RCJs in episodic 
recognition.  Here, we found that activity associated with cue validity during our semantic recognition task 
differed from cue validity effects shown in episodic recognition (O’Connor et al., 2010).  No regions 
showed greater activity for invalid as compared to valid cues during RCJs or recognition, a finding which 
is inconsistent with the results of O’Connor et al. (2010), wherein invalid cueing in an old/new recognition 
task was associated with medial PFC and inferior parietal activity.  This suggests the effects of cue 
validity on prefrontal and parietal activity vary based on memory modality.  Other metamemory monitoring 
literature found that different brain regions are engaged for feelings of knowing based on episodic vs. 
semantic recognition.  Maril, Simons, Mitchell, Schwartz, & Schacter (2003) found that as compared to 
‘don’t know’ responses, feelings of knowing were associated with activity in the middle frontal gyrus 
during episodic recognition, whereas in a different study, Maril, Simons, Weaver, & Schacter (2005) found 
FOKs were correlated with greater activity in lateral and posterior medial parietal and superior prefrontal 
cortices for semantic recognition.  Furthermore, a direct comparison of FOK-related activity during 
episodic and semantic retrieval within the same experiment showed greater activity during FOKs for 
semantic recognition in the right inferior frontal cortex, and greater activity for episodic FOKs in the middle 
temporal gyrus and posterior cingulate (Reggev et al., 2011). These results suggest a distinction between 
metamemory judgments based on episodic vs. semantic retrieval, and support our finding that the neural 
mechanisms underlying RCJs based on invalid cues during semantic recognition differ from those 
associated with invalid cueing during episodic recognition.  Metamemory research has not typically 
addressed how confidence-related brain activity varies based on the memory modality and/or external 
sources of information (Reggev et al., 2011).  Thus, our results represent a significant contribution to our 
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understanding of how subjects incorporate external cues into recognition and confidence judgments, and 
how this may differ for semantic as compared to episodic memory.  
Because we investigated the neural bases of RCJs based on semantic recognition, we were able 
to use an objective marker of item difficulty, as opposed to episodic tasks, in which confidence is typically 
used as a marker of difficulty.  We defined Easy and Hard questions by a median split in performance for 
general knowledge questions that had previously been answered by a large sample of college students, 
which allowed us to analyze how cue validity may have influence brain activity differently for questions 
that were objectively difficult vs. easy.  Despite discrepant findings between our study and those of 
O’Connor et al. (2010) for the overall Invalid > Valid contrast, we found that the comparison of Invalid > 
Valid cues for Easy questions only showed greater activity for invalid cues in the right caudate and 
cuneus.  Here, we show commonalities between our study and previous research showing these regions 
respond to invalidly cued trials in episodic memory (O’Connor et al., 2010).  The caudate nucleus has 
been implicated in the processing prediction errors, i.e. how much an event differs from the expected 
outcome, in a broad range of non-human animal studies investigating reward-based learning (Grahn, 
Parkinson, & Owen, 2009; Haruno & Kawato, 2006; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & 
Carter, 2004).  In humans, there is some evidence that the caudate plays a similar role in more complex 
cognitive functions, guiding goal-directed behavior by monitoring how closely events match expectations.  
One fMRI study showed that when subjects were trained to produce a series of body movements in 
response to auditory cues, and then watched videos of dancers producing the same movements, the 
caudate nucleus showed greater activity when the dancers did not produce the expected movement for 
the given cue, suggesting this region tracks violations of expectations (Schiffer & Schubotz, 2011).  
Furthermore, it has been proposed that the error-related negativity (ERN), an even-related potential 
produced when subjects make errors in cognitive tasks, may reflect a prediction error signal stemming 
from the basal ganglia, including the caudate, which is then conveyed to executive control regions 
through functional connections with frontal regions (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Therefore, our results, and 
those of O’Connor et al. (2010), showing greater caudate activity for invalid cueing, can be interpreted in 
the context of studies showing a role for the basal ganglia in tracking breaches of expectation, which in 
this case may occur when subjects are told a question is hard when in fact it is easy.  The fact that 
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greater activity for invalid as compared to valid cues was only seen for easy questions in Experiment 2 
may be due to a stronger conflict between internal and external memory signals.  In the case of an easy 
question, subjects are likely to know the correct answer, which may elicit a strong internal experience-
based memory signal.  Therefore, when presented with an invalid external cue, there may be greater 
conflict between internal and external signals when assessing confidence.  In contrast, for a hard 
question, subjects may not have a strong internal memory signal because they are less likely to know the 
correct answer, which consequently produces less conflict between internal and external cues.  
Finally, we found that activity in bilateral medial temporal lobes was correlated with cue 
dependency for invalidly cued hard questions that were answered correctly.  The MTL has typically been 
associated with episodic memory processes (Eichenbaum et al., 2012; Henson, 2005; Ranganath, 2010; 
Schacter & Wagner, 1999), but there is some evidence that it is also engaged during semantic 
recognition tasks (Chan et al., 2001; Ryan et al., 2008, 2010).  Given that these studies implicate MTL 
involvement in retrieval of semantic memory, we might expect that MTL activity would be associated with 
the process of making RCJs based on internal memory signals as compared to external sources of 
information in our semantic recognition task.  However, the more confidence ratings were inflated by the 
presence of an invalid external cue, the more activity we saw during RCJs in bilateral MTL.  Therefore, 
we speculate that MTL activity here may reflect integration of multiple sources of information, e.g., 
external and internal cues about memorability.  The MTL, and the hippocampus in particular, have been 
implicated in fMRI studies of retrieval-mediated learning, wherein memories of previous events are 
reactivated during the encoding of new related information (Shohamy & Wagner, 2008; Zeithamova, 
Dominick, & Preston, 2012), and one MEG study showed that theta band activity in the hippocampus 
during encoding predicted subsequent memory integration (Backus, Schoffelen, Szebényi, Hanslmayr, & 
Doeller, 2016).  There is also evidence that hippocampal activity increases when subjects have to 
integrate serially presented information into a cohesive mental representation, such as during mental 
scene construction, in which subjects integrate discrete phrases describing elements of a scene into a 
unified representation of the scene (Summerfield, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2010).  These studies suggest 
the hippocampus plays a role in linking memories for events that occurred at different times, but share 
overlapping content (Backus et al., 2016; Shohamy & Wagner, 2008; Zeithamova et al., 2012). During the 
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process of making an RCJ, subjects must integrate information related to internal cues, such as the 
strength of a memory signal during retrieval, with external cues about question difficulty, in order to 
decide the appropriate level of confidence to express.  Although the above studies implicate the MTL 
specifically in the activation of previously encoded memory content during encoding of new information, 
the broader role of this region in integration of multiple sources of information may account for the 
increased activity we found in the MTL with greater dependency on invalid cues during hard hits.  MTL 
activity may reflect integration between internal cues reflecting successful retrieval of the correct answer 
to a hard question, with the external cue indicating the question was easy.  In fact, one model of 
hippocampal function suggests the hippocampus plays a specific role in integrating exteroceptive 
information, which stems from the external environment, with interoceptive information, such as emotional 
valence associated with episodic memories (Kassab & Alexandre, 2015).  Therefore, activity in the 
hippocampus that increases with dependency on an invalid external cue during confidence assessment 
may reflect integration of internal and external memory signals.  Furthermore, for invalidly cued hard 
questions, subjects inflated their confidence based on the presence of an external cue indicating the 
question was easy, but because the question was actually difficult, it may have required effortful retrieval, 
which would give rise to an internal experience-based signal of low confidence.  There is some evidence 
that as part of its broader role in memory integration, the hippocampus is involved in comparing past and 
present experiences, and activity increases when what is expected to occur based on past experience 
conflicts with what occurs in the present reality (Kumaran & Maguire, 2006; Oehrn et al., 2015).  
Therefore, the increased MTL activity we saw with cue dependency during invalidly cued hard hits could 
reflect conflict between internal experience-based and external information-based cues.  This finding 
extends previous work demonstrating a role for the MTL in integrating multiple sources of information, 
and provides new evidence suggesting this region may similarly contribute to metamemory monitoring by 







Experiment 1 used HD-tDCS to test the behavioral effects of directly manipulating brain activity in 
the PFC. Although there has been an increasing interest in the potential for tDCS to enhance functioning 
in a variety of clinical populations, and to test causal roles of cortical regions in cognitive processes 
(Colzato et al., 2017; Flöel, 2014; Nitsche et al., 2008; Zhao et al., 2017), there is also some controversy 
surrounding the ability of tDCS to alter performance in cognitive tasks (Horvath et al., 2015b; Jacobson et 
al., 2012).  One meta-analysis of 42 studies using single-session tDCS during executive function, 
language, memory, and other cognitive tasks showed that tDCS had no effect on any of these functions.  
However, the results of this review have been called into question, particularly because the analyses 
combined studies that varied across dosage and duration of stimulation, and electrode montage (Antal, 
Keeser, Priori, Padberg, & Nitsche, 2015; Chhatbar & Feng, 2015).  The question of how behavioral 
effects of tDCS relate to the dosage of current applied is important to our understanding of the 
mechanisms by which tDCS exerts its effects, and also pertain to our interpretation of the results of 
Experiment 1. Previous research has suggested that in addition to altering the conductance of ion 
channels to modify resting potential of neurons under the electrode (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011) tDCS may 
also exert its effects by modifying astrocytic calcium levels that contribute to synaptic plasticity (Monai et 
al., 2016).  Small increases in calcium concentration have been shown to induce long-term depression, 
while large increases in calcium contribute to long-term potentiation (Stagg & Nitsche, 2011), highlighting 
the importance of current dosage in considering behavioral effects of tDCS. 
Indeed, research has shown that the effects of tDCS on neural excitability vary with the duration 
and intensity of stimulation.  One study found that when applying 1mA of current, cathodal tDCS inhibited 
excitability of neurons under the stimulation site, as evidenced by TMS-induced MEP amplitudes, 
whereas with 2mA of current, both cathodal and anodal stimulation enhanced excitability (Batsikadze, 
Moliadze, Paulus, Kuo, & Nitsche, 2013).  Furthermore, past work has shown that doubling the duration 
of stimulation prolonged the excitatory after-effects of tDCS (Monte-Silva, Kuo, Liebetanz, Paulus, & 
Nitsche, 2010).  In Experiment 1, we applied 2mA of stimulation, because this is the most commonly used 
strength of stimulation in cognitive tasks (Chua & Ahmed, 2016; Chua et al., 2017; Gaynor & Chua, 2016; 
Horvath et al., 2015a, 2015b; Hussey, Ward, Christianson, & Kramer, 2015; Nikolin, Loo, Bai, Dokos, & 
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Martin, 2015; Stagg & Nitsche, 2011), and previous research has shown this current intensity can alter 
metamemory performance (Chua & Ahmed, 2016; Chua et al., 2017).  Furthermore, we limited 
stimulation to the duration of the encoding task (~10 minutes), because we were only testing online 
effects of tDCS, as opposed to after-effects which are more influenced by stimulation duration (Monte-
Silva et al., 2010; Nitsche et al., 2005; Nitsche & Paulus, 2000).  However, given the described studies 
demonstrating that neuronal excitability are sensitive to differences in the dosage and duration of current 
applied, future research should test how these factors influence heterogeneity in the behavioral effects of 
tDCS.  
Because tDCS does not directly induce action potentials, but rather, alters resting membrane 
potential to make immediately subthreshold neurons more likely to fire (Bikson et al., 2004, 2012), the 
endogenous brain activity within the region being targeted by stimulation will also influence the dose-
dependent response to tDCS.  Indeed, a growing body of research has identified individual differences 
related to underlying neuronal activity, including mood states, education level (Berryhill & Jones, 2012), 
time of day (Gaynor & Chua, 2016; López-Alonso, Cheeran, Río-Rodríguez, & Fernández-del-Olmo, 
2014), task difficulty (Chua et al., 2017; Jones & Berryhill, 2012), and baseline cognitive abilities (Jones 
& Berryhill, 2012; Tseng et al., 2012), may predict responses to stimulation.  Additionally, variations in 
anatomy may also explain heterogeneity in the effects of tDCS on cognitive tasks.  For example, studies 
have shown women had a significantly heightened response to tDCS of the visual cortex as compared to 
males (Chaieb, Antal, & Paulus, 2008), older subjects showed a delayed response to tDCS as compared 
to younger adults (Fujiyama et al., 2014), and differences in current density under the stimulating 
electrode due to anatomical differences influenced performance on a working memory task (Kim et al., 
2014).   
One hypothesis regarding variability in outcomes from tDCS suggests there is an optimal balance 
between cortical excitation and inhibition, and this balance varies between individuals.  Therefore, an 
individual with intrinsically low excitation in a specific cortical region, may benefit from stimulation to that 
area; however, the same stimulation in a subject with high baseline excitability could lead to 
overexcitation which results in poorer performance (Krause & Cohen Kadosh, 2014; Krause, Márquez-
Ruiz, & Kadosh, 2013).  Therefore, there may be a curve that represents the relationship between neural 
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excitation and behavioral response, in which optimal excitability would fall in the center, with over- and 
under-excitability leading to suboptimal performance (Krause & Cohen Kadosh, 2014; Krause et al., 
2013).  Furthermore, if individual differences do indeed predict ‘responders’ and ‘nonresponders’ to tDCS, 
effects of tDCS at the group level can be obscured by analyses that group all subjects irrespective of 
individual differences, producing apparent null effects where in fact there may be a multimodal distribution 
of responses to stimulation (López-Alonso et al., 2014).  In Experiment 1, we addressed this limitation by 
controlling for the effects of individual differences related to both anatomy (head size, age, gender), and 
factors shown to alter endogenous neural activity (self-reported mood state, alertness, difficulties 
concentrating).  However, we did not test how duration and intensity of stimulation affected cognitive 
performance, and one possible future avenue of research is to manipulate current intensity and duration 
to test how individual differences in endogenous brain activity may interact with stimulation parameters to 
predict who does and does not benefit from tDCS. 
Another potential limitation to Experiment 1 is the fact that during both aPFC and DLPFC 
stimulation, 17 of 24 subjects correctly guessed they were receiving active as compared to sham 
stimulation.  Although sham stimulation involves a small amount of current administered at the start of 
stimulation to mimic the scalp sensations experienced during active stimulation, participant blinding 
during tDCS is known to be challenging due to differences in the duration and intensity of these 
sensations (Davis et al., 2013), and if subjects can indeed guess when they are receiving active vs. sham 
stimulation, this may impact behavioral results.  However, we also found that 10 of the 24 subjects 
incorrectly believed they were receiving active stimulation during the sham condition, which could offset 
any differences seen in performance for active vs. sham conditions that might be due to the belief that 
subjects were receiving active current.  Furthermore, there were no significant differences between aPFC 
and DLPFC conditions in terms of subjects’ guesses about whether they received active stimulation, 
which suggests the differences we saw in encoding success and JOL accuracy that were specific to each 
of these sites were unlikely to be influenced by participants’ beliefs about stimulation.  Moreover, given 
that subjects are likely to base their guess about stimulation condition on the sensations they experienced 
during  tDCS, our inclusion of covariates reflecting self-reported sensations during each session 
controlled for the possibility that their beliefs about stimulation condition impacted the observed results.  
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Nevertheless future studies could consider using a between-subjects design to limit the amount of 
experience each subject has with tDCS, or apply a topical anesthetic to reduce skin sensations 
associated with tDCS, to better blind participants to the stimulation condition. 
In experiment 1, we stimulated the left DLPFC because previous studies have shown that tDCS 
to this region alters metamemory and memory performance in other tasks (Chua & Ahmed, 2016; Chua et 
al., 2017; Gaynor & Chua, 2016; Hussey et al., 2015), and the left lateral PFC has been widely implicated 
in episodic encoding (Epstein, Sekino, Yamaguchi, Kamiya, & Ueno, 2002; Fletcher, Shallice, & Dolan, 
1998; Nyberg, Cabeza, et al., 1996; Spaniol et al., 2009).  A significant amount of past research has also 
supported the idea that the left and right prefrontal cortices are differentially recruited during encoding and 
retrieval of episodic and semantic information, wherein the left PFC is specifically engaged during 
episodic encoding (Epstein et al., 2002; Habib, Nyberg, & Tulving, 2003; Nyberg, Cabeza, et al., 1996; 
Opitz, Mecklinger, & Friederici, 2000).  Nevertheless, some studies have suggested that both right and 
left DLPFC are involved in episodic encoding; for instance right DLPFC activity has been associated with 
encoding of both verbal and nonverbal information (Opitz et al., 2000), and TMS to the right DLPFC 
during encoding has been shown to alter subsequent recall (Epstein et al., 2002) and recognition 
(Sandrini, Cappa, Rossi, Rossini, & Miniussi, 2003).  Therefore, future research should address whether 
the role of the DLPFC in encoding and JOL accuracy as demonstrated in Experiment 1 is exclusive to the 
left hemisphere, or whether right DLPFC stimulation would produce comparable results. 
One important limitation to the findings presented in Experiment 2 is the use of uncorrected p-
values for the analyses comparing activity during Uncued vs. Cued and Invalid vs. Valid trials.  Whereas 
we applied family-wise error corrections for multiple comparisons when analyzing the Confidence vs. 
Recognition contrasts, more specific analyses of activity by trial type were not corrected due to low power 
resulting from only 18 subjects in the sample, and the exploratory nature of the analyses.  Although we 
used a conservative significance level (p<0.001) to limit false positives, the interpretation of these results 
should be taken in the context of increased probability of Type 1 errors due to not having been corrected 
for multiple comparisons.  Nevertheless, the results of these analyses provide some preliminary evidence 
for regions that may be engaged based on the presence and validity of external cues, which may help 
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develop stronger hypotheses about regions of interest to be explored in future studies of brain activity 
associated with the incorporation of external cues during metamemory monitoring. 
Another limitation to Experiment 2 relates to the use of general knowledge questions that were 
categorized as “Easy” and “Hard” based on a median split in recall performance from previously collected 
data.  Some of these questions in the question database are considered “Hard” because they are 
answered incorrectly due to a lure in the form of a commonly endorsed incorrect answer, whereas others 
are difficult due to unfamiliarity with the domain or question content.  We expected invalidly cued trials to 
present a potential conflict between internal signals arising from the subjective experience of question 
difficulty and the external cue about question difficulty.  However, in the case of “Hard” questions with 
lures, although subjects tend to answer incorrectly, they may not experience a feeling of difficulty because 
they are confident in the incorrect answer and feel it is an easy question.  Therefore, when these 
questions are presented with an invalid cue indicating they are “Easy”, there may be no conflict between 
the subjective experience of difficulty and the external cue.  We included all trials in our analyses to 
maximize statistical power, but it may be fruitful to conduct future analyses that exclude Hard questions 
that were answered incorrectly due to subjects choosing the lure response, to more carefully control for 
the possibility that a portion of “Hard” questions were in fact subjectively experienced as “Easy” by most 
subjects. 
In Experiment 2, we used fMRI to dissociate the brain regions that contribute to the process of 
making an RCJ from those engaged during the semantic recognition task.  Although we found regions 
with greater activity for confidence than recognition, and vice versa, suggesting these processes are 
somewhat dissociable in the brain, it is worth noting that there may be confidence-related activity taking 
place during the recognition trial.  The relationship between retrieval and metamemory monitoring is 
highlighted by a prominent theory of metacognition (Nelson & Narens, 1990), which suggests 
metamemory processes are divided between object and meta levels.  Object-level information, such as 
the content of a memory, is monitored at the meta-level, and then controlled at the object level through 
changes in behavior.  Practically speaking, this means that individuals are likely to control their 
recognition decisions based on feelings of confidence arising from the meta-representation of the 
memory.  Indeed, studies have shown that memory search and termination strategies are influenced by 
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confidence: when subjects have a high feeling of knowing, (i.e. they feel they know the answer but can’t 
currently retrieve it), they are more likely to continue searching their memory (Nhouyvanisvong & Reder, 
1998).  Therefore, it may be that in the case of RCJs, the process of confidence assessment cannot be 
entirely isolated from retrieval, because subjects may assess their confidence in retrieved information 
during the recognition trial, and use the results of that assessment to determine whether they should 
continue or terminate their memory search.   
The issue of dissociating confidence from recognition processes may be partially eliminated 
through alterations to experimental design.  One option is to use a block rather than event-related design: 
comparing brain activity during a block of recognition-only responses to a block of recognition and 
confidence judgments could help isolate the neural activity associated with confidence judgments.  
Alternatively, within an event-related design, we could include individual trials in which recognition is not 
followed by an RCJ, therefore providing a true recognition-only condition to which to compare activity 
associated with confidence assessment.  Future work on the cognitive neuroscience of metamemory 
should consider these conceptual and methodological implications when testing for common and distinct 
neural components of memory and metamemory processes. 
Another limitation of Experiment 2 is the use of a confidence scale with only 4 possible choices.  
Due to technological constraints of using a button-box to give responses in the MRI machine, we used a 
limited confidence scale ranging from 1-4, in which a response of “1” represented 0-25% confident, “2” 
represented 25-50% confident, “3” represented 50-75% confident and “4” indicated confidence of 75-
100%.  Because we were interested in testing the degree to which subjects incorporated cues into their 
confidence judgments, this study may have benefitted from a more fine-grained scale of confidence, for 
example, using a scale of 0-100% in 10% increments.  Such as scale would be more sensitive to 
differences in confidence based on cue condition, which may have been obscured in Experiment 2 due to 
collapsing across large ranges of confidence.  Although there are limitations to response capabilities in 
MRI, a joystick response rather than a button-box could allow subjects to give responses on a more fine-
grained confidence scale.  Despite this potential limitation, we did demonstrate significant differences in 
confidence between conditions, suggesting our 4-point confidence scale was sufficiently sensitive to 
evaluate how RCJs were affected by recognition performance, question difficulty, and external cues. 
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Broader implications 
The results of this dissertation work inform our understanding of the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms that contribute to metamemory monitoring, and this has broader implications for other fields 
of study.  Metamemory deficits have been demonstrated in populations with Alzheimer’s disease 
(Cosentino et al., 2016; Pappas et al., 1992; Souchay, 2007; Souchay et al., 2003), traumatic brain injury 
(Chiou et al., 2011; Kennedy, 2001, 2004), dementia (Cosentino & Stern, 2005; Souchay et al., 2003), 
schizophrenia (Moritz & Woodward, 2006; Souchay, Bacon, & Danion, 2006), depression (Kalska, 
Punamaki, Makinen-Pelli, & Saarinen, 1999), and various learning disabilities (Harris, Graham, & 
Freeman, 1988).  In the learning domain in particular, accurate metamemory is crucial to the effective 
employment of study and testing strategies that facilitate optimal learning.  JOL ratings have been 
correlated with strategic study decisions, wherein individuals choose to allot greater study time to items 
they previously gave lower JOLs (Son & Metcalfe, 2000), and individuals with better metamemory 
accuracy often show better memory performance and are more likely to correct their previous errors 
(Butterfield & Mangels, 2003).  Therefore, an important question for future research is whether monitoring 
accuracy can be improved so that effective control strategies, such as appropriate study-time decisions, 
can be employed to benefit performance. 
Studies have shown that metamemory deficits in populations with learning difficulties can be 
improved by enhancing metamemory monitoring and control abilities.  For instance, Kennedy et al. (2003) 
showed that brain injury patients who demonstrate impairments in learning were able to make accurate 
metacognitive judgments by using delayed rather than immediate JOLs.  Delayed JOLs, which are made 
after a determined period of time following the study of each item, tend to be significantly more accurate 
than immediate JOLs made during or directly after encoding (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991).  Because delayed JOLs are likely made based on attempted retrieval from long-term 
memory (rather than short-term memory in the case of immediate JOLs), they are more predictive of long-
term memory performance at later test (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991).  Kennedy et al. (2003) found that as 
compared to those who used immediate JOLs, TBI patients who used delayed JOLs were not only more 
likely to make accurate judgments, but then had improved recall following restudy of selected items 
because their choices about which items to study were based on more accurate JOLs (Kennedy, Carney, 
Gaynor 95 
& Peters, 2003).  This suggests it is possible for individuals with learning impairments to overcome 
deficits by learning to make metamemory monitoring and control decisions based on information that is 
predictive of memory success, such as JOLs based on attempted retrieval.  
Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) has been widely associated with learning 
difficulties in both children and adults, (Loe & Feldman, 2007; Mayes, Calhoun, & Crowell, 2000; Semrud-
clikeman et al., 1992; Woods, Lovejoy, & Ball, 2002) and studies show that individuals with ADHD are 
also deficient in metamemory abilities (Antshel & Nastasi, 2008; Castel, Lee, Humphreys, & Moore, 2011; 
Knouse, Anastopoulos, & Dunlosky, 2012).  One study showed that adults with ADHD remembered fewer 
words than controls, but were equally accurate in predicting memory performance using JOLs.  However, 
the ADHD group was less likely to employ study strategies, such as self-testing, that would improve their 
memory (Knouse et al., 2012).  Therefore, it is important to consider not only how individuals make 
accurate metamemory monitoring judgments, but also the relationship between monitoring and control 
strategies.  Nevertheless, some studies have shown that training subjects in metamemory monitoring can 
enhance self-regulated learning.  For instance, JOLs are typically inflated for backward-associated word 
pairs, in which the likelihood of the first word eliciting the second during cued recall (e.g., rain – umbrella) 
is much lower than for a forward associated-pair (e.g., umbrella – rain) (Koriat & Bjork, 2006).  However, 
when subjects practiced studying and recalling lists of word pairs several times, they became more 
sensitive to mnemonic cues that actually predicted recall ability, such as retrieval fluency, and JOLs 
became more accurate.  Furthermore, when subjects were explicitly taught that JOLs for backward-
associated word pairs tend to be inflated because the presence of the cue and target together misleads 
subjects to believe the target will be easily retrieved when the cue is presented alone, JOL accuracy 
improved (Koriat & Bjork, 2006).  This evidence supports the possibility that metamemory monitoring can 
be improved by training learners to be more sensitive to mnemonic cues that are predictive vs. 
nonpredictive of memory performance.  Moreover, following both these metamemory monitoring training 
procedures, subject exhibited better metamemory control, allocating a greater amount of study time to 
backward than forward-associated word pairs (Koriat & Bjork, 2006).  Thus, making subjects aware of the 
predictive cues that lead to memory accuracy enhanced both JOL accuracy and subsequent self-guided 
learning strategies.  Further research should address how training subjects to use diagnostic cues during 
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confidence assessment can be applied to other types of metamemory monitoring, such as RCJs, as well 
as how brain-based interventions such as tDCS, which have been shown to enhance learning in a wide 
variety of tasks (Coffman, Clark, & Parasuraman, 2014; Flöel, 2014; Flöel et al., 2012; Meinzer et al., 
2014), can potentially enhance the benefit of metamemory training in order to promote more accurate 
monitoring and control strategies.  
Another important avenue of research relates to the prevalence of metamemory impairments in 
populations with neurodegenerative diseases, particularly those characterized by a primary deficit in 
memory abilities, such as AD.  Lack of accurate awareness in one’s own memory failures has been 
widely demonstrated in AD, and can have serious implications for disease treatment, including a failure to 
seek help early on, and make decisions about medication management (Cosentino, Metcalfe, Cary, De 
Leon, & Karlawish, 2011).  However, diagnosis of metamemory deficits often relies on patient- or 
caregiver-report, which are subject to bias, highlighting the necessity of objective systematic testing of 
metamemory to understand how metamemory impairments relate to the neural substrates of AD 
(Cosentino & Stern, 2005).   
Experimental work using objective measures of metamemory have shown that AD patients are 
impaired in JOL accuracy as compared to healthy controls (McGlynn & Kaszniak, 1991; Moulin, Perfect, 
& Jones, 2000), and in FOK accuracy using an episodic sentence memory task (Duke, 2000) and a 
paired associate task (Souchay, Isingrini, & Gil, 2002).  Using a semantic memory task Pappas et al. 
(1992) found that AD patients were impaired in FOK accuracy, but performed similarly to controls in RCJ 
accuracy, suggesting the metamemory deficits found in AD may depend on both the type of memory 
being monitoring, and the type of judgment elicited.  
Deficits in AD patients’ insight into their cognitive impairments has been associated with 
dysfunction of the prefrontal cortices in both neuropsychological (Mangone et al., 1991) and 
neuroimaging studies (Starkstein et al., 1995; Vogel, Hasselbalch, Gade, Ziebell, & Waldemar, 2005).  In 
Experiment 1, we used tDCS to show that the PFC plays a causal role in JOL accuracy in healthy adults, 
but to date no studies have tested whether stimulation of the PFC may enhance metamemory monitoring 
abilities in the AD population.  However, a growing number of studies have shown that non-invasive brain 
stimulation may be a promising tool by which to enhance other cognitive processes in AD, including 
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improving visual recognition memory using tDCS (Boggio et al., 2009), and improving object and action 
naming using TMS (Cotelli, Manenti, Cappa, Zanetti, & Miniussi, 2008).  These results, combined with 
evidence that metamemory monitoring can be improved by training individuals to base confidence on 
cues that are diagnostic of memory success (Koriat & Bjork, 2006), suggest a possible future avenue of 
research testing whether combining metamemory training with stimulation to enhance activity in regions 
known to contribute to metamemory accuracy, such as the PFC, may enhance metamemory abilities in 
patients with AD. 
Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that in healthy adults, the process of making 
RCJs during semantic retrieval engages regions associated with the default-mode network, and this is 
consistent with previous work identifying similar regions as contributing to episodic RCJs (Chua et al., 
2004, 2006, 2009b, 2009a).  Several studies have demonstrated that AD patients have abnormal default-
mode network activity as compared to healthy controls (Greicius, Srivastava, Reiss, & Menon, 2004; Liu 
et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2011); moreover, AD patients show decreased functional connectivity between 
prefrontal and parietal cortices, regions which were not only engaged during the process of making RCJs 
in Experiment 2, but also showed varying activity based on the presence of external cues about question 
difficulty. Given the possibility that people with weaker memory signals, such as those with AD, may be 
more reliant on external information when assessing their retrieval confidence (Bradfield et al., 2002; 
Jaeger, Lauris, et al., 2012), one important avenue of future research would be to test how dysfunction in 
these brain regions may contribute to metamemory inaccuracy in AD patients, and whether this relates to 
a possible over-reliance on external cues about memorability due to primary memory deficits. 
Taken together, the results of these dissertation experiments contribute to our understanding of 
how the neural and cognitive bases of metamemory interact, and suggest the ways in which brain regions 
support JOL and RCJ processes varies depending on the information on which metamemory judgments 
are made.  Establishing the neural correlates of metamemory processes, how they relate to cognitive 
mechanisms involved in metamemory, and whether interventions such as tDCS can enhance these 
functions, is crucial to the development of appropriate and effective treatments that have the potential to 































Figure 1. Brodmann Areas (BA) comprising the lateral (A) and medial 
(B) prefrontal cortex.  BA10, the most anterior region of the prefrontal 
cortex, and BA11, which includes the ventromedial prefrontal and 
orbitofrontal cortices, have been associated with JOL processes. 
 
From “Neurocognitive mechanisms of cognitive control: The role of prefrontal 
cortex in action selection, response inhibition, performance monitoring, and 
reward-based learning”, by K.R Ridderinkhof, W. P. van den Wildenberg, S. 
J.  Segalowitz, & C. S. Carter, 2004, Brain and Cognition, 56(2), p. 131. 
Copyright 2004 by Elsevier Inc. Reprinted with permission. 
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Figure 2. Modeled current densities based on HD-tDCS montages for 

















Figure 3.  Subjects had higher hit rates for low-frequency than high-frequency words under all 
stimulation conditions (A).  Subjects had higher false alarm rates following DLPFC stimulation relative 
to sham and aPFC stimulation (B), but this effect did not differ by word frequency.  Error bars reflect 
standard errors of the means. 
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Figure 4.  Hit rates for inverted words were significantly greater than hit rates for upright words, but there 
were no effects of stimulation on hits (A).  DLPFC stimulation increased false alarms relative to sham and 
aPFC stimulation, but there was no effect of orientation on false alarms (B).  Error bars reflect standard 





















Figure 5.  Relative to sham and DLPFC stimulation, aPFC stimulation improved JOL accuracy for low-
frequency words; aPFC and DLPFC stimulation impaired JOL accuracy for high-frequency words (A).  
Relative to sham and DLPFC stimulation, aPFC stimulation improved accuracy for inverted words, and 
there was a significant difference between inverted and upright words with aPFC stimulation (B).  Error 

















Figure 6.  In the scanner, subjects answered and gave confidence ratings for 300 general knowledge 
questions, presented with cues about difficulty (“Easy”, “Hard” or Uncued), which were valid 50% of the time 






























Figure 7.  Significant variation in individual subjects’ cue dependency scores for Invalidly Cued 
Hard Hits (mean RCJ for Invalidly Cued Hard Hits – mean RCJ for Uncued Hard Hits).  Each dot 
represents an individual subject’s cue dependency score.  Upper and lower boundaries of the box 
indicate the 1st and 3rd quartiles of the data set, respectively, with the 2nd quartile (median) 































Figure 8. The contrast of Confidence > Recognition showed greater activity in the medial 
prefrontal cortex (A, B) and medial parietal cortex (A).  Colorbar represents t-values.  
































Figure 9. Comparisons of activity during Recognition > Confidence tasks showed greater activity in 
the medial prefrontal cortex (A, B), and left lateral prefrontal cortex (B).  Colorbar represents t-
































Figure 10. The contrast of Uncued > Cued trials during recognition showed 
greater activity for Uncued trials in the left lateral prefrontal cortex (A), and left 






























Figure 11. Differences in activity for Confidence > Recognition covaried with individual differences 
in Invalid Hard Hit cue dependency in bilateral MTL regions (A).  Mean percent signal change in 
the left MTL (-12, -7, -17) increased with cue dependency (B). Mean percent signal change during 
Recognition did not appear to be related to cue dependency (C), but there was a positive 
relationship between activity during Confidence and cue dependency (D).  A similar pattern of 
percent signal change was seen in the right MTL cluster.  Datapoints represent mean percent 
signal change for all voxels within significant clusters; colorbar represents t-values. 
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Tables  
Table 1. Clusters showing significant differences between the Recognition and Confidence tasks 
(p<0.001, uncorrected; 10 voxel extent threshold).  Peak differences in activation are reported in MNI 
coordinates.  Sub-peaks are reported when clusters span multiple Brodmann areas (BA) and 
hemispheres, and are further separated out if sub-peaks are located in different gross anatomical areas.  
 
Confidence > Recognition 
Region x y z No of voxels z value 
Medial prefrontal cortex    187 5.63 
 BA10 0 50 16   
 R BA11 6 41 -11   
 BA32 0  53 -2   
Medial parietal cortices    135 5.23 
 BA 23 0 -22 31   
 R BA24 3 -19 37   
 R BA31 3 -31 46   
 L BA31 -6 -25 40   
 L BA23 -3 -31 28   
R lateral tempo-parietal cortex    17 5.05 
 R BA21 60 -28 -8   
R medial parietal cortex    11 4.97 
 R BA23 12 -52 31   
Recognition > Confidence 
Medial prefrontal cortex    51 5.08 
L BA 8 -6 17 46   
 L BA6 -3 14 52   
 R BA6 6 14 49   
L lateral prefrontal cortex    62 5.45 
L BA 44 -48 14 28   
 L BA9 -45 26 25   
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Visual cortices    31 5.30 
L BA 18 12 -76 -8   
 R BA17 6 -85 1   
 R BA18 3 -82 -2   





Table 2.  Clusters showing significant differences between Uncued and Cued trials during recognition 
task and confidence task (p<0.001, uncorrected; 10 voxel extent threshold).  Peak differences in 
activation are reported in MNI coordinates.  Sub-peaks are reported when clusters span multiple 
Brodmann areas (BA) and hemispheres, and are further separated out if sub-peaks are located in 
different gross anatomical areas. 
 
Uncued > Cued during recognition 
Region x y z No of voxels z value 
L anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 10) -24 65 10 25 3.76 
R medial prefrontal cortex (BA 10) 9 59 7 11 3.36 
L medial prefrontal cortex (BA 8) -9 47 46 26 4.16 
R medial prefrontal cortex (BA 8) 18 32 43 17 3.73 
L lateral prefrontal cortex    129 4.04 
 L BA8 -33 14 43   
 L BA6 -39 11 49   
L lateral prefrontal cortex (BA 8) -42 14 31 11 3.65 
L premotor cortex (BA 6) -21 14 61 11 3.49 
R motor cortex (BA 4) 51 -7 28 36 3.62 
L motor cortex (BA 4) -33 -7 34 39 3.75 
R motor & somatosensory cortices    24 3.65 
 R BA4 18 -22 58   
 R BA1 21 -34 67   
L middle temporal pole (BA 38) -30 17 -29 10 3.90 
L lateral temporal lobe (BA 21) -51 -28 -5 19 3.51 
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R lateral parietal lobe (BA 7) 39 -43 43 29 3.85 
R inferior parietal cortex    26 3.73 
 R BA39 48 -61 15   
L superior parietal lobe (BA 7) -18 -61 55 38 3.65 
R lateral parietal lobe (BA 7) 30 -61 52 30 3.43 
R medial parietal lobe    291 4.30 
 R BA7 3 -61 40   
 R BA31 0 -49 43   
R visual association area1 (BA 19) 0 -82 34   
R primary visual cortex (BA 17) 21 -67 10 27 3.73 
L visual association area    370 4.52 
 L BA19 -36 -70 22   
 L BA17 -12 -82 13   
 BA18 0 -94 13   
 L BA18 -21 -67 19   
 L BA39 -30 -79 31   
R visual association area (BA 18) 15 -88 16 10 3.45 
R primary visual cortex (BA 17) 0  -88 1 10 3.56 
Uncued > Cued during confidence 
R premotor cortex (BA 6) 27 2 52 14 3.62 
L medial temporal lobe (BA36) -18 -22 -8 12 3.60 
L inferior temporal lobe (BA 37) -30 -49 -14 23 3.56 
L medial parietal lobe (BA 23) -9 -58 10 25 3.93 
L cerebellum -6 -55 -26 43 4.28 










Post tDCS questionnaire 
 
 
Subject ID: ________________      Date: ________________ 
 
 




     1- Absent 1- None 
     2- Mild  2- Remote 
     3- Moderate 3- Possible 
     4- Severe 4- Probably 
       5- Definite 
 
 
Did you experience any of the 
following symptoms/side 
effects? 
Severity Relationship Notes 
Headache    
Neck Pain    
Scalp Pain    
Tingling    
Burning sensation    
Skin redness    
Sleepiness    
Trouble concentrating    
Acute Mood Changes  
(Indicate Direction) 
 
   
Other (specify)    
 
 
Do you think you received active or sham stimulation? ________________ 
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